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This thesis explores various acquisition and contracting issues relevant to the 
proposed United States Marine Corps’ CH-53E Super Stallion helicopter modernization.  
The research includes a preliminary cost and operational effectiveness analysis that 
identifies critical requirements issues and potential acquisition and contracting pitfalls.  
Cost and effectiveness modeling draws on multi-attribute decision analysis and 
simulation software to capture the complexities and uncertainties inherent in this 
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revision of the Department of Defense 5000 Series, contractor logistic support, operating 
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As the fleet of American combat aircraft age, the Department of Defense (DoD) is 
faced with an ever-expanding problem: how to keep aging aircraft technologically 
relevant and capable given tightening fiscal constraints.  Balancing requirements for 
greater capabilities without major procurement funding has become increasingly 
problematic as aviation systems age.  A complete and thorough understanding of 
requirements and their associated costs and benefits is integral in developing innovative 
business approaches to purchase, field, and support systems for tomorrow’s warfighters.  
This research studies and analyzes those linkages. 
The recent renovation of the Defense Acquisition System, promulgated in the 
2001 rewrite of the DoD 5000 Series, provides a unique opportunity for innovative 
business approaches.  Acquisition managers now have greater flexibility to tailor 
procurements; inserting new programs at various stages in the acquisition process can 
dramatically shorten the amount of time required to field new or updated systems.  The 
ability to insert new technologies into our current weapon systems is perhaps the greatest 
force multiplier.   
The challenge now facing acquisition managers of the Marine Corps’ CH-53E 
Super Stallion helicopter is like that of many other aviation systems.  While the CH-53E 
is a relatively new helicopter, current utilization rates will cause significant numbers of 
aircraft to reach their service life limits beginning in 2011 [Ref. 1].  Currently, the Marine 
Corps Aviation Implementation Plan (AIP) calls for the CH-53E to remain in service 
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until approximately 2025 [Ref. 2], when it will likely be replaced by the Joint Common 
Lift (JCL).  Recent studies indicate that the critical role the CH-53E would play in a 
major operation or war cannot be adequately compensated for by the substitution of other 
platforms [Ref. 3].  Thus, the gap in capabilities must be bridged in order to ensure the 
Marine Corps can effectively carry out its future missions. 
Developing an acquisition strategy to provide that bridge to the fleet is the issue 
of this research.  In order develop such an acquisition strategy, and subsequent 
contracting plan; managers must have a thorough understanding of the requirements they 
seek to meet.  A firm grasp on requirements allows decision-makers to make better 
business decisions in matching risks with resources and thus providing the greatest 
benefit to the final system user.  Conducting a cost-effectiveness analysis provides just 
such an in-depth knowledge of the marginal costs and benefits of meeting those 
requirements.  Armed with this knowledge, the acquisition manager can better appraise 
options and cost vs. performance tradeoffs, as well as recognize potential pitfalls earlier 
in the acquisition process. 
The current proposal to ensure the CH-53E meets the Marine Corps’ requirements 
involves a six-point modernization plan that includes a Service Life Extension Program 
(SLEP) as well as other improvements that seek to reduce operations and support costs 
(O&S) and increase capabilities [Ref. 1].  The increased requirements are the result of 
doctrinal concepts that call for the CH-53E to operate over the horizon with heavier loads 
than it is currently capable of transporting.  For example, current Marine Corps doctrinal 
publications, Operational Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS) and Ship to Objective 
Maneuver (STOM), require that the CH-53E transport the seven-ton Medium Tactical 
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Vehicle Replacement (MTVR) over the horizon to provide prime mover support for 
artillery assets [Ref. 4].  Balancing requirements such as these and the costs to meet them 
will be critical, since the initiative is, as of yet, unfunded.  Which leads to the objective of 
this thesis: develop flexible programmatic and contractual responses to meet a range of 
funding possibilities that maximize user satisfaction and utility. 
B. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
This research evaluated the acquisition management issues associated with the 
proposal to “modernize” the United States Marine Corps’ fleet of CH-53E helicopters.  
For the purposes of my research, “modernization” is defined as a means of retarding and 
managing the aging process, as well as expanding the current system capabilities.  A cost-
effectiveness analysis was used to evaluate requirements and develop programmatic and 
contractual options based on possible resource limitations.  Those options, and the insight 
provided by the cost-benefit analysis, form the foundation of tailored acquisition 
strategies and contracting plans that provide an efficient and effective means of meeting 
program objectives.  This research will develop cohesive yet flexible responses, to 
include business and support strategies, which meet the asymmetric challenges of the 
current acquisition environment. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Research Question 
What are the critical program management and contracting issues involved in 
generating an acquisition strategy for the CH-53E helicopter modernization and how can 
a cost-effectiveness analysis enhance the success of that strategy? 
2. Secondary Research Questions 
• What are the essential elements of the CH-53E modernization proposal? 
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• What are the relevant benefits and costs of modernization and how do 
different approaches to modernization affect those benefits and costs?   
• How can the CH-53E modernization program exploit opportunities for 
innovation made available in the 2001 rewrite of the DoD 5000 series? 
• How can the acquisition approach, risk mitigation, business strategy, 
support strategy, and program management portions of the acquisition 
strategy be tailored to insure success of the modernization program? 
• What contracting plan, to include vehicle type and incentive arrangement, 
is best suited for the modernization program? 
• How can study of the CH-53E modernization acquisition strategy and 
contracting plan provide insight to other acquisition managers faced with 
the challenges of aging aircraft? 
D. SCOPE AND ORGANIZATION 
The scope will include: (1) a review of the current status of the Marine Corps CH-
53E fleet and its proposed role in future warfighting doctrine; (2) a review of the critical 
elements of the proposed CH-53E modernization plan; (3) an explanation of the metrics 
and assumptions used to develop the cost-benefit analysis framework; (4) a cost-benefit 
analysis of the proposed CH-53E modernization program; (5) an evaluation of potential 
CH-53E modernization program options based upon various resource constraint levels; 
(6) an analysis of program options in order to develop a tailored, flexible acquisition 
strategy and contracting plan that meets program objectives; and (7) a presentation of a 
comprehensive acquisition strategy and contracting plan.  The thesis will conclude with 
any relevant suggestions or recommendations for similar aviation program initiatives. 
This thesis is organized into five chapters.  These progress logically, providing the 
reader first with relevant background information and then delving into the cost-
effectiveness analysis of the proposed modernization elements.  Discussion and analysis 
then focuses on using that information to develop potential acquisition strategy and 
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contracting options.  Finally, conclusions are drawn and recommendations are made for 
possible application to other aging aviation systems faced with similar challenges. 
Chapter I is the thesis introduction. 
Chapter II presents background information on the CH-53E helicopter, its 
missions, roles and requirements, the program description, and modernization element 
descriptions. 
Chapter III provides the framework and assumptions used in the cost 
effectiveness analysis, explains the decision support software used, describes the cost and 
benefit data used and explains how it was gathered.  Finally, the chapter outlines the 
results of the cost-effectiveness analysis and how the decision support software can be 
updated and modified to support programmatic decisions as the program progresses. 
Chapter IV synthesizes the cost-effectiveness analysis data and conclusions with 
the literature search materials to develop acquisition management and contracting options 
for a flexible and responsive acquisition strategy.  Key elements of this are the business 
and support strategies. 
Chapter V infers possible lessons that can be applied to other aviation systems 
from the body of this work.  Additionally, this chapter presents answers to the research 
questions posed earlier as well as identifying areas for future research opportunities. 
E. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology used in this thesis research consisted of the following steps. 
1. Conducted a comprehensive literature search of books, magazine articles, 
CD-ROM systems, government reports, Internet-based materials and other 
library information resources. 
5 
2. Collected cost-effectiveness analysis data from Logistics Management 
Decision Support System (LMDSS), Naval Air Systems Command 
(NAVAIR) Cost Department, the H-53 Program Office (PMA-261), the 
Center for Naval Analyses (CAN) Marine Aviation Requirements Study 
(MARS), and user functional area experts. 
3. Conducted a cost-effectiveness analysis using Logical Decisions for 
Windows in order to assess and prioritize CH-53E modernization 
requirements.  Measures of costs included dollar expenditure, time to 
develop and field the solution, and any increased infrastructure and 
support requirements.  Benefits included increased 
capabilities/performance, greater efficiency, reduced operations and 
support costs, and greater commonality and interoperability. 
4. Conducted interviews either in person, or by telephone, with acquisition 
professionals and functional area experts at NAVAIR and user commands 
in order to develop a full understanding of program issues and objectives. 
5. Synthesized cost-effectiveness analysis information with fiscal, logistical, 
technical, and business considerations provided from interviews and the 
literature research into an acquisition strategy and contracting plan 
options.  
F. BENEFITS OF RESEARCH 
This thesis is intended to benefit Department of Defense aviation acquisition 
managers trying to cope with the challenges of aging aircraft.  Specifically, studies such 
as this will continue to build the body of knowledge necessary to extrapolate 
management guidance for the modernization of aging aviation systems.  It is the author’s 
intention that the results of this research will also be directly beneficial and informative to 







This chapter provides the requisite background information necessary to 
understand the current status of the CH-53E program and its role within Department of 
Defense (DoD) and Marine aviation.  Additionally, this chapter provides a limited 
technical description of the planned modernization elements to facilitate later discussion 
of potential cost, schedule, logistical, and performance implications. 
B. STATUS AND CONTEXT OF MARINE AVIATION 
Recognizing the potential savings of migrating towards common aircraft to meet 
multi-service requirements, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) Review 
Board tasked the Joint Staff to study the feasibility of establishing a Joint Advanced 
Rotorcraft Technology (JART) Office similar to the Joint Advanced Strike Technology 
(JAST) Office that was the early incarnation of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program.  
Although the JROC agreed that there was value in establishing the JART Office, service 
representatives delayed its initiation because of insufficient funding [Ref. 5].  
Nonetheless, the JROC commissioned a study called the Overarching Rotorcraft 
Commonality Assessment (ORCA), to determine the opportunities for joint rotorcraft and 
when they would likely be required [Ref. 5].  Looking at the heavy lift mission area, 
ORCA found that the Army’s current initiative to upgrade their CH-47 Chinooks to the 
Improved Cargo Helicopter (ICH) or CH-47F would satisfy their requirements until 
approximately 2020 [Ref. 6].  The Marine Corps, realizing that a new aircraft to replace 
the CH-53E was fiscally infeasible, had tentatively planned a Service Life Extension 
Program (SLEP) to prolong its service life until a joint replacement could be fielded.  
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Thus, the 2020-2025 timeframe would be the first opportunity to pursue a joint heavy lift 
replacement, tentatively labeled the Joint Common Lift (JCL). 
In order to fully grasp the challenges facing program managers of aging aircraft, a 
clear picture of the surrounding landscape must be described.  For the CH-53E, that 
entails describing Marine aviation and its role and future within the Department of 
Defense.  The U.S. Marine Corps, like its sister services, is currently coping with the 
effects of an aging fleet of aircraft.  In a recent Marine Corps Gazette article titled 
“Transforming Marine Aviation” [Ref. 7], Deputy Commandant for Aviation, Lieutenant 
General Fred McCorkle, describes a neckdown strategy for the number of systems 
currently fielded and supported by the Marine Corps (See Figure 2.1).  For example, the 
Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) is slated to replace both the AV-8B and F/A-18 fleet within the 
Marine Corps fixed wing community.  Other systems, such as the AH-1W Super Cobra 
and UH-1N Huey, are being upgraded.  Still others are being recapitalized by the 
purchase of new variants of the same aircraft currently fielded.  For example, the KC-
130J Hercules is set to replace the KC-130F/R models.  Most relevant to this research is 
the MV-22 Osprey, the medium lift replacement for the CH-46E Sea Knight and CH-53D 
Sea Stallion, because of the similarity of missions flown by the MV-22 and the CH-53E.  
Currently however, the heavy lift replacement for the CH-53E is yet to be described or 
defined other than it will need to be available for fielding in the 2025 timeframe. 
8 
Figure 2.1 Marine Corps Assault Support Platform Neckdown Strategy [After Ref. 7] 
While the Operational Requirements Document (ORD) for the CH-53E Mid-Life 
Upgrade (which calls for a SLEP) was approved in 1992, the program remained unfunded 
due to competing requirements for Marine aviation dollars.  Given the number of 
programs competing for funding, any initiatives to modernize the CH-53E must plan to 
be fiscally conservative.  Since most of the Marine Corps’ fleet of aircraft will be 
modernized or replaced over the next two decades, to meet projected future requirements, 
securing the funding to support yet another program is a difficult proposition.  The 
budgetary constraints created by already established programs, such as the MV-22 
Osprey and the H-1 Upgrade, pose the greatest hurdle to CH-53E modernization. 
C. THE CH-53E SUPER STALLION 
1. Aircraft Description 
Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation (SAC) of Stratford, Connecticut, a subsidiary of 
United Technologies Inc, manufactures the CH-53E.  When manufactured and sold for 
export the helicopter is referred to as the S-80.  The CH-53E Super Stallion used by the 
Marine Corps has a single main rotor and tail rotor and is powered by three General 
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Electric gas turbine turboshaft engines.  There are seven main rotor blades and four tail 
rotor blades.  The main rotor blades and tail pylon are capable of folding for ease of 
movement and stowage during shipboard operations.   
Fuel is stored internally in the sponsons on either side of the aircraft as well as 
externally in two jettisonable auxiliary fuel tanks.  The aircraft is also capable of aerial 
refueling utilizing a low-speed drogue deployed from a KC-130 refueling aircraft.  The 
primary structure of the aircraft is comprised of lightweight aluminum alloy, steel, and 
titanium.  The skin of the aircraft is fashioned primarily from fiberglass and Kevlar.  
The landing gear is a retractable tricycle-type with two wheels on each landing point.  
The cabin can seat up to 55 troops utilizing seats along the wall as well as centerline 
seats.  Approximately seven standard-sized pallets can be stored inside the cabin and can 
be loaded using a hydraulically actuated ramp and winch. [Ref. 8] 
The aircrew to operate the CH-53E includes, at a minimum, two pilots and a crew 
chief, and typically includes an aerial observer.  The current communication and 
navigation avionics suite remains much as it was when delivered on the original aircraft, 
but is not integrated as a whole.  Recent improvements include a Global Positioning 
System (GPS) receiver, new AN/ARC-210 V/UHF Radios (two), and a second-
generation navigation Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) system.  Performance and flight 
instruments are a combination of analog and pitot-static instruments.  Table 2.1 provides 
aircraft dimensions and performance specifications.  Figure 2.2 is a graphical depiction of 




Table 2.1 CH-53E Super Stallion Aircraft Specifications [After Ref. 8] 
Main rotor diameter 79 ft 0 in Weight empty: 33,228 lb
Main rotor blade chord 2 ft 6 in Internal payload (100 n mile radius): 30,000 lb
Tail rotor diameter 20 ft 0 in External payload (50 n mile radius): 32,000 lb
Length overall: rotors turning 99 ft 0½ in Max external payload: 36,000 lb
rotor and tail pylon folded 60 ft 6 in Max T-O weight
Fuselage: Length 73 ft 4 in internal payload 69,750 lb
Width 8 ft 10 in external payload 73,500 lb
Width overall, rotor and tail pylon folded: 28 ft 5 in
Height: to top of main rotor head 17 ft 5½ in
tail rotor turning 29 ft 5 in Max level speed at S/L 170 kt (196 mph)
rotor and tail pylon folded 18 ft 7 in Cruising speed at S/L 150 kt (173 mph)
Wheel track (c/l of shock-struts) 13 ft 0 in Max rate of climb at S/L 25,000 lb payload 2,500 ft/min
Wheelbase 27 ft 3 in Service ceiling at max continuous power 18,500 ft
Hovering ceiling at max power: IGE 11,540 ft
OGE 9,500 ft
Cabin: Length (rear ramp/door hinge to fwd 
bulkhead) 30 ft 0 in
Self-ferry range, unrefuelled, at optimum 
cruise condition for best range: 1,120 n miles
Max width 7 ft 6 in
Max height 6 ft 6 in
CH-53E Dimensions, External 
CH-53E Dimensions, Internal





Figure 2.2 CH-53E Super Stallion Aircraft [After Ref. 8] 
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2. Program Description and History 
The Program Office supporting the CH-53E (PMA-261) also manages the Navy 
variant MH-53E, the CH-53D (an older twin-engine variant slated for replacement by the 
MV-22 Osprey) and the Executive Helicopter Program which includes a variety of 
specially-equipped helicopters flying in support of the President at Marine Helicopter 
Squadron One (HMX-1).  There are currently nine Marine Corps CH-53E squadrons or 
Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadrons (HMHs); six active duty squadrons, two reserve 
squadrons, and one training squadron.  Two active squadrons and the training squadron 
are based at Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) New River in Jacksonville, North 
Carolina.  The remaining four active duty squadrons are stationed at MCAS Miramar in 
San Diego, California.  One reserve squadron is based at Edwards Air Force Base in 
Lancaster, California the other is located at Willow Grove Joint Reserve Base outside of 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.  Each active duty squadron’s table of equipment (T/E) calls 
for 16 aircraft, the training squadron calls for 15 aircraft, and the reserve squadrons call 
for eight aircraft each [Ref. 9].  Current levels are slightly higher due to lower than 
expected attrition rates. 
H-53E development began in 1973, and the first aircraft was delivered to the 
Marine Corps in 1981.  A majority of the aircraft were funded and delivered through 
1993, with a more sporadic delivery schedule continuing until receiving the final aircraft 
in October 1999.  Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation (SAC) was then in negotiations with the 
Turkish government to purchase eight S-80Es and kept the production line open in 
anticipation of a contract.  However, the Turkish government was unable to secure 
funding for the purchase and the deal fell through, at least for the time being [Ref. 10].  
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Sikorsky is continuing to keep the production line “warm” in hopes of negotiating a sale, 
but the future fate of the production line is uncertain at this point. 
Since the final CH-53E was delivered to the Marine Corps in 1999, the program 
has shifted priorities to sustainment.  Now considered a legacy system, the Program 
Office for the H-53E is only staffed with the resources and personnel to continue with 
minor upgrades.  Approval of a large-scale modernization would require significantly 
more personnel.  Recent and ongoing improvements and initiatives include an Integrated 
Mechanical Diagnostic/ Health Usage Monitoring System (IMD/HUMS) designed to 
detect failures without mandating numerous hourly inspections, thereby reducing 
Operation and Support (O&S) costs, and a Ground Proximity Warning System designed 
to enhance safety and pilot situational awareness through a warning system coupled with 
various sensors.  While these improvements are important, they fail to fully address the 
deteriorating effects time has on the aircraft and represent a relatively small monetary 
investment. 
In order to determine the material condition of the fleet, a Service Life 
Assessment Program was initiated once the average fleet aircraft reached 3,500 hours.  
The results of that assessment indicated that major airframe components would reach 
their fatigue life limits at approximately 6,120 hours.  Data on past and forecasted 
utilization rates indicated an average of 18.9 flight hours per month per aircraft [Ref. 1].  
Based on this data, projections were made to determine when significant numbers of 
aircraft would reach their fatigue life limits and have to be either retired or refurbished 
through a Service Life Extension Program.  The results of those projections are depicted 
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in Figure 2.3, and show that in the year 2011, the number of aircraft requiring 
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Figure 2.3 CH-53E Projected Retirement Schedule [After Ref. 11] 
The realization that the current fleet of CH-53Es would not remain a viable asset 
until they could be replaced by the JCL initially gave rise to the SLEP initiative and later 
the CH-53E modernization plan.  The SLEP seeks only to remanufacture fatigued 
airframe components, while the modernization plan calls for much more substantive 
improvements in both performance and reduced O&S costs.  Both plans initially called 
for the modernization of approximately 140 of the 165 CH-53Es currently in service.  
That number was later reduced to 111 in order to reflect the planned conversion of the 
two reserve squadrons to MV-22s.  However, both plans are unfunded and now must 
compete with other Marine aviation programs to gain funding support.  Although the 
SLEP alone allows for the CH-53E fleet to remain operational, it fails to maintain 
operational parity with other combat aviation platforms, and is therefore seen as a less 
than desirable option by users and program managers.  Initial program estimates 
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indicated that program initiation would have to begin by FY 2004 to meet the “bow 
wave” of aircraft requiring remanufacture or retirement [Ref. 12].  Preliminary cost 
estimates placed the price tag for modernization at approximately $1.5 billion, with a 
target unit/aircraft cost of $21 million [Ref. 13]. 
D. MISSION ROLES AND REQUIREMENTS 
1. Past and Present 
As a heavy lift helicopter the CH-53E’s primary mission in the Marine Corps is 
transporting heavy equipment and supplies during the ship-to-shore movement of an 
amphibious assault and during subsequent operations ashore [Ref. 14].  Secondary 
missions include transporting combat troops (exclusive of the initial assault wave) and 
the tactical recovery of aircraft and equipment.  However, the changing capabilities of 
other Marine Corps assault support aircraft and changing doctrine and employment has 
migrated the CH-53E away from its primary mission of heavy lift. 
Original design specifications called for the CH-53E to be capable of lifting a 16-
ton load at sea level, transporting it 50 nautical miles and returning [Ref. 14].  The 
specification reflects past expectations of the sort of missions a heavy lift helicopter 
would perform in support of an amphibious assault.  While this capability still exists 
today, most operations call for much greater standoff from the objective area, which 
increases the amount of fuel the helicopter must carry and reduces the weight of the load 
it can lift.  Additionally, the temperature and atmospheric conditions assumed in setting 
the CH-53E 16-ton load capability are more forgiving than the prevailing conditions in 
which the helicopter has been used since its introduction to the Fleet Marine Forces 
(FMF).  The cumulative result is that the helicopter appears to be quite capable on paper; 
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however, actual operations often call for the aircraft to perform in missions and/or 
environments that exceed the helicopter’s current capabilities.   
Currently, CH-53Es are deployed as part of an Aviation Combat Element (ACE) 
within a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU).  MEUs are the smallest version of the 
Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF).  MEUs are self-contained task-organized units 
built around an infantry battalion and are embarked on U.S. Navy amphibious ships, 
organized into an Amphibious Ready Group (ARG).  ARGs typically include three air-
capable ships, one of which is a helicopter carrier that serves as a sea-borne base for the 
ACE.  The ACE is built around a Marine Medium Helicopter squadron (HMM, currently 
comprised of CH-46Es that are to be replaced by MV-22s) that is augmented by 
detachments from a Marine Light/Attack Helicopter squadron (HMLA, comprised of 
AH-1Ws & UH-1Ns), a fixed-wing Marine Attack squadron (VMA, comprised of AV-
8Bs), and a HMH squadron (CH-53Es).  A typical ACE detachment of CH-53Es usually 
includes four aircraft. 
While the CH-46E is the primary combat assault troop carrier in the Marine 
Corps, an aging airframe and degraded engine performance often make it difficult or 
impossible for this aircraft to perform its mission.  As a result, the CH-53E has and will 
continue to fill this gap in capability until the MV-22 becomes operational.  Indeed, the 
CH-53E’s capability with regard to lift capacity, speed, range and endurance has made it 
one of the most flexible tools available to MAGTF Commanders.  However, by 
compensating for the performance deficiencies of the CH-46E, the CH-53E infrequently 
performs its primary heavy lift mission.  High density-altitude ambient conditions (where 
engine and aerodynamic performance are degraded) often reduce power margins when 
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lifting heavy loads, leaving little room for error.  Additionally, conspicuous problems 
with the helicopter’s external cargo hook system, resulting in damage to or loss of 
expensive equipment, has undermined aviation leader’s willingness to sanction lifting 
heavy equipment for strictly training purposes.  Yet the trend leading the CH-53E away 
from its primary heavy lift mission appears likely to change.  With the heralded, yet 
delayed arrival of the MV-22, potentially a more capable assault support platform than 
the CH-46E, the CH-53E will likely be relieved of transporting combat assault troops and 
return to its primary duty as the Marine Corps’ heavy lift platform. 
2. The Future 
While the nature and location of conflicts in the future is unclear, it seems likely 
that advances in weapons’ range and accuracy will require U.S. forces to engage their 
enemies or provide support from a safer distance.  Yet as our force becomes more 
technologically advanced it also becomes more reliant on robust logistics support.  
Providing robust logistics support over greater distances will demand even greater 
capabilities from Marine Corps heavy lift assets.  Additionally, the greater speed of 
movement afforded by other assault support aircraft, such as the MV-22, will allow 
Marines to quickly displace further away from their point of origin.  That displacement 
speed must be matched by logistical support speed that can only be provided by 
transporting heavy cargo and equipment externally.  Operational concepts, such as 
Operational Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS), Ship-to-Objective Maneuver (STOM), 
and Sea-Based Logistics (SBL), determine the broad requirements the Marine Corps 
seeks to meet, and each requires the means to provide fast, flexible support over distances 
and in conditions that currently exceed the capabilities of the CH-53E or any Marine 
aviation platform. 
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Recently, the Marine Corps commissioned the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) 
to conduct a study to determine the appropriate size, composition, manning, force 
structure and capabilities for Marine aviation in 2015. Aptly titled the Marine Aviation 
Requirements Study (MARS), the study analyzed three activity level scenarios; 
peacetime deployment rotation, MEU ACE operations, and a Major Theater War (MTW) 
scenario.  The peacetime scenario focused on the manning and force structure required to 
support regular deployments and training, as well as the capability to surge to meet real-
world contingencies.  The MEU ACE portion analyzed capabilities and mix of aircraft 
required to support the range of MEU ACE missions.  Not surprisingly, the report 
concluded, “[t]here will continue to be heavy equipment, which the V-22 can not 
transport, in the MEU….  It makes sense to continue to include some heavy lift transport 
capability (CH-53Es) in the MEU ACE.” [Ref. 3]  The report not only recognized that the 
heavy lift requirement would remain, but that the CH-53E would have to be upgraded or 
improved to meet the requirements of the 2015 MEU ACE. 
A portion of the MTW scenario analyzed the assault support assets necessary to 
support aerial insertion of a Regimental Landing Team (RLT) as part of an amphibious 
assault.  Table 2.2 summarizes the how troops and equipment are transitioned ashore by 
the MV-22s and CH-53Es.  Note the significant number of external lifts required (74%) 
and that 62% of all MV-22 lifts were external loads.  Due to their aerodynamic 
instability, most external loads are flown at 100 knots, so the MV-22’s speed advantage is 
sacrificed when it carries external loads.  Additionally, the study noted that the CH-53E 
moved, on average, two short tons more per lift than an MV-22 in the MTW scenario.  
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With the expanded capabilities of the modernized CH-53E described later, that advantage 
would be increased to more than ten short tons per lift. [Ref. 4] 
Table 2.2 Regimental Landing Team (RLT) Air Insertion Summary [From Ref. 4] 
 
Yet, performance enhancements are not the only requirements for the future.  
Modernizing aging aircraft provides the opportunity to address many problems that could 
not be anticipated when the system was being developed.  Years of experience and data 
can be used to address recurring problems.  Components and subsystems that are top 
maintenance degraders can be redesigned or replaced by more reliable ones.  Indeed, 
improving readiness does improve performance by requiring less time and resources to 
accomplish a given mission.  Reducing O&S costs liberates funds for other uses, such as 
training that also improves readiness rates.  These are just some of the major expected 
benefits of a modernized CH-53E.   
Modernizing an aging platform such as the CH-53E provides other opportunities 
for cost and non-cost benefits.  For example, commonality of components and 
subsystems takes full advantage of economies of scale when making purchases and 
19 
reduces inventories and the warehouse space required to maintain and support a system.  
Greater commonality, like that obtained in the H-1 upgrade program, is forecasted to save 
$897 million (FY96 constant dollars) over the life of the systems [Ref. 5].  Another 
common problem of aging aircraft, like the CH-53E, is avionics obsolescence and the 
accompanying lack of interoperability.  Improving modern aviation systems’ ability to 
communicate and share data with other systems on the battlefield, as well as between 
components within the same airframe, can greatly enhance mission performance and 
safety.  This requirement is somewhat unique however, because the benefits are shared 
across platforms, which attracts new stakeholders to participate in defining modernization 
requirements. 
Identifying and prioritizing requirements in order to allocate sufficient resources 
to meet those requirements is a critical first step towards insuring programmatic success.  
Clearly, as CH-53E program managers contemplate the potential benefits of modernizing 
the system, one of their greatest challenges will be to strike the proper balance between, 
satiating the user’s performance requirements on the one hand and, the bureaucrat’s cost 
savings requirements on the other, without jeopardizing both.  Using cost effectiveness 
analysis as a tool to ascertain how that balance might be struck, will be the focus of the 
subsequent chapters. 
E. MODERNIZATION ELEMENT DESCRIPTIONS 
This section describes the nature of the currently proposed modernization 
elements, the technologies upon which they rely, and some of the potential risks that may 
arise in pursuing them. 
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1. Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) 
As discussed earlier, a SLAP was conducted to determine which areas of the 
airframe were most likely to fail, and when, to determine what portions of the airframe 
would have to be replaced.  The CH-53E SLAP determined that the pylon transition lug 
area had the shortest fatigue life (6,120 flight hours) and would require replacement, as 
would the cabin sections around the main transmission (see Figure 2.4). Improving the 
cabin structure in the vicinity of the main transmission could increase maximum gross 
payload by 5000 pounds and thereby take full advantage of the performance benefits 
provided by the new engines and rotor blades described below.  Other work that will be 
included in the SLEP modernization element is replacing of aircraft wiring that has 
become brittle and unreliable over time. 
SLEP: Manufacture New






















Figure 2.4 CH-53E SLEP: Areas Requiring Airframe Structural Work [After Ref. 11] 
Of all the modernization elements, the SLEP is the most essential; without it the 
Marine Corps’ fleet of CH-53Es will not survive until 2025.  Yet, while it is simple to 
justify undertaking the SLEP, the procedure itself is by no means simple.  After 6,000 
21 
flight hours, tens of thousands of maintenance actions, exposure to disparate climates and 
dissimilar flight operations, significant losses in commonality from the baseline that 
existed when the aircraft came off the production line are inevitable.  This can produce 
problems when trying to apply production line techniques with standardized components.  
Tolerance stack-up, where parts that meet individual design specifications fail to fit into 
the larger system, is a distinct possibility for some SLEP structural components, as are 
planning difficulties arising from the varying configurations of aircraft entering SLEP 
[Ref. 15].  For this reason, establishing and defining the baseline from which SLEP work 
will begin can be somewhat problematic and lead to greater cost and schedule risk.  
However, the technology to perform SLEPs is relatively stable and there is ample 
historical data on other helicopters that have undergone SLEPs.  Despite the frequency 
with which SLEPs are performed, program managers must be cautious not to assume 
away potential sticking points in the SLEP process. 
2. Engines 
Current modernization plans call for replacing the existing General Electric T64-
GE-416/A engines with engines common to other Marine or Navy aircraft, like the Rolls-
Royce Allison AE1107C.  The AE1107C, is used in the MV-22 and KC-130J aircraft.  
This engine can provide a significant increase in performance from the existing engine, 
and provides greater commonality among Marine aviation platforms.  Additionally, as 
Figure 2.5 shows, initial drawings indicate that engine compartments would require 
limited modification to install the AE1107C.  As it is currently configured, the CH-53E is 
engine-limited, which is to say that the engines do not produce enough horsepower to 
meet or exceed the transmission’s limits.  This excess capacity in the transmission is 
exploited with the addition of the AE1107C, making the CH-53E a transmission-limited 
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helicopter, like most others serving the U.S. military.  Due to the strength of the drive 
train, initial projections only foresee the requirement to make interface modifications 
rather than a complete redesign. 
Rolls Royce AE  1107C
Existing Engine
Figure 2.5 Outline of Rolls Royce AE 1107C Engine in CH-53E Cowling [After Ref. 11] 
As depicted in Figure 2.6, the total performance enhancements realized by adding 
the AE1107C are impressive, particularly when combined with the new main rotor blade 
that will be described later.  Despite the quantum leap in performance, adoption of the 
AE1107C does not come without risk.  Notably, the engine is a new design with a short 
performance history, although initial data demonstrates reliable performance.  
Additionally, while the integration prospects appear positive, further testing and 
evaluation could unearth unforeseen problems because the engine generates greater 
horsepower.  While not all-inclusive, these are just some of the potential programmatic 
risks faced by managers and decision-makers considering the adoption of the AE1107C 
as the new engine for a modernized CH-53E. 
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Figure 2.6 CH-53E Performance Capabilities (New Engines and Blades) [After Ref. 11] 
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The final piece of the engine modernization element involves a contractor 
logistics support (CLS) arrangement for maintenance of the engine above the 
organizational level.  In the case of the Rolls-Royce AE1107C, the trademark, Power-by-
the-Hour, recognizes the specific CLS arrangement.  Under this arrangement, which is 
currently being used by the V-22 Program, engines are purchased by the Marine Corps 
from Rolls Royce under one agreement.  Under a separate agreement, the Marine Corps 
pays for intermediate and depot level engine support based on usage.  Usage is measured 
by the post-flight downloading of engine performance information through a Full 
Authority Digital Electronic Control (FADEC) System which records engine 
performance parameters.  These data are then converted into a standard unit of measure 
called an Equivalent Specification Mission Hour (ESMH) that serves as the basis for 
support charges.  Since most accounting for flight operations is tied to the flight hour, an 
estimate of the ratio of ESMH to flight hour must be made in order to predict the cost of 
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the arrangement.  Because the CH-53E has migrated away from its initial role of heavy 
lift, but is likely to return to that mission in the future, using historical data on engine 
usage may not accurately reflect future usage, leading to both erroneous estimates of the 
ESMH to flight hour ratio and potentially serious cost overruns. [Ref. 16] 
3. Improved Main Rotor Blade 
Based on a blade for Sikorsky’s S-92 Helibus helicopter, the proposed blade is an 
all-composite, swept anhedral tip design (See Figure 2.7) that would provide an 
additional 4000-6000 pounds of lift and allow for faster airspeeds before the onset of 
blade stall [Ref. 11].  The improved blade also addresses maintenance problems with the 
current blades that utilize a pressurized honeycomb structure.  Since the basic design of 
the blade is proven, there is little technical risk involved in modifying it to support the 
CH-53E.  However, it is unclear how the composite materials would endure exposure to 
the austere environments and harsh conditions in which the Marine Corps routinely 
operates (i.e., shipboard and desert operations).  Failure to address these issues could lead 
to greater than expected O&S costs due to more frequent blade repairs and replacements. 
 
Figure 2.7 S-92 Rotor Blade with Swept Anhedral Tip [After Ref. 11] 
4. Elastomeric Rotor Head 
The rotor head design, like the main rotor blade, is based on S-92 as well as CH-
53D design and technology.  The new rotor head is fashioned entirely from titanium; uses 
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elastomeric pitch, flap, and lag bearings; utilizes a dry housing design; and incorporates 
an electric blade fold system (see Figure 2.8).  The current design utilizes standard 
bearings and a hydraulic damper or “wet” head that has been very maintenance-intensive.   
The blade fold system on the current rotor head is hydraulic as well and has not been as 
reliable as was originally expected. 
 
Figure 2.8 CH-53E Seven Bladed Elastomeric Rotor Head [After Ref. 11] 
This modernization element is very attractive because it targets consistent 
maintenance degraders and therefore has the greatest potential for O&S cost savings.  
Additionally, both the design and technology have been proven in similar applications, 
decreasing the likelihood of early design or production problems.  However, the loads 
that will be placed on the modernized CH-53E rotor head are significantly higher than 
those applied to either the S-92 or CH-53D rotor heads and could produce unforeseen 
hazards. 
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5. Common Cockpit 
The exact design and makeup of the common cockpit has yet to be defined, but 
current propositions seek to maximize commonality with other Marine aviation assault 
support systems (MV-22 or UH-1Y).  Sikorsky has proposed the “international” glass 
cockpit used in the S-80E that incorporates much of the latest avionics functionality, such 
as moving map displays.  Regardless of the design finally selected, improvements should 
address the problems of avionics obsolescence, data exchange, commonality, and 
interoperability.  Another goal is to improve pilot field of view by reducing the size of the 
center console in a manner similar to the S-92 console depicted in Figure 2.9. 
 
Figure 2.9 Common Cockpit (S-92 shown here) [After Ref. 17] 
Because the nature and design of the common cockpit remains fluid, it is still 
difficult to ascertain all the potential risks that may arise.  Clearly, as with any electronic 
endeavor, one of the greatest risks is in the area of software integration.  Utilizing a group 
of components that has been used in other platforms may alleviate some of the 
uncertainty with respect to both cost and schedule. 
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6. Improved Cargo Hook System 
The improved cargo hook system element seeks to address two primary issues, 
the first being the lack of reliability and maintainability in the current system.  The 
second is to ensure that the new system is capable of handling the heavier and larger 
loads made possible by engine and blade improvements.  Like the common cockpit 
modernization element, the details of this modernization element are yet to be defined. 
The current system is an electromechanical system that allows for single or dual-
point attachment of loads.  Reliability problems have plagued both the single and dual-
point systems and apprehension about their ability to function properly has been 
exacerbated by a few incidents where valuable ground equipment was damaged or 
destroyed.  Restoring confidence among users of the ground equipment that is going be 
transported by the helicopter, as well as avoiding costly mishaps, is one of the 
overarching goals of this modernization element. 
Because the particulars of this element are yet to be determined, it is difficult to 
accurately assess what the potential technical risks may be.  However, because the 
current solution is unsatisfactory and there is no apparent ready solution from another 
platform, original design work will have to be done to produce a workable solution, 
thereby increasing the risks relative to the other elements that build upon existing 
solutions. 
7. Summary and Other Potential Elements 
Survivability improvements, such as armor, ballistic vulnerability improvements, 
an On Board Inert Gas System (OBIGS), and traditional Aircraft Survivability Equipment 
(ASE) have all received attention as possible additions to the modernization plan for the 
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CH-53E.  While it is possible that they and/or others may be added at a later time, for the 
purposes of this study, the elements were limited to the first six described.   
The use of commercial and/or readily available technologies was emphasized in 
each modernization element, when possible, to mitigate cost, schedule, and technical 
risks.  This is intended to keep the cost of the entire project low; otherwise it becomes 
politically untenable due to the number of other valid Marine aviation requirements vying 
for limited funding.  Despite the individual risks involved with each modernization 
element, integration is critical, as is maintaining the production schedule, because the 
CH-53E fleet will have to remain operational as the aircraft are modernized.  Conversely, 
the synergistic rewards of the modernization elements create a more capable complete 
platform.  Another technical issue somewhat unique to helicopters is the potential adverse 
effects of vibrations and their interaction or interference with the dynamic systems and 
components within the helicopter.  Like many technical risks, these are difficult to predict 
and are often concealed until actual prototype testing begins.  Due to the possibility of 
this sort of “hidden” problem, it is important to minimize other sorts of technical risks by 
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This chapter describes how the cost effectiveness analysis model was developed 
and constructed.  The decision support software used to support model formulation and 
analysis is also described and explained.  Additionally, information is provided on how 
cost and effectiveness measures were obtained, aggregated and used in the model.  Due to 
the early stages of the CH-53E modernization effort, not all of the desired cost or 
effectiveness data were available, primarily because of technical and practical 
uncertainties.  As a result, data shortfalls are discussed along with what sort of data 
would enhance the applicability and robustness of the model.  Finally, the analysis 
portion evaluates the potential implications of using the cost effectiveness model as well 
as how the model might be improved and used by acquisition managers.     
B. ALTERNATIVES AND ANALYSIS STRUCTURE  
1. Modernization Configuration Alternatives 
Ten alternative modernization configurations were formulated using the six 
elements described in the preceding chapter.  While these ten alternatives are not meant 
to describe every potential combination of elements, they do provide a spectrum of 
capabilities and costs.  Additionally, combinations were chosen that, in the author’s 
opinion, were logically consistent with user needs, potential fiscal constraints and 
manufacturing prudence.  The model is constructed such that the addition of future 
combinations or elements will not require an exorbitant amount of effort, although it will 
require regeneration and insertion of the applicable cost and effectiveness data.  Table 3.1 
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provides a listing of the abbreviations for modernization elements and the ten alternative 
configurations. 
Table 3.1 CH-53E Modernization Element Abbreviations and Configuration Alternatives 
Modernization Element Abbreviations 
Abbr. Element Abbr. Element 
S SLEP R ELASTOMERIC ROTOR HEAD 
E ENGINES H IMPROVED CARGO HOOK SYSTEM 
B IMPROVED MAIN ROTOR BLADES C COMMON COCKPIT 
Modernization Configuration Alternatives 
1 S (SLEP ONLY) 









To date, program office efforts to gain funding for program initiation have 
focused on developing a cost estimate for all modernization elements to secure funding 
beginning in fiscal year 2004 (FY04).  That initial cost estimate was used as a basis for 
determining configuration development and production costs.  Because the estimate 
reflects a complete CH-53E modernization, some element costs were inseparable and 
therefore were burdened on all configurations.  The exact nature of the cost allocation 
will be discussed in the measures of costs and effectiveness section of this chapter.   
Which elements are of primary concern is still a matter of some debate and is a 
question this study hopes to illuminate.  It is already recognized that the alternatives 
chosen do not reflect all the possible options facing acquisition managers.  Rather, the 
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intent was to create a template that can support manager decision analysis.  Therefore, 
modernization configurations used in this study should be viewed as representative of the 
range of options that may be evaluated in the future.    
2. Decision Support Software and Analysis Structure 
As mentioned earlier, a software package called Logical Decisions for 
Windows (LDW) was used to aid in the organization and analysis of the data collected.  
LDW converts the collected data into measurements of utility to determine the most 
desirable alternative.  The user can determine the range of utility scores; for this study the 
range was from zero to one, with one having the greatest utility and zero having the least.  
LDW uses a four-step process in its decision analysis; structure the problem, describe the 
alternatives, assess preferences, and rank alternatives [Ref. 18]. The second step in the 
process, describing alternatives, was accomplished in the previous section.   
Structuring the problem involves identifying alternatives, goals and measures.  
For every alternative, each goal or sub-goal has a computed utility, determined by 
aggregating the measure levels that comprise that goal.  Goals are concerns that each 
alternative must seek to answer.  Sub-goals are aggregated into goals until a final utility is 
computed for the overall goal, which is then used to rank the alternatives.  Measures are 
used to describe each alternative.  They are numerical or categorical variables that 
characterize various aspects of a given alternative and either contribute to or detract from 
an alternative meeting a given goal.   
Ideally, measures should be objective measurements that can be quantified with a 
degree of certainty, such as the tactical range of the CH-53E.  LDW can also perform 
Monte Carlo simulations to replicate the probabilistic distribution of a range of measure 
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levels.  However, some of the requisite objective data were not available to determine an 
accurate probabilistic distribution for all the measures used.  Therefore, subjective data 
derived from expert assessments was used as a proxy for the objective data and scored 
using categorical descriptors.   
Once identified, goals and measures are then structured into a hierarchy to 
organize the decision problem.  Figure 3.1 graphically depicts the goals hierarchy created 
for CH-53E modernization decision analysis.  All measures (except O&S Costs) were 
removed to limit the size of the figure.  A complete goal / measure hierarchy is provided 
in Appendix A. 
Max Msn Performance (Objective)
Utility










Figure 3.1 CH-53 Modernization Goal Hierarchy 
The overarching goal in this case is to choose the best modernization 
configuration.  Sub-goals include maximizing mission performance (objective and 
subjective) and minimizing Total Ownership Costs (TOC), which fall under the 
overarching goal and contribute to overall utility.  A sub-goal of minimizing TOC is 
minimizing procurement costs.  Table 3.2 shows all remaining measures and their 
associated goals not depicted in Figure 3.1.  A detailed description of the measures 
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chosen and how data were collected and incorporated into the model will be provided in 
the next section of this chapter. 
Table 3.2 Remaining Measures and Associated Goals 
GOAL Max Msn Perf. (Obj.) Max Msn Perf. (Subj.) Min. Procurment Costs
Payload 3H Scenario Assault METL APN Account Costs 
Range 3H Scenario Raid METL RDT&E Account 
Costs 
 TRAP METL  
 MEDEVAC METL  
 Spec. Ops. METL  
 NEO METL  







 Night/IMC METL  
Goals were chosen based upon their likely influence on decision-makers and 
measurability.  Mission performance was divided into an objective and subjective goal to 
isolate the different types of measures.   Objective measures are numeric variables of 
estimated performance capability.  Subjective performance measures are based upon the 
CH-53E’s Mission Essential Task List (METL) described in Training and Readiness 
Volume I (T&R Vol. I) [Ref. 19].  Each METL outlines the type of missions a fleet CH-
53E squadron must be prepared and capable to execute.  It reflects most accurately the 
way a CH-53E aircraft will be employed in the future.  Procurement cost measures reflect 
estimated expenditures from the RDT&EN (Research, Development, Test and 
Evaluation, Navy) and APN (Aircraft Procurement, Navy) accounts for program 
development and execution through production.   
Should CH-53E modernization become a funded program, continued testing and 
research will undoubtedly yield more data to expand the number of goals used in the 
analysis.  Additional data will also more accurately predict measure levels, thereby 
removing some subjectivity and uncertainty that exists in this preliminary model.  By 
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continuing to refine goals and measure data, this model can continue to be used as the 
program progresses as a decision aid for management personnel.  
The third and most critical step in the LDW decision process is assessing 
preferences, which involves converting measures levels to common measures of utility 
and assigning weights for each sub-goal and measure.  The assessment step creates a 
preference set for a given decision-maker.  LDW allows for the creation of more than one 
preference set to analyze how the desires of various decision-makers will affect the 
recommended outcome.  Because several individuals will likely be involved in any 
programmatic decisions, a composite preference set of users (pilots) and program 
management personnel was created and used for this analysis.  Experienced pilots were 
asked to provide a numerical weight characterizing the importance of each METL 
measure evaluated, such that they sum to one.  Other weights were determined by 
interviews with program managers based on their individual priorities and the perceived 
priorities of their superiors.  As new personnel become involved in the program or 
priorities shift, new assessments can be used to generate new preference sets that reflect 
changing concerns; old preference sets can also be modified accordingly. 
LDW converts measure levels to measures of utility using a Single-measure 
Utility Function (SUF) [Ref. 18].  LDW initially assumes a linear SUF between utility 
and a given measure across the user specified range.  However, non-linear SUFs or any 
break points in the measure range can be incorporated into LDW as well.  With respect to 
cost, a linear SUF characterizes a risk neutral decision-maker.  The ability to capture 
decision-maker risk aversion or risk seeking behavior and their valuation of each measure 
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is a powerful tool that provides insight into which modernization elements should be the 
program’s focus.   
Assessing weights provides the scaling constants necessary to aggregate measure 
levels and sub-goals and determine a final ranking of alternatives.  LDW uses Multi-
measure Utility Functions (MUFs) to aggregate measure level SUFs and sub-goal MUFs 
[Ref. 18].  Each goal and sub-goal has a MUF.  Weights must be assessed for every goal 
and measure beneath the overall goal.  Weights can be assessed in a number of ways in 
LDW.  The primary method used in this analysis was the “smarter method,” which 
involves ranking the sub-goals and measures under a particular goal against one another.  
From this information LDW calculates a percentage weight for each sub-goal and/or 
measure such that they sum to one.  These percentage weights are then displayed to the 
user to confirm that they accurately portray their preferences.  As alluded to earlier, the 
other method used was the “direct assessment” method where experienced pilots were 
asked to assign each METL measure a numeric percentage weight that was then averaged 
and entered into LDW.  Program management personnel also used the “direct 
assessment” method to assign weight to some sub-goals and measures. 
The fourth and final step in the LDW process is ranking the alternatives.  This 
process is made fairly simple, it merely involves instructing the program to compute 
overall utilities and rank each of the alternatives based on the measure and assessment 
data provided.  In addition to ranking the alternatives, LDW provides some powerful 
analysis tools that allow the user to manipulate parts of the problem and see what affects 
this has on the final ranking of alternatives.  These sensitivity tools will be discussed in 
detail in the analysis section of this chapter.  Additionally, LDW allows the user to 
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evaluate how any uncertainties and individual measure levels affected each alternative’s 
overall utility score.  
While the overall model appears somewhat simplistic, it is important to remember 
that the structure facilitates analysis with the data currently available.  Given the limited 
data, the model structure captures only a portion of the complexity of the CH-53E 
modernization problem.  Yet, as was the intent, it does provide a template that can be 
expanded in scope and complexity to accommodate more information as it becomes 
available to program managers. 
C. MEASURES OF COST AND EFFECTIVENESS 
1. Procurement Cost Measures 
To date, a majority of the cost estimation effort on the part of the program office 
has focused on generating an accurate estimate of procurement costs.  Procurement costs 
include the development and production costs for a fleet of 111 modernized Marine 
Corps’ CH-53Es.  All cost estimate measures were adjusted for inflation and calculated in 
millions of fiscal year 2000 dollars (FY00$M).  Probabilistic distributions for each 
modernization configuration alternative were generated using Crystal Ball simulation 
software based on cost estimate data collected from the program office.  Distributions 
were calculated separately for the development effort (funded from the RDT&EN 
account) and the production effort (funded from the APN account) for each alternative.  
These distributions were then entered into LDW, which used 1000 Monte Carlo 
simulation trials to determine the measure levels used in the final decision analysis.  The 
H-53 Program Manager determined weights for the “Minimize Procurement Cost” sub-
goal and the “APN Cost” and “RDT&E Cost” measures.  Because risk behavior 
regarding cost is often driven by political realities that are not easily predicted or 
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modeled, the linear risk neutral relationship between procurement costs and utility was 
used in this analysis.  Specific weights for the cost measures will be discussed in the 
analysis section of this chapter.   
The ground rules and assumptions used by the program office cost estimators in 
developing the Rough Order of Magnitude (ROM) estimate are provided below.   
• The CH-53E Product Improvement/SLEP will be Sole-Source to 
Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation in Stratford, CT.  All non-recurring 
engineering and testing as well as all recurring production and kit 
installations will be done at the facilities in Stratford. 
• The program will include an Engine upgrade, installation of a 
Common Cockpit, improved M/R Blades, Elastomeric M/R Head, 
improved Cargo Handling System, and the original SLEP kits with 
improvements and design changes to increase the aircraft gross 
weight.  The original SLEP included a T/R Driveshaft Coupling 
modification, redesign and installation of a new Spec-55 Wiring 
Harness, replacement of the Center Fuselage Cabin (Sta. 162 to 
Sta. 522), and replacement of the Tail Pylon.  The SLEP 
improvements include redesigned Main Gearbox Support 
Structure, and redesigned Tail Pylon. 
• This estimate is a “High Order ROM” and will include the 
Research and Development (R&D) (non-recurring and recurring) 
as well as the Production costs (non-recurring and recurring).  It 
does not include an estimate of Operations and Support (O&S) 
costs. 
• System Test and Evaluation (DT/OT) will include four (4) test 
units (Flight Test Articles), which will be full-up units. 
• The MH-53E is not included in this analysis/estimate. 
• The H-1 Upgrade program will be used as an analogous 
comparison for R&D/ST&E schedule as well as non-recurring 
design and integration for the Elastomeric M/R Head, improved 
M/R Blades, Common Cockpit, and Software. 
• The V-22 will be used as an analogous comparison for the Engine 
upgrade, engine cost and integration. 
• This estimate will be done in Then Year (TY) and FY00$ dollars. 
[Ref. 20] 
39 
In order to account for both recurring and non-recurring costs, a high and low 
figure was calculated for each fiscal year in which RDT&EN and APN funds were to be 
expended.  Based on these high and low figures, a uniform distribution was created for 
each fiscal year and account.  These distributions were then summed to determine a total 
cost for each account and alternative.  5000 simulation trials were run using Crystal Ball 
to forecast total account cost distributions for entry into LDW.  The resulting total 
RDT&EN and APN account costs were determined to be normally distributed and were 
entered into LDW as such.  Forecast distributions and statistics as well as the uniform 
distribution assumptions can be found in Appendix C.  Because the program office ROM 
estimate is for a complete modernization (all six elements), some cost elements could not 
be broken out.  Cost elements that couldn’t be separated and attributed to a specific 
modernization element will be identified in the development and production cost measure 
analysis discussion below. 
Development cost elements include the design and engineering work for each of 
the modernization elements, Flight Test Articles (FTAs), Special Tooling/Special Test 
Equipment (ST/STE), System Test & Evaluation (ST&E), Systems Engineering/Program 
Management (SE/PM), Engineering Change Orders (ECOs), and Integrated Logistics 
Support/Spares/Government Support Costs.  Independent design and engineering 
estimates were made for each of the modernization elements with the exception of the 
Improved Cargo Hook System, which was included in the SLEP cost estimate.  
Therefore, a percentage of the original SLEP cost was used to approximate and separate 
the cost of the hook system so that cost estimates for configurations that included the 
SLEP but not the hook system would be more accurate.  
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FTA costs include material and labor for the manufacture of modernization 
element kits as well as the Induction, Disassembly, Inspection, Assembly and Test 
(IDIA&T) required integrate and manufacture the FTAs themselves.  ST/STE, ST&E and 
ILS/Spares/Government Support Costs were determined by an expert estimate and were 
not adjusted for each of the alternatives.  SE/PM and ECO costs were calculated by 
applying rates to the sum of the other cost elements with the exception of the 
ILS/Spares/Government Support Costs. 
Production costs comprise the bulk of the procurement costs and include the labor 
and materials to fabricate the modernization kits for each of the elements, IDIA&T, 
ST/STE, ST&E, ECOs and ILS/Spares/Govt. Support costs.  IDIA&T costs could not be 
separated into individual cost elements and therefore the same costs were allocated to all 
alternatives.  All other production cost elements were allocated in the same manner as in 
the development effort.    
Because some costs could not be linked to each modernization alternative, 
estimates for configurations with fewer modernization elements are likely inflated over 
what would be expected.  This weakens the cost distinction between some of the 
alternative configurations, yet doesn’t render the model valueless.  Additionally, ongoing 
cost estimating efforts, that use analogous data from other programs such as the Army’s 
CH-47F Improved Cargo Helicopter (ICH) Program, should yield more accurate cost 
estimates.  However, these data were not available at the time of this writing.  
Additionally, the sole-source assumption and the lack of any competition inflates the 
project cost and fails to capture the effects of incorporating competition into the 
procurement.  
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2. Operating and Support Cost Measures 
Attempting to capture the potential operating and support cost impact of various 
modernization configurations proved to be much more difficult than anticipated.  
Nonetheless, research did yield some relevant insights that modernization acquisition 
managers should bear in mind as they seek to develop a program to modernize the CH-
53E.  Additionally, investigating the operating and support cost issues demonstrated how 
the challenges facing program managers for major weapons systems are not easily 
isolated and overcome.  This section will highlight some of those difficulties as well as 
document the approach taken to collect operating and support cost data and the rationale 
behind the measures actually used in LDW. 
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Before beginning to collect data, it was important to define the relevant costs for 
this study.  In particular, what are the costs that can realistically be affected by a 
modernization effort and which costs seem to be most affected by aircraft aging?  Not 
surprisingly, focusing on these costs excludes a great deal of the personnel and 
infrastructure costs that typically remain unchanged when a weapon system is 
modernized.  Nonetheless, actually separating and isolating these costs for measurement 
and analysis is not as simple as it might appear.  One part of the difficulty and confusion 
can be attributed to the budgetary language used to describe the costs of running the 
Department of Defense (DoD).  Conceptually, O&S costs include all the costs associated 
with the day-to-day functioning of the military and are funded from a variety of 
budgetary accounts.  Most of the funding for the daily operations of the Navy and Marine 
Corps is paid out of the Operations and Maintenance, Navy (O&MN) account.  This does 
not include funding to pay uniformed personnel, which is paid out of the Military 
Personnel, Navy (MPN) account or some procurement expenditures that directly support 
operations that are funded out of the APN account.  However, not all of the expenditures 
from MPN or APN are directly attributable to a given weapon system.  Those costs that 
can be linked directly to a weapon system are the focus of this analysis because most 
personnel and infrastructure costs will remain unchanged under the currently proposed 
modernization plan.  The Venn diagram below depicts the interrelation between some of 
these costs. 
 
Figure 3.2 Operating and Support Cost Venn Diagram [After Ref. 21] 
As Figure 3.2 suggests, because the costs to support a given weapon system draw 
from a variety of budgetary accounts, “cost growth” may arise in one or more of the 
accounts mentioned earlier.  For this reason, examining macro-level expenditures in 
budgetary accounts fails to capture cost growth problems with individual programs.  
Additionally, because the Armed Forces are each budgeted a finite dollar amount for each 
account (O&MN, MPN, APN, etc.), rising maintenance costs necessitate reductions in 
other areas to meet the total expenditure limits.  While this seems intuitive, a recent 
Congressional Budget Office study reported, “the fact that aging equipment does not 
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appear to be driving total O&M spending does not rule out the possibility that the costs of 
operating and maintaining equipment increase with the age of that equipment (italics 
added).” [Ref. 22]  This indicates that some officials were under the impression that the 
rising costs of aging systems were actually forcing the services to exceed or increase their 
O&M budget limits.  
To facilitate the comparison and analysis of O&S costs across platforms, the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG) has 
published an O&S cost element structure (See Figure 3.3 below).  This structure provides 
a framework to capture the Total Ownership Costs associated with a given weapon 
system.  The costs that typically receive the greatest attention are those elements that 
“buy” flight hours to accomplish naval aviation missions and training because these 
account for the greatest percentage of total ownership costs (other than personnel) and 
tend to be most responsive to system modernization efforts.  These cost elements are 
funded under the Flying Hour Program (FHP) that is drawn from the O&MN account.   
    O&S COST ELEMENT STRUCTURE  
OSD CAIG OPERATING AND SUPPORT COST ESTIMATING GUIDE   
1.0  MISSION PERSONNEL  
1.1  OPERATIONS  
1.2  MAINTENANCE  
1.3  OTHER MISSION PERSONNEL 
2.0  UNIT  -  LEVEL CONSUMPTION 
2.1  POL/ENERGY CONSUMPTION 
2.2  CONSUMABLE MATERIAL/REPAIR PARTS 
2.3  DEPOT  -  LEVEL REPARABLES 
2.4  TRAINING MUNITIONS /  
EXPENDABLE STORES 
2.5  OTHER  
3.0  INTERMEDIATE MAINTENANCE 
3.1  MAINTENANCE  
3. 2  CONSUMABLE MATERIAL / REPAIR PARTS 
3.3  OTHER  
4.0  DEPOT MAINTENANCE  
4.1  OVERHAUL / REWORK   
4.2  OTHER  
5.0  CONTRACTOR SUPPORT 
5.1 INTERIM CONTRACTOR SUPPORT 
5.2 CONTRACTOR LOGISTICS SUPPORT 
5.3 OTHER 
6.0  SUSTAINING SUPPORT 
6.1 SUPPORT EQUIPMENT REPLACEMENT  
6.2 MODIFICATION KIT  
PROCUREMENT / INSTALL 
6.3 OTHER RECURRING INVESTMENT 
6.4 SUSTAINING ENGINEERING SUPPORT  
6.5 SOFTWARE MAINTENANCE SUPPORT  
6.6 SIMULATOR OPERATIONS 
6.7 OTHER 
7.0 INDIRECT SUPPORT 
7.1 PERSONNEL SUPPORT 
7.2 INSTALLATION SUPPORT 
Grey Elements are  
Flying Hour Program 
 
 Figure 3.3 CAIG O&S Cost Element Structure [After Ref. 23] 
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In the aggregate, FHP costs accounted for approximately 38% of the nine billion 
dollars expended in fiscal year 1999 to operate and support naval aviation [Ref. 21].  The 
most recent O&S cost study of the CH-53E found a similar distribution of costs.  Table 
3.3 shows the percentage distribution of O&S costs according to the CAIG cost element 
structure.  Notice that element 2.3 Depot Level Repairables accounted for the greatest 
percentage of O&S costs. 
Table 3.3 CH-53E O&S Cost Driver Percentages [After Ref. 24] 
CH-53E 
CES FY2000   AIR 4.2.5 TOC/O&S Cost Element Structure Cost Driver Percentages & $/Flight Hour 




1.0 MISSION PERSONNEL 28.2% 4,058
1.1    OPERATIONS 6.1% 880
1.2    MAINTENANCE 16.9% 2,428
1.3    OTHER MISSION PERSONNEL 5.2% 751
2.0 UNIT-LEVEL CONSUMPTION 23.7% 3,402
2.1    POL/ENERGY CONSUMPTION 1.7% 251
2.2    CONSUMABLE MATERIAL/REPAIR PARTS 4.5% 646
2.3    DEPOT LEVEL REPAIRABLES 17.2% 2,471
2.4    TRAINING MUNITIONS/EXPENDABLE STORES 0.0% 0
2.5    OTHER 0.2% 34
3.0 INTERMEDIATE MAINTENANCE 8.1% 1,163
3.1    MAINTENANCE 4.4% 634
3.2    CONSUMABLE MATERIAL/REPAIR PARTS 3.7% 529
3.3    OTHER 0.0% 0
4.0 DEPOT 13.6% 1,952
4.1    OVERHAUL / REWORK 9.2% 1,325
4.2    ENGINE REPAIR 2.2% 315
4.3    OTHER 2.2% 312
5.0 CONTRACTOR SUPPORT 0.0% 0
5.1   INTERIM CONTRACTOR SUPPORT 0.0% 0
5.2    CONTRACTOR LOGISTICS SUPPORT 0.0% 0
5.3    OTHER 0.0% 0
6.0 SUSTAINING SUPPORT 9.2% 1,328
6.1    SUPPORT EQUIPMENT REPLACEMENT 0.1% 7
6.2    MOD KIT PROCUREMENT / INSTALLATION 8.3% 1,187
6.3    OTHER RECURRING INVESTMENT 0.0% 0
6.4    SUSTAINING ENGINEERING SUPPORT 0.6% 86
6.5    SOFTWARE MAINTENANCE SUPPORT 0.1% 18
6.6    SIMULATOR OPERATIONS 0.0% 6
6.7    OTHER 0.2% 24
7.0 INDIRECT SUPPORT 17.2% 2,475
7.1    PERSONNEL SUPPORT 10.5% 1,504
7.2    INSTALLATION SUPPORT 6.8% 971
Total 100.0% $14,378
Several databases are used to collect data and develop these cost percentages.  FY 
2000 costs reflect averages of data collected between 1996 and 1998.  According to the 
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FY2000 CH-53E Program Operating and Support Cost Analysis published by NAVAIR, 
Aviation Depot Level Repairables (AVDLRs) accounted for $2,471/flight hour of the 
total O&S cost of $14,378/flight hour [Ref. 24].  Yet, because these data are based upon 
averages from earlier years, then inflated to FY00$, it fails to capture more recent trends, 
which would alert decision-makers of a potential problem.  While it seems clear that 
attacking AVDLR cost growth represents the “low hanging fruit” in the fight to reduce 
O&S costs for an aging system, identifying a course of action to pluck the “low hanging 
fruit” can be confounded by accounting practices that mask cost trends.  For example, a 
Cost Recovery Rate (CRR) is applied to the “price” charged operational units for their 
AVDLRs.  This rate is adjusted annually to balance the Navy Working Capital Fund 
(NWCF), accounting for changes in supply system and repair depot operations costs, and 
does not follow any predictable trends.  Figure 3.4 below depicts the relationship between 
total AVDLR cost per flight hour and the CRR deflated AVDLR cost per flight hour.  
The CRR rate applied to CH-53E AVDLR costs is also depicted. 









































Figure 3.4 FY93-FY00 CH-53E AVDLR & CRR Costs [After Ref. 25 & 26] 
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Clearly AVDLR costs are rising; nonetheless this chart demonstrates that there 
are significant costs associated with AVDLRs that are beyond the control of the program 
office.  For this reason, acquisition managers should realize the limited impact 
modernization efforts might have on aging aircraft.  This is not to say that attempts to 
reduce O&S costs through modernization are fruitless, only that the magnitude and 
complexity of the costs allocated to AVDLR costs might negate or at least dampen the 
potential reductions in O&S costs.   
Armed with a knowledge of how O&S costs, and in particular AVDLR costs, are 
allocated to a program, attention was then focused on discovering what the potential O&S 
cost impacts of the proposed modernization elements might be.  To obtain this level of 
visibility, AVDLR cost information was obtained for components affected by the 
proposed modernization.  Costs were obtained by querying the Logistics Management 
Decision Support System (LMDSS).  LMDSS was developed to facilitate continuous 
action by the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) and Naval Inventory Control 
Point (NAVICP) Philadelphia logistics management teams to measurably reduce the life 
cycle support costs of aviation systems while protecting readiness [Ref. 27].  The 
LMDSS application is capable of retrieving a variety of data for logistics managers.  One 
function, called “Candidate Identification,” allows the user to query the database and 
construct reliability, supportability, and cost (R/S/C) summary matrices for particular 
airframes, sub-assemblies, components, or individual parts.  The granularity visible in the 
matrix is determined by the number of digits in the Work Unit Codes (WUC) specified 
for the item/system being queried.  WUC detail ranges from two-digits, which 
corresponds to major subsystems of the aircraft, to seven-digits that represent individual 
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piece-parts.  The matrix provides summary AVDLR, Aviation Fleet Maintenance (AFM) 
and Direct Maintenance Man Hour Dollars (DMMH$) data as well as total support costs.  
LMDSS calculates total support costs by summing the AVDLR, AFM and DMMH$ cost 
categories (See Appendix D). 
  The Sikorsky operating and support cost baselines presented below were based 
on data obtained from LMDSS.  Sikorsky presented these data to Marine aviation leaders 
in response to their request for information on projected options and the potential cost 
impacts of modernization.  Due to proprietary restrictions, the author was not allowed 
access to the source data used to calculate the O&S cost savings.  Without this 
information it would be impossible to critically evaluate the validity of the Sikorsky 
projections.  It is important to note that the “O&S Savings for Returning Parts” represents 
a one-time credit from the supply system for the turn-in of Ready For Issue (RFI) 
components that would be replaced under the proposed modernization and therefore 
should not be considered a flight hour recurring O&S cost savings.   


















Engines $447.00 -$155.00 -$103.00 -$258.00 $292.00
Blade $154.00 -$125.50 -$157.50 -$283.00 $28.50 
Cockpit $145.00 -$18.23 -$22.77 -$41.00 $126.77
Rotorhead $390.00 -$234.43 -$117.57 -$352.00 $155.57
Cargo Hook Sys $73.00 -$11.00 -$7.00 -$18.00 $62.00 
SLEP (Wiring) $34.00 -$17.00 N/A -$17.00 $17.00 
SLEP (D/S/Bearings) $56.00 -$10.00  -$10.00 $46.00 
SLEP (Airframe) $444.00  N/A  $83.00 
SLEP (Airframe)  -$250.00  -$250.00  
SLEP (Airframe)  -$111.00  -$111.00  
TOTAL $1,743.00 -$932.16 -$407.84 -$1,340.00 $810.84
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While it was not possible to quantify the O&S cost impact of modernization with 
a reasonable degree of accuracy, it was possible to draw some important conclusions.  
Only approximately $1,743 in O&S Costs, out of a total of $14,378, will be affected by 
any modernization efforts.  The most recent data indicates that aging components along 
with growing obsolescence is causing AVDLR costs to grow at a more rapid rate.  
Nonetheless, Sikorsky’s aggressive cost savings estimate yields only a $27M/year 
savings and fails to account for many costs allocated by the CRR being unavoidable and 
that they will not be affected by component improvements.  With these considerations 
taken into account, a conservative cost savings estimate of $10M-$15M/year seems more 
prudent.   
In the absence of quantifiable O&S cost data, a categorical proxy was used 
indicating whether O&S costs would rise, decline or remain the same.  The categorical 
descriptors used for each modernization configuration were based on the author’s 
subjective assessment of likely O&S cost outcomes given current cost trends and the 
magnitude and complexity of the modernization elements involved.  Three of the 
components (blades, rotor head, and engines) targeted by the modernization program 
made the AVDLR top 100 cost driver list maintained in the Aviation Maintenance and 
Supply Readiness (AMSR) database.  This indicates that the modernization effort is 
indeed proactively addressing critical areas of O&S cost growth.   
The current model fails to quantify the O&S cost impact; as more exacting design 
and testing information becomes available it should be incorporated into the model.  
However, any proposed O&S cost savings presented in the future and subsequently 
incorporated in to this model should include their reduced impact due to unavoidable 
49 
allocated costs, such as the CRR.  Additionally, O&S cost savings derived from improved 
Mean Time Between Failures (MTBFs), Time Between Overhauls (TBOs) and on-
condition maintenance initiatives must be validated by testing or simulation.  
3. Operational Effectiveness Measures 
As mentioned earlier, operational effectiveness measures included both objective 
and subjective measures.  Objective measures consisted of a combat radius range 
measurement as well as a payload measurement.  Individual configuration measures were 
calculated based performance parameters and conditions depicted in Figure 2.6, CH-53E 
Performance Capabilities (New Engines and Blades) [Ref. 11].  The common units 
measurement of both payload and range were adjusted to reflect the user preferences 
outlined in the draft Operational Requirements Document (ORD) [Ref. 29].     
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Subjective measures were gathered through a survey distributed to five CH-53E 
pilots/instructors from Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One (MAWTS-
1).  A copy of the survey is included in Appendix E.  The survey asked the instructors to 
evaluate each of the modernization configurations and assign a categorical descriptor 
(See Table 3.5) of expected performance under each METL.  The evaluators were 
instructed that when assigning categorical descriptors, to take into account all factors that 
might improve the aircraft’s ability to prosecute its mission.  This liberal interpretation of 
enhanced performance included, but was not limited to, such topics as the evaluator’s 
assessment of any potential improvements in readiness.  However, evaluators were 
instructed not to include in their assessment any perceived cost reductions or increases, as 
these impacts would be captured in the model’s cost measures.   Once categorical 
descriptors had been assigned to each modernization configuration/ METL combination, 
the evaluators were asked to prioritize METLs, by assigning percentage weights to each 
of the METLs (such that the percentages summed to 100%).   Weights were assigned 
according to the evaluators’ assessment of which METLs would constitute the most 
critical mission areas from the present until 2025.  Both weights and categorical 
descriptors were “averaged” to arrive at a composite measure that was then input into the 
LDW model.   
Table 3.5 CH-53E Operational Effectiveness Categorical Descriptors 
A. Significantly enhances current capability 
 Performance improvement is likely to meet projected requirements until 2025 
B. Enhances current capability 
 Performance will be improved but will likely require further improvements/technology 
refreshment before system retirement 
C. Doesn’t alter current capability 
 Self-explanatory 
D. Provides for Limited capability 
 System will still meet some requirements but will be unable to meet the full range of projected 
requirements until 2025 
E. Lack of capability is a performance liability 
 Performance shortfall will likely result in the inability of the Marine Corps to successfully 
prosecute the sort of missions anticipated until 2025 
 
More objective measures would have increased the robustness of the model.  
However, the critical design information necessary to generate quantitative measures of 
effectiveness was not available.  As such design information becomes available, Key 
Performance Parameters (KPPs) should be incorporated into the model as additional 
effectiveness measures.  Readiness rate projections would also help to capture the non-
cost benefits of greater reliability and supportability.  While subjective measures, such as 
those obtained from the survey, are less desirable than objective measures, they do 
provide an accurate means of capturing end user desires and priorities.  Because defense 
procurement decisions and success are based on building coalitions of support, it is 
critical to incorporate effectiveness measures that capture various stakeholders’ views.  
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For this reason, future iterations of the model should continue to include subjective expert 
assessments as part of the effectiveness measure.   
D. COST AND OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS 
1. Weighting 
In order to develop a consensus on how sub-goals should be weighted, program 
management personnel were interviewed and asked which sub-goals they felt were most 
critical to programmatic success.  Programmatic success was defined as meeting cost and 
schedule parameters at the various milestone decision points and most importantly, 
delivering an effective weapon system to the user on time.  All managers interviewed 
agreed that the weighting or prioritization of sub-goals would wax and wane with 
program progress.  For example, while development costs are a relatively small portion 
of system total ownership costs, there is a much greater level of uncertainty and therefore 
scrutiny associated with them.  Programs that demonstrate poor cost control in the 
development phase are more likely to be “killed.”   
Because this model was constructed as an ongoing decision aid to acquisition 
managers, each of the sub-goals was given equal weight, with the thinking that as the 
situation dictated, weights could be adjusted to account for changing priorities.  Second 
tier sub-goals and measures were also given equal weight with the exception of the 
subjective operational effectiveness measures, which were weighted according to the 
average percentage weights assessed by the MAWTS-1 evaluators.  Using the “smarter 
method” of assessment, an equal weighting for the various sub-goals and measures was 
achieved by ranking them all as number one priorities.   
One of the most powerful tools provided by LDW is the ability to graphically 
depict various elements of the decision process.  This provides insight into how altering 
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circumstances may affect the recommended outcome.  Figure 3.5 is a graphical depiction 
of the relative weights assigned to each member (sub-goal and measure).  When viewing 
this graphic in LDW, the user is able to manipulate the weights and immediately see how 
that affects the recommended outcome.  This sort of sensitivity analysis and the insight it 
provides into the CH-53E modernization will be discussed in the next section.     
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Figure 3.5 LDW Sub-goal and Measure Relative Weights 
2. Sensitivity Analysis 
Given the data provided in the model and the weights assigned to the various 
members within the model, LDW ranks the alternatives under a specified goal.  In this 
instance, we are most concerned about the overall goal of choosing the best 
modernization configuration.  However, it is also important to consider those elements 
that are not captured by the model and how their inclusion might affect the overall 
recommendation.  As discussed earlier in this chapter, there are three general areas that 
could have significant impact on the course of action recommended by the model: 1) Cost 
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Uncertainty, both with the costs included and those, such as O&S costs, that are not 
captured in the current model; 2) Performance Uncertainty, due to the subjective 
assessments used, as well as the early estimates of performance levels that were used to 
develop the objective operational effectiveness measures; 3) Omitted Measures, this 
includes measure elements that could not be captured anywhere in the model as it is 
presently constructed, such as the benefits of commonality or the non-cost impacts of 
schedule changes.  All of these elements may be incorporated into the model at a later 
time but should be considered in using the current model as a decision aid.  Figure 3.6 
below is a graphical depiction of the ranked alternatives under the overall goal and their 
corresponding utilities.  The tick marks to the right end of each bar represent the range of 
uncertainty associated with each utility, and are derived from the probabilistic 
distributions used to generate the procurement cost estimates.  The LDW model does not 
capture uncertainties associated with measures not having probabilistic distributions, such 
as those using categorical measures.   
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Figure 3.6 LDW Best Configuration Goal Alternative Ranking with Uncertainties 
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Not surprisingly, the complete modernization configuration received the highest 
overall utility.  However, the order of the ranking does provide some insight.  In 
particular, the configurations with the modernized rotor head as one of the major 
elements failed to receive higher utility scores.  This is most likely due to the greater 
developmental costs associated with that element, combined with limited performance 
improvements.  The greatest benefit of the rotor head is likely to be greater reliability 
and/or reduced O&S costs.  Nonetheless, because the development effort of this element 
is more risky and costly, if this model were used it would be the first element removed if 
funding levels were reduced.  This is also demonstrates how the incentives for program 
managers drive decisions that favor short-term savings with certainty over long-term 
savings with uncertainty.   
Using the LDW “Dynamic Sensitivity” tool, weights can be adjusted to see how 
they affect the recommended configuration.  For example, since the O&S cost estimate 
was based solely on the author’s assessment, it seemed prudent to see how removing this 
element would affect the ranking.  Surprisingly, it had little affect; the full modernization 
configuration was still ranked the highest, although not by as large of a margin as it was 
in the original model.  Adjusting the weights of various sub-goals and measures did little 
to alter the overall ranking.  While this suggests that the complete modernization 
configuration is the best choice, it also highlights how some measures still need to be 
incorporated into the model.  In particular, the addition of quantitative data that can be 
assigned a probabilistic distribution will likely yield more insightful results.   
Because a linear relationship was assumed between costs and utility, there is an 
implicit assumption that decision-makers are risk-neutral across the spectrum of cost 
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outcomes.  Clearly this is unlikely.  However, in order to determine how decision makers 
might behave, information on likely funding levels is required.  Once program managers 
know the rough amount of funding that is available and their relative standing in relation 
to other programs competing for funding, they can identify funding break points that alter 
decision-maker valuation of costs and may change alternative rankings.  Additionally, 
once actual costs begin to be incurred, the model can be modified slightly to incorporate 
Earned Value Management System (EVMS) data and used as an ongoing decision tool 
for acquisition managers. 
The importance of matching resources and freezing requirements early in the 
process cannot be overstated.  The current model was constructed around several key 
assumptions that, if violated, could dramatically alter program success.  Primary in those 
assumptions are the goals of the program and the alternatives available to meet those 
goals.  Obtaining funding levels that support the program timeline is critical to success.  
Requirements “creep,” where the call for greater capability results in continually 
adjusting program goals, poses the greatest threat to program success.   There are several 
elements that were not included in this model because debate continued concerning their 
relative merits.  A final determination must be made prior to program initiation and user 
representatives must understand the complications that adding requirements creates.  In 
order to limit their call for such modifications, the user community must understand the 
financial and political realities constraining the program.  Otherwise the goals, and thus 
the requirements of the program, will continue to be a source of debate.   
As mentioned throughout this chapter, some measures were not captured in the 
current model but should be incorporated into later iterations, including: schedule 
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metrics, quantitative O&S measures validated by testing or simulation (without some sort 
of validation they should be omitted as these sort of things are easy to promise and hard 
to deliver), and objective operational effectiveness measures linked to KPPs.  Each of 
these metrics should use probabilistic distributions to capture any uncertainty in measure 
levels.  This allows greater visibility into overall outcomes when the alternatives are 
ranked.  Nonetheless, as a first step, this model provides acquisition managers with a 
powerful tool for crafting and understanding their acquisition strategy, which will be the 
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This chapter provides a framework, description, discussion and analysis of some 
of the issues and factors that must be considered in constructing an acquisition strategy 
and contracting plan for CH-53E modernization.   
Based on results of the preliminary cost effectiveness analysis discussed in 
Chapter III, a complete six-point modernization effort provides the scope of work to be 
encompassed by the acquisition strategy.  The CH-53E modernization acquisition can be 
divided into the three phases outlined in the most recent revision of the DoD 5000 series 
(see Figure 4.1): Concept and Technology Development (C&TD), System Development 
and Demonstration (SD&D), and Production and Deployment (P&D).   
Figure 4.1 Defense Acquisition Management Framework [Ref. 30] 
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For the CH-53E modernization effort C&TD involves business case analyses, 
proof of principle evaluations, market research and trade studies to evaluate business and 
technical options.  SD&D involves actual engineering development and integration of the 
planned modernization elements to ensure the architecture principles that form the 
foundation of the program are sound.  Finally, P&D involves scheduling and actual 
production to modernize of the CH-53E fleet.   
To facilitate analysis and discussion, the acquisition was further partitioned into 
three groups based upon the nature of work required.  The first is the engine and engine 
logistics support portion.  The second is the cockpit portion.  The last constitutes all 
remaining modernization elements, including the SLEP, rotor head, improved cargo 
handling system and blades.  Each of these portions corresponds with three, potentially 
different, suppliers.  For this reason, each of these groupings will be addressed in the 
subsequent sections of this chapter.  Because of the diverse and complex nature of work 
to be performed along with the possibility of three independent suppliers, crafting a 
strategy that integrates these different work elements is essential and will be the guiding 
focus of this chapter. 
It is important to note that the acquisition strategy discussion and analysis below 
does not capture all the potential issues that must be considered prior to program 
initiation.  However, it does outline the salient elements that require the most attention 
and some potential means for dealing with them.   
B. CH-53E MODERNIZATION ACQUISITION ENVIRONMENT 
Acquisition strategies primarily serve as a contract between the program manager 
and the leadership within the Department of Defense.  They chart a course for the 
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procurement so that leaders can track and measure program performance.  Yet, there are 
many other stakeholders, both outside and inside DoD, that must be satiated when 
formulating a successful acquisition strategy.  The strategy itself becomes a written 
portrait of coalitions made to meet a variety of competing interests.  For this reason, it is 
important to survey the acquisition landscape to find the pitfalls that have befallen 
previous programs.  Armed with this information, acquisition managers can craft a 
strategy that is tailored to the specific procurement as well as resilient enough to survive 
the gauntlet of bureaucratic and political review.  This section will provide a snapshot of 
some relevant programs and issues currently being debated within the acquisition 
community that will likely impact the form and substance of a CH-53E modernization 
acquisition strategy. 
While DoD’s annual weapon systems investment has increased from about $90 
billion three years ago to approximately $100 billion for fiscal year 2001 [Ref. 31], the 
competition for funding grows fiercer as current weapon systems age and the cost for 
new systems escalates.  A quick look at the status of Marine Corps aviation platforms 
provides a clear picture of the level of competition.  Every tactical aviation platform in 
the Marine Corps has a program in place to either replace or upgrade the current 
platform.  This places aviation investment dollars at a premium and is confounded by the 
problems recently experienced by some of these programs, such as the V-22 Osprey.   
Another challenge is presented by the failures and problems that have plagued 
recent modernization and upgrade efforts.  For example, after a considerable 
development effort, the Navy H-60 Seahawk program realized that modernizing their 
older aircraft would only slightly lower unit cost and probably lower readiness rates due 
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to the reinstallation of refurbished dynamic components on a new airframe [Ref. 32].  
Similarly, the plan to remanufacture day attack variants of the AV-8B Harrier to provide 
a night radar attack capability received significant scrutiny from the General Accounting 
Office (GAO).  As in the case of the H-60, the decision to remanufacture existing 
airframes added significant risk to the program because it relied upon “best case” 
performances from government depots to provide critical components to the contractor.  
If the depots failed to perform perfectly, there existed a significant possibility for cost 
growth and schedule slippage due to government-caused delays in production [Ref. 33].  
Another modernization effort, the H-1 Upgrade program, has experienced 
considerable cost growth during their development effort.  The original development 
contract was for $567 million; however, recent indications from the contractor suggest 
that the total cost for the development effort will likely approach $1 billion [Ref. 34].  
The cost growth in the H-1 Upgrade development effort highlights yet another problem 
often identified in GAO reports on government acquisition inefficiency.  They have 
found that, “the desire of program sponsors to keep cost estimates as low as possible and 
to present attractive milestone schedules encourages the use of unreasonable assumptions 
about the pace and magnitude of the technical effort, material costs, production rates, 
savings from competition, and other factors [Ref. 35].”  The institutional tendency to 
project optimistic outcomes as a means of protecting program funding routinely 
compromises some aspect of cost, schedule or performance objectives.  Yet program 
managers are often faced with a quandary; realistic statements of program costs and 
schedules would prevent a new program from being initiated.  This problem is created by 
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a failure to communicate fiscal and political realities to the requirements generation 
community. 
Because of the early stage of the CH-53E modernization effort, now is the time to 
rectify and clarify these issues.  The ORD remains in draft form and the requirements 
community has not reached consensus on all the elements modernization might entail.  
As a recent GAO report highlighted, successfully matching developer resources with user 
expectations prior to product development is a key factor in determining whether cost, 
performance and schedule objectives are achieved.  Table 4.1 illustrates how various 
complex products in both the commercial and military sectors demonstrate this principle. 
Table 4.1 Matching of Expectations to Resources and Product Development Outcomes 
[After Ref. 31]   
 
As Table 4.1 illustrates, now is the time for CH-53E program management 
personnel to communicate the fiscal and political constraints to the user community to 
develop and “freeze” requirements that are achievable, given the current resource 
environment.  If requirements are allowed to fluctuate during development, it will be 
difficult or impossible to ensure the resources necessary are available to meet those 
requirements. 
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Finally, because the CH-53E is an aging aircraft, it is natural and logical to 
assume that any modernization effort would seek to address areas that have experienced 
cost growth as the airframe has aged.  Yet, design improvements or replacing 
components that cause operating and support cost growth, such as the rotor head, provide 
little performance enhancement and therefore tend to be a lower priority with the user.  
However, failure to address such components now could lead to exponential cost growth 
as components reach unprecedented ages.   
All of these issues contribute to the bureaucratic and political debate that has 
become an unavoidable part of Acquisition Category 1 (ACAT 1) program initiations.  
While it is impossible to detail all of the political hurdles that the CH-53E modernization 
effort might encounter, one area that will undoubtedly generate attention is the suggestion 
to use Contractor Logistic Support (CLS), versus using the military depots, for engine 
intermediate and depot level maintenance.  That issue and some steps that can be taken to 
overcome its opposition will be discussed in the business and contracting strategy section 
of this chapter.  For this and many other reasons, program managers must continually 
survey the acquisition landscape and ask themselves what they are doing to ensure their 
programs don’t fall victim to the problems identified above.  The subsequent sections are 
intended to chart a course for success for the CH-53E modernization effort in light of all 
these and many other challenges currently facing acquisition managers involved in 
complex weapon system programs.    
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C. REQUIREMENTS, PROGRAM STRUCTURE AND ACQUISITION 
APPROACH 
1. Requirements 
Because the details of the relevant source documents, such as the ORD, applicable 
Capstone Requirements Documents (CRDs), and Acquisition Program Baseline (APB) 
are yet to be definitized, an opportunity exists for both the user and program management 
personnel.  Now, prior to program initiation, is the time for both parties to work to match 
requirements and resources.  As Figure 4.2 depicts, this process relies on power parity 
between the two parties; without it, one party can compel the other to continue toward 
program initiation prior to establishing a course of action that will achieve program 
objectives.  Additionally, by working together at this early stage, and by engaging 
contractors in the systems engineering analysis of the requirement, technical and cost 
obstacles can be identified and avoided prior to the expenditure of significant funds.   
 
Figure 4.2 The Requirements Process [After Ref. 31] 
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While the basic requirement stems from the need to provide the Marine Corps a 
heavy lift capability until 2025, the specifics require greater lift and range capabilities, 
the ability to communicate and operate in a larger battle space, a reduction in operating 
and support costs and commensurately improved readiness rates.  Specific cost, schedule 
and performance targets should be identified and agreed upon as feasible by the user 
community, program manager and prospective contractors prior to program initiation.  
These capabilities are expected through a single-step upgrade, yet should also incorporate 
open systems architecture in some areas to facilitate later improvements.  Specifically, 
the cockpit and its components should allow for software and hardware evolutionary 
changes as necessary and incorporate the overarching goals specified in the Common 
Avionics Master Plan (CAMP).   
Due to the fluidity of the requirements, this acquisition strategy will provide 
guidelines and considerations based on the generic requirements available at this time.  
The active participation and input of potential contractors in developing the requirements 
is essential to program success.  The ORD should be sufficiently defined in concert with 
program initiation.  As part of the requirements process, concurrent analysis should 
evaluate the impact of modernization on dynamic components, measured against the cost 
of new procurement, to determine if modernization is the most cost effective means of 
achieving the specified requirements.   
2. Program Structure 
Because initiating concerted efforts toward CH-53E modernization depends upon 
future funding, the notional program structure will likely change as the program evolves.  
The actual time that will elapse between various phases will largely depend upon the 
trade studies, requirements analyses and funding determinations during the C&TD phase.  
Figure 4.3 depicts the basic program structure, to including anticipated contract vehicles 
for the various program phases and efforts.  Subsequent figures will provide more 
detailed information for each phase of the acquisition.  At the In Progress Review (IPR) 
in the SD&D phase, enough cost and testing information should be available to confirm 
that modernization is still the most cost effective means of providing the Marine Corps an 
adequate heavy lift capability through 2025. 
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Figure 4.3 Notional CH-53E Modernization Program Structure 
Figure 4.4 depicts the planned entry of the CH-53E modernization effort into the 
Defense Acquisition Management Framework as outlined in the DoD 5000 series of 
instructions and directives.  Additionally, Figure 4.4 identifies the purposes of the work 
effort, major program events, entrance criteria and desired outcomes of this phase as well 
as the key parties involved in each activity.  This phase primarily clarifies the modernized 
CH-53E requirement and ensures that the industrial capability to produce such an aircraft 
exists, given the projected resources.  Probably the most difficult and most important 
issue to be resolved in this phase is striking the correct balance between increased 
performance while ameliorating the effects of aging and the attendant O&S cost growth.  
The user community will undoubtedly be less concerned with O&S cost growth and more 
concerned with increased performance capabilities.  However, they must be persuaded 
that a program that can demonstrate improved maintainability and reliability through 
focused modernization of selected problematic components becomes much more 
politically and fiscally resilient.  Nonetheless, MTBF improvements must be validated by 
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testing and simulation before being accepted and used as a rationale for reduced O&S 
costs.   
Decision Review
Development of Blades, Engines, Rotor Head, Cockpit, SLEP Cabin 
Center sections and Hook System designs and parameters.  Confirm
producibility and identify potential program risks. 
Basic requirements scope identified.  Concept to meet those 
requirements in hand, but system architecture to be developed
Specific concept to be 
pursued and technology 
exists: Modernized CH-53E!
Requirement and development capabilities matched within projected 
resource levels.  Successful Program Initiation.  Prototype components 
developed within system parameters.
CH-53E Modernization








PURPOSES OF WORK EFFORT
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MAJOR PROGRAM EVENTS
•PMA-261 Designated Provisional 
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WBS for entire Modernization
•Presolicitation Conference & 
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Figure 4.4 CH-53E Modernization Concept and Technology Development Phase 
The work performed in the C&TD phase is very critical because user 
requirements, program office resources and contractor capabilities must be synthesized 
into an accomplishable common Work Breakdown Structure (WBS).  The Integrated 
Product Team (IPT) established in this phase will become the focal point of the entire 
program effort.  Contractor and industry input is essential to establish reasonable 
performance parameters that meet user expectations.  Additionally, functional area 
experts, such as the NAVAIR Aging Aircraft IPT and the Combat Electronics Program 
Office (PMA-209), should be included in solidifying requirements and developing 
system solutions [Ref. 36].  With the exception of the engine and cockpit, Sikorsky will 
be a sole source-supplier for development and production because they have the 
proprietary design information necessary to develop a secondary source or compete this 
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requirement.  Attempting to develop or utilize another source would be extremely 
difficult and increase program risk to unacceptable levels. 
A formal CH-53E modernization program office will be established at the outset 
of the SD&D phase; most likely this new office will be an outgrowth of PMA-261, the 
current H-53 program office.  Figure 4.5 depicts the purposes of the work effort, major 
program events, entrance criteria and desired outcomes of this phase. 
Interim Progress Review
•System integration of demonstrated engine, 
blade, rotor head and cockpit designs
•Component and System interface conflicts 
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effectiveness.
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•Impact on existing drivetrain confirmed
•Continue to match resources and requirements 
as final design is stabilized.
•Validate System 
make-or-buy decision
•O&S cost impact and System MTBF’s validated
•Successful Prototype Test in Operational 
Environment
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Figure 4.5 CH-53E Modernization System Development and Demonstration Phase 
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The SD&D phase will begin by selecting and awarding the engine and cockpit 
contractors based on a competitively negotiated source selection.  Associate Contractor 
Agreements (ACAs) and an award fee incentive arrangement will ensure contractor 
efforts are coordinated, working to achieve IPT designated program objectives, and that 
any conflicts are resolved quickly.  Because most modernization elements utilize existing 
technologies, this phase will be used to confirm the capability to integrate various 
modernization elements and reduce programmatic technical, cost and schedule risks. 
 The program IPT will continue to ensure that design changes keep program costs 
within resource levels as well as guaranteeing that performance remains within the user 
community’s expectations.  Any modifications to system requirements should be minor.  
Any major changes require program review and cost effectiveness should be reevaluated 
based upon performance and cost changes.  All contractors will be required to use an 
Earned Value Management System (EVMS) to provide the IPT with a complete picture 
of program progression, to help identify and resolve any obstacles.   
The In Progress Review (IPR) will serve as a system “make-or-buy” review, 
where an economic analysis of the modernization costs, including O&S cost impacts, are 
compared with the costs of procuring new aircraft to validate modernization cost 
effectiveness.  Specifically, the ability of the existing drivetrain (transmissions and drive 
shafts) to withstand more powerful engines, rotor head and blades must be validated at 
the IPR. 
The detailed activities for the P&D phase will be determined largely by the 
outcomes of previous phases.  This phase consists primarily of testing and validating 
work performed in earlier phases.  Closely monitoring contractor EVMS systems is 
critical in this phase as schedule slippage could have dramatic effects on the fleet’s ability 
to maintain operational readiness.  Figure 4.6 shows the critical events and issues 
occurring in this phase. 
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•Testing of production representative articles




•No significant manufacturing risk
•Acceptable interoperability
•Acceptable operational supportability
•BLRIP & LFT&E reports prior to FRPDR
•Successful FRPDR
•Full operational capability; deployment complete•System operationally effective, suitable and 
ready for full-rate production
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Figure 4.6 CH-53E Modernization Production and Deployment Phase [After Ref. 37] 
The design should be stable at the outset of the P&D phase; the ongoing concern 
will be variability in aircraft induction condition for SLEP and the need to maintain fleet 
operational capability while in Full-Rate Production (FRP).  For this reason, an incentive 
arrangement that adequately induces the contractors to maintain the production schedule 
is essential.  P&D contract types and incentive arrangements may vary based on an 
economic analysis to determine the feasibility and benefits of Multi-Year Procurement 
(MYP) for each of the three major work areas; engines, cockpit and the remaining 
elements.  An economic analysis will also be done, based on Low-Rate Initial Production 
(LRIP) data, to determine which, if any, components are candidates for advance 
procurement.  The engine Integrated Logistics Support (ILS) contract will be a 
commercial procurement in accordance with the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 
Part 12.    
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The preliminary program structure depicted earlier provides an outline of major 
events and requirements in the CH-53E modernization acquisition.  Subsequent sections 
will provide a detailed discussion of risk management, program management plan, 
support strategy and business strategy developed to ensure successful program 
completion. 
3. Acquisition Approach 
CH-53E modernization will use a single-step to full capability acquisition 
approach to meet the Marine Corps’ requirement for an expanded heavy lift capability 
through 2025.  An evolutionary approach was considered but determined to be incapable 
of providing an adequate heavy lift platform rapidly enough within the relevant period.  
However, given the difficulty in obtaining consensus among the Services as to the future 
shape and form of heavy lift platforms, and the possibility the CH-53E will be used 
beyond the 2025 time horizon, modernization must incorporate open systems architecture 
where possible.  This is particularly true with cockpit modernization, as advancements in 
software and electronics will necessitate follow-on improvements to maintain battlefield 
parity with other naval aviation assets. 
D. RISK 
A program as large and complex as modernizing the CH-53E involves many 
facets and types of risk.  Both the development effort and production effort will be 
discussed along with some potential tools for mitigating those risks and continuing to 
monitor program progress to identify new areas of risk as they arise.  Figure 4.6 
graphically depicts a basic risk management process that will be used to continually 
monitor and deal with all facets of risk within the program.  IPT members will ensure that 
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their personnel are aware of potential risks and alert the appropriate managers to changes 




































Figure 4.7 Risk Management Process [After Ref. 38] 
1. Development Phase (C&TD and SD&D) Risk  
The development phases contain the greatest risks in modernizing the CH-53E.  
Many of the risks in these phases could be classified as technical risks, such as the 
uncertainty about the existing drivetrain’s ability to withstand the increased engine power 
and airfoil lift capability without increasing maintenance costs or reducing reliability.  
The rotor head has similar risks because the elastomeric design has not been used on a 
helicopter with the lift capability projected for the modernized CH-53E.  Cockpit 
software integration and communication interoperability (compliance with the Joint 
Technical Architecture and Common Avionics Master Plan) present significant technical 
challenges as well.   
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While there clearly are some technical challenges, much of the difficulty arises 
from integrating the various modernization elements.  Using proven design technologies 
mitigates some of this integration risk.  Most of the components comprising the 
modernization elements are based on existing technologies, thereby eliminating much of 
the design risk.  Gathering the appropriate stakeholders in an IPT mitigates other 
integration risks.  In this setting, acquisition managers will be able to use flexible 
requirements to find common ground between the user and the contractors.  Often times 
the user or requirements community is unaware of the enormous amounts of 
programmatic risk that are incurred by expanding performance ever so slightly.  It is 
absolutely imperative that requirements be constrained so as not to incrementally increase 
the various technical and integration risks inherent in a complex undertaking such as this.  
Indeed, using a commonly-located IPT will help quickly identify and resolve interface 
conflicts.  This also helps to foster a shared commitment to the entire project and 
promotes better use of the tradespace created by using the Cost As an Independent 
Variable (CAIV) principle.   
The engine design originally called for in the CH-53E modernization proposal 
specified the AE1107C for commonality benefits.  Yet much of the commonality benefits 
of using this engine would be reaped in savings related to intermediate and depot level 
maintenance, a function that is contracted out.  For this reason, competing this 
requirement as a modified commercial core engine and specifying an output power target 
is expected to yield a greater benefit.  Using a commercial core engine, sufficient data 
should be available to estimate and develop reliability and maintainability targets.  The 
support portion of the engine contract is simplified by the existing recording architecture 
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that was developed to support IMD/HUMS.  With a fairly minor interface modification, 
the necessary engine usage data can be captured to track usage and identify maintenance 
intervals. 
Aggressive use of an integrated EVMS and Decision Support Software (DSS), 
such as Logical Decisions for Windows (LDW), to monitor program progress and 
cost effectiveness will prove invaluable as a risk management tool.  This will allow 
decision-makers to quickly identify new areas of risk as well as make informed economic 
determinations of the best response.  These tools are a powerful means of building the 
coalitions of support among stakeholders outside the program office that are necessary 
for programmatic success.  Most importantly, these systems allow acquisition managers 
to continually ensure that requirements, resources and capabilities are matched in the 
development phases.  Additionally, the incentive arrangements and business strategy 
described later will encourage the contractors to accept reasonable risks and reduce both 
technical and integration risks by working together to find quick resolutions to identified 
problems.   
2. Production Phase Risk 
While the production phase poses significantly less risk than that encountered in 
the developmental phases, there are some critical challenges that must be addressed.  
Most notably is the issue of “over and aboves.”  “Over and aboves” are those work 
elements that are not specifically called for in the contract, but are “discovered” when an 
aircraft is disassembled and readied for structural enhancement.  Often times these 
elements involve corrosion and damage that cannot be known until work is actually 
begun.  Because of the unknown nature and scope of the work that may be included in 
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“over and aboves,” SLEP programs often have trouble accounting for this uncertainty.  
Some of this trouble has been mitigated by the decision to replace the entire center 
section of the helicopter cabin, thereby reducing the need to reuse numerous structural 
components that may be damaged or severely corroded.   
Another issue involves an unstable induction configuration.  In a SLEP contract, 
the government is typically responsible for delivering an aircraft that meets a certain 
induction configuration, so the contractor has a common baseline from which to begin 
work and can more accurately estimate the costs of production.  If this induction 
configuration is not closely managed, the possibility of schedule slippage and cost growth 
increases exponentially.  A certain degree of instability is inherent with a platform that 
has been in service for twenty years.  Therefore, the contractor must have strong 
incentives and be adequately rewarded for overcoming these obstacles and maintaining 
program schedule.  Failure to do so could result in a serious degradation of fleet readiness 
because the modernization program will be conducted while fleet squadrons continue to 
support operational requirements.   
Although not strictly a part of the production effort, the engine support contract 
will begin in the production phase.  While this sort of arrangement may be new to the 
government, it is quite common in commercial aviation.  The details of the support 
arrangement will be discussed in the support strategy portion of this chapter, but suffice it 
to say that the nature and substance of that arrangement will be based upon lessons 
learned under the V-22 engine Integrated Logistics Support (ILS) contract, as well as an 
analysis of how commercial aviation utilizes such arrangements.  The overarching intent 
is to ensure that the engine manufacturer, who has the knowledge and experience to make 
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design improvements, bears the design or what commercial users call the “product 
attribute risk.”  By structuring the arrangement in this manner the engine contractor has a 
strong positive incentive to make continuous improvements to the engine as long as the 
government operates it [Ref. 39]. 
E. PROGRAM MANAGEMENT 
1. General Philosophy and Approach 
For all phases of the CH-53E modernization effort, continually exchanging 
information in a collaborative environment is critical to achieving success.  The program 
will build upon the Integrated Product Team (IPT) principle in that functional experts 
will be asked to provide input and work together to develop innovative solutions.  
Additionally, all the parties including the various contractors must be committed to the 
program’s objectives.  It is critical that the program leadership communicate the 
importance of having a common understanding of what is necessary to ensure program 
success.  Success is defined as delivering a valuable asset to the fleet quickly and within 
cost limitations.  Due to the complexity and criticality of integration in this effort, 
proactive steps must be taken to ease management challenges.  Specifically, forming a 
joint government/contractor office/team helps swiftly resolve issues and contributes to a 
feeling of shared responsibility for program goals by all participants.   
Management challenges encountered in the upgrades to the H-60 program (PMA-
299) highlight the need for developing an innovative approach to integrate the efforts of 
several contractors.  PMA-299 created a single Weapon System Integration Team 
(WSIT), where both prime contractors were encouraged and contractually bound to 
exchange information to help achieve program objectives.  Rather than segmenting team 
efforts according to individual contractors, this approach streamlined information 
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exchange between the contractors and quickly resolved interface and schedule conflicts. 
[Ref. 40]  A WSIT-type program management approach is recommended to integrate the 
various contractors who will work on CH-53E modernization. 
As a recent GAO report observed, “programs that were meeting product 
development objectives had more effective teams than programs that were having 
problems.  In addition to meeting objectives, the successful programs were often 
surpassing the performance of their predecessors in both time to market and 
performance.” [Ref. 41]   Clearly, greater performance and reduced cycle times will be 
the goal of the various IPTs.  To achieve this, CH-53E modernization IPTs need to have 
the knowledge necessary for informed decisions and the requisite authority to make those 
decisions.  To arm them otherwise dooms the program to gridlock and frustration.  
Without coordinating key IPT personnel, significant integration challenges could 
overcome the program.  While the ability of empowered teams to tackle and overcome 
difficult problems is impressive, they are not the answer to every issue.  The program 
office must resist the urge to proliferate teams for every project.  Doing so degrades their 
importance and drains personnel of their motivation. 
A significant institutional barrier that must be hurdled is the “business as usual” 
attitude.  Modernization efforts are nothing new, yet as mentioned earlier, there are few if 
any salient successes.  Therefore, acquisition managers should encourage their people to 
challenge the status quo; history indicates that the best solution is yet to be found.  Efforts 
should focus on simplicity, affordability, and supportability.  While performance 
improvements may gain short term recognition, all personnel involved need to realize 
that there are many lessons to be learned from twenty years of historical data that can be 
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put to good use in modernizing the CH-53E.  To ignore this wealth of information would 
be a tremendous tragedy.  Paying attention to the lessons from the past will aid in 
mitigating programmatic risk and make the program much easier to defend and 
rationalize to external stakeholders.     
2. Resources 
Advance procurement of costly and long-lead time components could provide 
significant cost savings for the program and therefore should be at the forefront of 
acquisition managers’ minds as the production phase approaches.  Because the program 
production schedule will be driven, but also constrained by the need to keep the fleet 
operational, fewer aircraft may be modernized in a given period than the efficient 
production rate for some critical components.  For example, the rotor head will be a 
particularly costly item to produce and savings may accrue if production could be limited 
to one continuous run.  However, to comply with the full funding requirement specified 
in DoD Regulation 7000.14-R, lots can only be purchased to cover two years’ production 
quantities.  A similar principle could hold true for the rotor blades.  An economic analysis 
therefore should be planned as the production phase nears to determine which 
components have sufficiently stable designs and would reap savings through increased 
efficiency and learning created by a continuous production run.   
3. Tailoring and Streamlining Plans 
CH-53E modernization elements were chosen largely around developed 
technologies, thereby reducing the design and engineering work necessary to enhance a 
weapon system’s capability.  By emphasizing non-developmental items as modernization 
elements, more attention can be focused on correcting existing maintainability and 
supportability issues.  Additionally, the present plan uses a commercial core engine for 
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the engine modernization, as well as a commercial support arrangement for the engine.  
This will help streamline the acquisition and should provide the Marine Corps more 
efficient service because the engine manufacturer has a positive incentive to keep the 
engine on wing as long as possible.  This also provides a continuous incentive for design 
and engineering improvements on the engine, which should produce greater reliability, 
availability and reduced sparing requirements.   
ACAs and a WSIT-type joint development office/team will help quickly resolve 
design and schedule conflicts.  It also provides a single point of interface between the 
program office and all contractors.  This promotes more effective and efficient use of 
program office personnel.  Additionally, using an Integrated Master Schedule and EVMS 
by all contractors will provide the program office with a single means of tracking 
program progress and integrating contract management. 
F. DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING THE ACQUISITION 
STRATEGY 
Perhaps the greatest design consideration affecting the acquisition strategy is the 
necessity to use Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation (SAC) as a sole-source supplier for a 
majority of the modernization effort.  Nonetheless, the design of the modernization 
elements has focused on currently developed technologies that only require modification 
for use on the CH-53E.  Open systems will be specified, particularly in rapidly evolving 
industries such as in communications and electronics equipment and software for the 
cockpit.  Interoperability and commonality standards, such as compliance with the Joint 
Technical Architecture interfaces, as well as CAMP, will also be a requirement for the 
cockpit.   
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Acquisition managers must focus both the user and contractor to develop and 
address the potential design implications on aging components.  While the six 
modernization elements focus on some of the leading problems facing the CH-53E due to 
its age, failure to estimate and validate the potential impacts of modernization will yield 
useless performance enhancements due to decreased readiness and maintainability.  The 
program is currently structured such that the economic analysis performed at the IPR in 
the SD&D phase is a final affirmation that modernization will result in greater reliability 
and maintainability, not just performance.  If this is not the result of that review, serious 
consideration must be given to new procurement.  Yet even after the IPR, the intent of 
using a DSS, such as LDW, for acquisition managers is to provide them with an ongoing 
scorecard to ensure sunk costs are not the basis for continuing a program with uncertain 
long-term consequences.  Modernization represents a second chance to address the 
original design errors; failure to do so will exacerbate the current aging problem 
described earlier and therefore should remain a primary design consideration throughout 
the evolution of the acquisition strategy.   
G. SUPPORT STRATEGY 
Even as the cost of supporting aging aircraft continues to escalate, recent audit 
reports by the Naval Audit Service and GAO highlight the Services’ failure to place 
sufficient priority on developing effective support strategies that reduce O&S costs for 
major weapon systems [Ref. 42, 43 and 44].  And yet, despite the challenges described 
earlier in obtaining and using the current O&S cost data on the CH-53E, there are some 
clear lessons that can be applied to this acquisition and the subsequent development of 
the accompanying support strategy.   
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The research of Dr. L. Stoll and Mr. R. Ernst provides some important insight into 
the symptoms common to aging helicopters.  As mentioned earlier, all aging aircraft tend 
to experience operating and support cost growth.  Yet this cost growth is usually not the 
result of the aging airframe, but rather aging components or AVDLRs.  As Figure 4.8 
indicates, helicopter and engine AVDLR cost growth drivers are almost exclusively 
caused by aging.  Therefore, it is logical that any modernization effort must account for 
this and look at those AVDLRs currently experiencing cost growth and ensure that they 
are addressed as part of the modernization effort.  [Ref. 21] 
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Figure 4.8 AVDLR Cost Growth Drivers By Aircraft Type and Engines [Ref. 21] 
As it happens, the categories of AVDLRs most affected by aging also vary by 
aircraft type.  Not surprisingly, helicopter dynamic component AVDLRs (rotary blades, 
gear boxes and associated items) accounted for most of the cost growth drivers by item 
count (see Figure 4.9).  However, the real cost impact becomes clear when the dollar 
value for those dynamic component AVDLRs is compared with the other item categories 
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(see Figure 4.10), where dynamic components account for approximately 64% of the 
dollar value cost growth. 
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Figure 4.9 Aircraft AVDLR Cost Growth Drivers by Major System [Ref. 21]  
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Detailed Data Showing AVDLR Item 
Counts and Associated Costs
Avg  FY2 0 0 0 Total Tota l VAD
Co s t/ Ite m Ite ms FY2 0 0 0
Ave rage 4 2 ,7 3 8 9 ,8 5 6 1 5 9 ,3 8 8 ,2 5 6 TOTALS
Surve illance  A/ C Co unt Sum Items S um  Do lla rs S um Do lla r% Count%
Avio nics 4 1 4 ,2 4 5 6 5 ,1 1 0 ,3 6 5 4 1 % 5 5 %
Dyn am ic Co m p o nen ts 1 1 3 5 8 5 ,7 6 1 0 % 1 %
Electrica l 8 2 ,4 4 1 3 0 ,1 4 0 ,4 0 8 1 9 % 1 1 %
P rop u ls ion  Relat ed 8 1 ,8 1 7 4 0 ,2 2 5 ,8 4 2 2 5 % 1 1 %
S tructu res / Airfra m e 3 2 3 8 3 ,5 4 9 ,2 1 1 2 % 4 %
S u bs yst em s 1 4 1 ,1 0 2 1 9 ,7 7 6 ,6 7 0 1 2 % 1 9 %
Tota ls 7 5 9 ,8 5 6 1 5 9 ,3 8 8 ,2 5 6 1 0 0 % 1 00 %
Ave rage 3 7 ,1 6 5 1 1 ,07 9 1 6 7 ,0 4 5 ,2 8 8 TOTALS
Fig hte r/ Attack Co unt Sum Items S um  Do lla rs S um Do lla r% Count%
Avio nics 2 7 4 ,3 2 1 5 2 ,5 9 1 ,5 6 9 3 1 % 2 8 %
Dyn am ic Co m p o nen ts 0 0 0 0 % 0 %
Electrica l 1 2 1 ,3 0 8 1 6 ,9 1 7 ,9 0 2 1 0 % 1 2 %
P rop u ls ion  Relat ed 2 1 ,1 4 2 5 ,3 6 9 ,9 9 0 3 % 2 %
S tructu res / Airfra m e 1 1 4 0 8 1 6 ,4 3 1 ,5 3 7 1 0 % 1 1 %
S u bs yst em s 4 5 3 ,9 0 0 7 5 ,7 3 4 ,2 9 0 4 5 % 4 6 %
Tota ls 9 7 1 1 ,07 9 1 6 7 ,0 4 5 ,2 8 8 1 0 0 % 1 00 %
Ave rage 5 1,6 2 8 1 2 ,1 4 8 2 5 2 ,6 3 2 ,9 5 7 TOTALS
He lico pters Co unt Sum Items S um  Do lla rs S um Do lla r% Count%
Avio nics 1 5 1 ,6 9 0 2 2 ,9 3 0 ,3 5 5 9 % 1 5 %
Dyn am ic Co m p o nen ts 4 1 2 ,9 6 6 1 6 1 ,2 8 2 ,8 4 4 6 4 % 4 1 %
Electrica l 9 1 ,3 3 7 1 5 ,0 8 1 ,8 1 7 6 % 9 %
P rop u ls ion  Relat ed 7 2 ,1 5 2 2 2 ,0 4 7 ,3 1 5 9 % 7 %
S tructu res / Airfra m e 2 2 5 8 2 ,6 6 2 ,1 7 5 1 % 2 %
S u bs yst em s 2 5 3 ,7 4 5 2 8 ,6 2 8 ,4 5 1 1 1 % 2 5 %
Co mpara tive Sta tis tics
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Figure 4.10 AVDLR Item Counts and Associated Costs [After Ref. 21] 
The results of this research are particularly important for modernizing the CH-
53E because, while the blades, rotor head and engines are in part being addressed in 
modernization, other dynamic components such as drive shafts and gearboxes are not.  It 
is absolutely imperative that the assumptions about the strength of the current drivetrain 
are validated early in the modernization acquisition so as to preclude an exponential O&S 
cost growth as already aging dynamic components are placed under greater stress.  This 
is the primary purpose of the extensive component development effort prior to program 
initiation.  Additionally, the use of the IMD/HUMS system currently being fielded to the 
fleet will be a powerful tool for acquisition and logistics managers in evaluating and 
validating the potential impacts of the various modernization elements, undoubtedly 
saving aircraft and lives throughout the CH-53E’s deployment.  
A continually evolving support strategy based on careful analysis and evaluation 
of the modernization elements’ impacts must be developed concurrent with the rest of the 
acquisition strategy.  Support strategy initiatives should focus on continually improving 
system affordability, reliability and supportability while meeting readiness targets.  One 
means of achieving this objective is by testing critical components early and thoroughly 
during the C&TD and SD&D phases to validate and discredit exaggerated MTBFs that 
naively understate future O&S costs.  Additionally, the incentive structure for the various 
modernization elements should incentivize the contractors to incorporate reliability and 
maintainability improvements into their design, as well as utilize Value Engineering 
Change Proposal (VECP) clauses.  
The CH-53E modernization support strategy will continue to rely on organic 
sources of support, with the exception of the proposed engine support contract.  That will 
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rely on CLS for intermediate and depot level engine maintenance.  As mentioned earlier, 
CLS arrangement was chosen in anticipation of reduced maintenance costs, greater 
reliability over the life of the engine, reduced sparing requirements and greater engine 
availability.  While the reduced maintenance costs are difficult to estimate, some of the 
other benefits are clear, based on fleet hour agreements in the commercial aviation 
market [Ref. 39].   
Nonetheless, the CH-53E, like most tactical military aircraft, is flown differently 
than commercial aircraft and therefore, adjustments are needed to the support agreement.  
Most notably, provisions must be made to ensure that ESMHs, missions, and flight hours 
are tracked and correlated so that the rate being applied (charged) remains accurate over 
time [Ref. 45].  This provides the government with the ability to evaluate the accuracy of 
the rate being charged.  If there is a gross or consistent inaccuracy, the method used to 
calculate ESMHs should be reevaluated.  Another concern is over engine data loss that 
results in applying penalty hours, which are typically billed at two and a half times the 
normal rate [Ref. 46].  Failure to anticipate these sorts of problems could lead to 
significant cost growth in the engine support contract.   
Some political considerations that must be accounted for in choosing a CLS 
arrangement are the backlash that will likely be generated by the depots and their political 
supporters.  Additionally, and perhaps even more problematic, is the manning issue.  
While the program office has indicated that they would like a CLS arrangement, there are 
no plans to reduce intermediate or depot level uniformed work forces.  If the engine work 
for both the V-22 and CH-53E are provided by CLS, it will become increasingly difficult 
to justify not reducing manning levels in those units.  These political considerations must 
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be carefully weighed and may result in a traditional in-house support plan.  If this is the 
case, a new way must be found to ensure the contractor has a stake in keeping engines on 
wing as long as possible (disincentive for bare firewalls). 
Unlike with the engine, the cockpit design and support stands to benefit by using 
common “boxes” available through the Combat Electronics Program Office (PMA-209) 
to reduce logistical support costs.  However, a non-developmental cockpit that meets the 
basic user requirements may be available from Sikorsky.  This issue will be discussed in 
the following section.  Suffice it to say that the benefits of a ready, integrated cockpit 
may outweigh commonality logistics savings.  Again, an economic analysis should 
determine which course of action is most appropriate.  In any case, the desire of the user 
community to over-specify the cockpit requirement must be constrained.    
H. BUSINESS AND CONTRACTING STRATEGY 
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The business strategy developed for CH-53E modernization resulted from careful 
analysis of this procurement as well as lessons learned from other programs.  In 
particular, experiences from two programs, the H-1 Upgrade and H-60R/S programs were 
the primary sources used to develop this unique and tailored strategy.  Of course, this 
strategy represents a preliminary interpretation based upon the current modernization 
element design and competitive environment.  Scope of work and technical changes 
could alter to this strategy.  Additionally, the preponderance of effort was placed on the 
development phases of the strategy, because the information currently available is more 
pertinent to those phases.  For example, MYP may prove to be a feasible and beneficial 
strategy for production, but more detailed design and engineering information is required 
along with a thorough economic analysis to determine whether there are EOQ gains from 
pursuing this and to confirm that the requisite funding is available. 
The business strategy described below is crafted to maximize competition where 
possible, incentivize outstanding contractor performance, reduce the time required to 
meet the warfighter’s requirement and provide the best value to the government.  
Discussion and analysis is divided into the three acquisition management phases in which 
the three modernization work areas are analyzed.   
1. Concept and Technology Development Phase 
This phase will begin by establishing the program office portion of the WSIT.  
Contracts will be awarded to conduct trade studies to evaluate current market capabilities.  
A sole-source Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee (CPFF) type contract will be awarded to Sikorsky to 
begin work with the program office to construct the Joint Statement of Work (JSOW), 
common WBS and Integrated Master Schedule (IMS) for the entire modernization 
development effort.  Draft Associate Contractor Agreements (ACAs) will also be drawn 
up for engine and cockpit manufacturer evaluation.  Multiple competitively-selected 
engine and cockpit design and demonstration contracts will be awarded to various 
contractors.  The winning contractors will then compete for final award of the engine and 
cockpit portions at the beginning of the SD&D phase.     
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A pre-solicitation conference and draft Request For Proposals (RFP) will be used 
to develop the RFP to award multiple design and demonstration contracts to aircraft 
engine manufacturers.  Prospective engine contractors will be asked to design a 
commercial core, modified turboshaft engine that meets user-specified performance 
ranges and Sikorsky-specified interface requirements.  The RFP will state that engine 
contractors will be required to sign ACAs with other modernization contractors should 
they be selected for the subsequent phase.  Additionally, engine contractors will be 
informed that if selected for award to the subsequent phase, they will be required to 
provide a priced intermediate and depot level support proposal, akin to the commercial 
Fleet Hour Agreements (FHA) sold in the commercial aviation market.  CPFF or Firm-
Fixed-Price Level-of-Effort (FFP LOE) type contracts will likely be used for the engine 
design and demonstration contracts.  The number of contracts awarded will likely be 
constrained to between three and five to allow conscientious evaluation of each of the 
designs; developmental funding limitations will also be a constraint.   
In this phase, engine manufacturers should also be consulted about their 
willingness to enter into a government-industry partnership where touch labor for 
intermediate and depot level maintenance would be subcontracted to the Naval Aviation 
Depots (NADEPs).  Contractors would thereby maintain the “product attribute risk,” 
providing a positive incentive for continuous product improvements, while the depots did 
not lose any work.  Clearly, orchestrating such an agreement would be difficult yet it 
does have several positive effects.  Most notably, the political quagmire usually 
encountered when trying to take work out of the depots is avoided, yet the Government 
retains the organic capability to perform this critical maintenance.  Additionally, 
improved designs would likely result in higher reliability, maintainability and a lower 
spares requirement.  Naval Inventory Control Point-Philadelphia (NAVICP-P), NADEP 
Cherry Point, North Carolina and Honeywell successfully orchestrated such an 
arrangement to support several aircraft Auxiliary Power Units (APUs) [Ref. 47]. 
Evaluating and selecting the winning engine design should be based upon 
drivetrain impacts as determined by both simulation and prototype testing.  For this 
reason, prospective engine contractors must have access to information from Sikorsky on 
the possible downstream effects of engine output and design might be.  Evaluation will 
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also be based upon past reliability and maintainability of the core engine and the number 
and scope of modifications needed to construct the CH-53E modernization engine.  
Additionally, output performance and reliability will also be evaluated.  Total system 
O&S cost impact, however, should be the greatest evaluation factor. 
A similar pre-solicitation and draft RFP process as that used to solicit RFP input 
for engine designs will be used to draft the cockpit avionics design and demonstration 
RFP.  Similarly, multiple competitively-negotiated CPFF or FFP LOE contracts will be 
awarded to several cockpit manufacturers and integrators for the design and 
demonstration of cockpit avionics suites.  Current research indicates that Sikorsky will 
likely compete as an integrator for this portion.  They, along with three to four others, 
will be allowed to compete.  Cockpit contractors must also be willing to sign an ACA 
with other modernization contractors should they be selected to provide the cockpit. 
Cockpit competition evaluation will be based on commonality and 
interoperability compliance outlined in the Common Avionics Master Plan (CAMP), 
non-developmental designs of components and open systems architecture based upon 
industry standards.  Designs will also be evaluated on Human Systems Integration and 
basic performance requirements.  However, because the CH-53E cockpit is not as space 
constrained as other platforms, deviations from standard designs should be avoided.  
Evaluations should focus on minimizing developmental costs and maximizing the 
capability for upgrades and technology refreshment as these components continue to 
advance.  More so than the engine competition, this will be a cost/price competition since 
most components should have similar capabilities and performance.  However, because 
the cockpit must be integrated with current system software, software development 
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capability (as specified by the Software Engineering Institute’s (SEI) Capability Maturity 
Model (CMM)) will be a critical selection factor because successfully integrating the 
cockpit is essential to overall program success. 
The remaining modernization elements undergoing advanced development and 
proof of principle demonstration by Sikorsky in this phase will be used in the subsequent 
phases to determine total system and component reliability, maintainability and 
supportability factors.  Component performance in these areas in the subsequent phases 
will be the basis for incentive payments and therefore contractors, particularly Sikorsky, 
will have a positive incentive to invest in developing high-reliability components. 
If developmental funding is seriously constrained, a more careful analysis will be 
required to see if the positive effects of competition support the additional investment in 
multiple designs.  However, it should be remembered that the effects of competition here 
extend beyond price factors.  Specifically, because total system O&S cost impact is the 
primary evaluation factor in both the engine and cockpit designs, there should be a fair 
degree of variability in design innovation that cannot be replicated without competition.  
Therefore, despite the greater outlay of investment capital required in the development 
phase, competition here will likely yield tenfold savings over the life of the system, and 
thus should be staunchly defended.  Nonetheless, if funding is constrained, consideration 
should be given to making minor modifications to the Sikorsky “international” cockpit to 
meet CAMP and JTA requirements rather than eliminating the engine competition from 
this phase.   
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2. System Development and Demonstration 
This phase will mark the initiation of a new program as well as the selection of 
the engine and cockpit contractor based on the best value competition that will culminate 
in product principle validations and demonstrations.  This phase is by far the most critical 
for the modernization effort.  Therefore, it should receive the requisite amount of 
attention from acquisition managers when planning its development and execution.  This 
phase requires successfully integrating the various modernization elements, which upon 
exiting the previous phase were considered to be mature enough to support integration 
and program initiation without incurring too great a risk.    
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The source selection of both the engine and cockpit contractor made at the outset 
of this phase will result from an ongoing evaluation of the design and product 
demonstration results of the previously-awarded CPFF contracts.  Selection criteria will 
be much the same as before, but should be further refined as more product design and 
capability information becomes available.  The selected engine and cockpit contractors 
will now become an integral part of the WSIT.  With the final WSIT members identified, 
their input will be taken to continue to refine and improve the JSOW, common WBS and 
IMS.  With the aid of government acquisition mangers, the ACAs between the various 
contractors will be finalized.  Draft ACAs generated by Sikorsky and the Government 
should be provided in the CT&D phase.  The ACAs will be tailored to the WBS and 
detail rights and responsibilities of each of the parties.  While this process will require 
significant commitment of all WSIT members, the benefits will be reaped throughout the 
subsequent phases.  Table 4.2 illustrates the ACA responsibility matrix excerpted from 
the H-60 program agreement between Lockheed Martin Systems Integration – Owego 
(LMSI-O) and Sikorsky (SAC). 
Table 4.2 H-60S AMCM ACA Amendment Responsibility Matrix [Ref. 48] 
LMSI-O  SAC 
   
Interface Management Team  Interface Management Team 
AMCM Leadership IPT  AMCM Leadership IPT 
AMCM Weapon System Integration IPTs  AMCM Weapon System Integration IPTs 
Support Master Integrated Program Schedule (MIPS)  Develop and Maintain Master Integrated Program 
Schedule (MIPS) 
Manage Electrical Engineering Working Group  Manage Mechanical Engineering Working Group  
Earned Value Measurement for LMSI-O contract and 
WSIT monthly report 
 Earned Value Measurements for SAC contract and WSIT 
monthly report 
Alternate lead for Program Reviews (Integrated Baseline 
Review, System Design Review, Preliminary Design 
Review, and Critical design Review), including 
development of meeting minutes 
 Alternate lead for Program Reviews (Integrated Baseline 
Review, System Design Review, Preliminary Design 
Review, and Critical design Review), including 
development of meeting minutes 
Develop and Maintain Program Management Plan  Support Program Management Plan 
Technical Performance Measures for LMSI-O contract 
and WSIT monthly report 
 Technical Performance Measures for SAC contract and 
WSIT monthly report 
Support Contract Work Breakdown Structure  Develop and maintain Contract Work Breakdown 
Structure 
Alternate lead for Program Status Reporting  Alternate lead for Program Status Reporting 
Develop and Maintain Systems Engineering 
Management Plan and Systems Engineering 
Development Plan 
 Support Systems Engineering Management Plan and 
Support Systems Engineering Development Plan 
Maintain AMCM DOORS database  Support AMCM DOORS database 
Support AMCM risk database  Maintain AMCM risk database 
Support Automatic Flight Control System with cockpit 
modifications 
 Design and incorporate updates for the Automatic Flight 
control system. (Being performed under a separate 
Contract) 
Support integration of the Carriage, Stream, Tow and 
Recovery System 
 Manage the integration of the Carriage, Stream, Tow and 
Recovery System 
Manage development Mission Avionics Kit  Support development Mission Avionics Kit 
Support Mission Avionics Integration into the aircraft  Manage Mission Kit Integration into the aircraft 
Develop and Maintain AMCM system architecture and 
documentation 
 Support AMCM system architecture and documentation 
Design and build portable test rack and common console  Support development of portable test rack and common 
console 
Support development and maintenance of mission kits  Develop and maintain mission kits 
Support development of installation provisions for the 
Tactical Common Data Link 
 Develop installation provisions for the Tactical Common 
Data Link 
  Ensure Cabin Primary Emergency Egress/Rescue System 
(PEERS) requirements are met 
Support weight control program  Develop and maintain a weight control program, 
including updating the Weight Control Handbook 
Support cabin layout design  Coordinate cabin layout design utilizing digital mockup 
Configuration Management Board and CM of Mission 
Avionics Kit  
 Configuration Management Board and CM of Aircraft 
and mission kits 
  
Notice the level of detail outlined in the matrix and the interdependence between parties.  
Furthermore, the details and actions specified in the ACA correlate directly with the 
JSOW and common WBS.  
The subsequent contracts in this phase should be Cost-Plus-Award-Fee for all 
contractors involved.  This phase will likely span two to three years; each contract should 
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be tailored to the work to be performed during the period.  Options during this phase are 
not anticipated, although they may be used if the contractor is not adversely affected by 
the arrangement.  The incentive structure in this phase is critical to success.  Specifically, 
a majority of the award fee pool for each of the contractors should be tied to WSIT 
performance.  Additionally, award fee evaluations should take place at program 
milestones, such as the System Design Review (SDR), rather than arbitrary calendar 
dates.  By tying a majority of the award fee to total team performance at program 
milestones the various contractors have a shared incentive for outstanding performance.  
Similarly, if they fail to reconcile problems they are both “punished.”  Because the 
modernization elements themselves should have fairly stable designs at this point, the 
critical obstacle to success is integration.  Under this sort of arrangement, contractors 
have a vested interest in meeting schedule and resolving conflicts quickly.  During the 
latter portion of this phase (System Demonstration), consideration should be given to 
including liquidated damages clauses to ensure contractors meet schedule “gates.”   
Ensuring that the work of the various contractors is properly integrated and 
continues to progress is often a difficult task for a program office.  Even with a single 
prime contractor, as with the H-1 Upgrade program, significant challenges were 
encountered that hampered both the contractor and the program office from realizing the 
severity of the problem until it had grown considerably [Ref. 34].  By virtue of forming 
the WSIT and subsequent JSOW, WBS and IMS, integrated contract management 
problems become immediately visible because each of the contractors relies on these 
systems to schedule their work and input into the effort.  While this sort of visibility may 
make some program managers uncomfortable, it helps detect and resolve even the 
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smallest issues more rapidly.  It also requires the contractors to communicate with each 
other, giving all concerned parties greater clarity on the total system schedule.   
Of course a portion of the award fee pool for each of the contractors should be 
used to reward individual contractor element performance.  However, this should be a 
relatively small amount compared to the WSIT award fee performance pool.  Clearly, the 
program office has to be the focal point of planning and coordination between the 
contractors.  While this responsibility, when coupled with managing the award fee 
incentive, may be burdensome to acquisition managers, it is nonetheless the most 
effective and efficient means of coordinating the contractors’ complex efforts.   
Consideration should be given to the including specific dispute resolution 
language into the ACAs.  The Government should not become involved in such disputes 
unless asked to intercede by both parties.  Additionally, it would likely be helpful if all 
parties concerned had procedures in place to handle the inevitable conflicts that occur and 
allow the program to continue to progress while steps are taken to reach a resolution.   
3. Production and Deployment 
As mentioned earlier, many of the details of this phase will depend on how the 
program has progressed and developed up to this point.  While the ACAs that were 
developed in the previous phase will continue to be used, during this phase the 
contractors are not as interdependent upon each other.  This phase includes Low Rate 
Initial Production (LRIP), where the demonstrations conducted in the previous phases are 
further refined and production methodologies and practices are certified.   
The LRIP and initial production contracts should be Fixed-Price-Award-Fee.  The 
incentive arrangement will remain largely the same as it did in the previous phase where 
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WSIT performance determined the distribution of a majority of the award fee pool.  Once 
production pace and procedures have stabilized, consideration should be made to utilize a 
Firm-Fixed-Price (FFP) type contract.  Additionally, it is at this point that, funding 
permitting, establishing a MYP for the whole effort, should be considered, as well as 
advance procurement of some high value long-lead items that are likely to reap learning 
curve benefits that will reduce the Government’s cost.  Of course, the economic analysis 
would have to account for the production limitation (only two years) that must be applied 
to items or components purchased using advance procurement funds.  Consideration 
should also be given to competing out IDIAT on later production runs to ensure 
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1. The Lust for New and Greater System Performance Tends to 
Dominate All Other Requirements   
While this provides American fighting forces with the most capable weapon 
systems in the world, it does so at great expense.  New and aging systems alike tend to 
accept high levels of programmatic risk and blindly buy into optimistic Life Cycle Cost 
(LCC) estimates.  This fate has yet to befall the CH-53E modernization effort, however, 
it is threatening an attack as various stakeholders inside and outside the user community 
begin to add to the growing list of modernization requirements and known O&S cost 
drivers receive less and less attention.  The discussion and analyses in Chapters III and IV 
outlines some of the programmatic risks and challenges acquisition managers involved in 
modernizing the CH-53E should heed if they wish to stem the tide of growing O&S costs 
associated with their aircraft and actually deliver a more capable and reliable platform.   
2. There Are No Modernization Success Stories that Provide Easy 
Solutions for Acquisition Managers 
Aging systems should, in theory, have the advantage of experience over new 
programs.  After all, the data are there, or should be, to identify which areas are 
degrading reliability and driving costs upward.  However, there are few success stories of 
programs adequately ameliorating the affects of aging airframes and concurrently 
refreshing capabilities.  This is often the result of the overwhelming force of  “take-all-
you-can-get-when-you-can-get-it” user communities who feel, and have been, starved of 
adequate funding to maintain operational parity with other platforms.  Yet making 
dramatic capability leaps with aging systems is fraught with more perils than with new 
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systems.  As this thesis has documented, the complexities of modernization are difficult 
to address and not easily understood.  Indeed, the challenges discovered in this research 
by no means capture the entire spectrum of difficulties that may be encountered in 
modernizing such a complex system.  To the student of major weapon systems 
acquisitions, trying to organize and capture all the pertinent issues involved in developing 
a coherent acquisition strategy for an undertaking of this magnitude is truly humbling. 
3. Determining the Effects of Modernization and Aging On Dynamic 
Components Is the Critical Issue for CH-53E Modernization  
For the CH-53E modernization acquisition strategy, the demonstrated impact of 
aging on dynamic components combined with the potential effects of modernization on 
the existing dynamic components must be carefully evaluated and monitored.  
Acquisition managers allowing themselves to “buy in” to overly optimistic presumptions 
of these impacts will likely observe astronomical O&S cost growth accompanied by 
declining readiness rates and perhaps even catastrophic failures.  Additionally, the drive 
for greater performance will encourage acquisition managers to minimize the significance 
of this issue.  Failing to ensure this issue is resolved before key program decisions will 
likely lead to disastrous results.  This is by far the greatest facet of risk to the proposed 
modernization and should be of primary concern to program and acquisition managers as 
well as users. 
4. Using Decision Support Software to Facilitate Ongoing Economic 
Analyses of Program Progress Will Lead to Better Decisions 
This research explored the issues involved in addressing the aging phenomenon at 
an early stage, prior to the formal initiation of a program or receipt of funding.  While 
this made it difficult to collect some data, there are some clear benefits.  Specifically, the 
use of a DSS such as LDW, and the construction of an economic cost effectiveness model 
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that can be used as an ongoing decision aid for program managers, may yet prove to be 
invaluable.  Additionally, it provided an opportunity for program personnel to begin to 
consider some of the issues involved in modernization and organize their thoughts and 
actions toward addressing those issues.   
5. Common Program Offices and Teams within NAVAIR Are Unlikely 
to Realize Full Potential Because of Current Funding Arrangement 
A supplementary conclusion was made while conducting this research regarding 
the obstacles to success of non-aircraft PMAs and other indirectly funded entities, such as 
PMA-209 and the Aging Aircraft IPT.  While these organizations offer valuable 
experience and expertise to the various aircraft program offices, they are overwhelmingly 
seen to be funding parasites.  While not funding them directly ensures a certain incentive 
for efficiency, it also serves as a strong disincentive for program managers of aircraft 
PMAs to utilize such organizations because it requires them to sacrifice control of their 
funding to procure some good or service they can usually obtain themselves through 
normal channels.  Given this funding arrangement, it makes it very difficult for such 
organizations to receive the funding necessary to pursue opportunities for cost savings or 
reliability improvements because Program Managers have little incentive to relinquish 
control of their funding.  As long as this situation persists, it seems unlikely that these 
organizations will succeed addressing the numerous problems common to many Naval 
aviation platforms. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Early and Continuous Dialogue between Users, Acquisition Managers 
and Contractors Is Needed to Match Resources and Expectations 
Much of Chapter IV serves as a recommendation for proceeding with the CH-53E 
modernization.  However, acquisition managers must actively engage the user and 
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requirements community and educate them concerning the perils and pitfalls of major 
weapon systems acquisitions.  It seems that all too often they fail to realize the potential 
programmatic impacts of inflexibly approaching requirements.  The reality is that these 
programs live and die in a politically-charged environment.  Ignoring or choosing to 
disregard that environment only serves to endanger a program’s chances for achieving 
cost, schedule and performance objectives.  Additionally, acquisition managers must 
serve as a conduit between the contractors and the users; keeping each party informed of 
changes and challenges as the program progresses.  Failure to do this will inevitably lead 
to a mismatch between user expectations, program funding and/ or contractor capability.  
2. Acquisition Managers Must Innovate New Strategies Tailored to 
Platform Specific Technology and Needs 
While it is unlikely that the acquisition strategy developed in the previous chapter 
will be followed or acted upon exactly, it does provide a basis of departure.  The methods 
it presents for mitigating risk, incentivizing outstanding contractor performance, reducing 
O&S costs and delivering the best value to the government are not the only methods, but 
they do address the salient issues that acquisition managers should consider as they 
approach the challenge of modernizing the Marine Corps’ CH-53E Super Stallion.  More 
importantly however, this strategy highlights the need for acquisition managers to 
continually seek out new and innovative approaches to ameliorating the insidious effects 
of aging on our fleet of aircraft.  Clearly there is no single recipe for success for all 
platforms.  Acquisition managers must carefully analyze the distinct requirements of each 
program and developing a tailored approach that addresses those requirements such as 
was done for the CH-53E modernization in Chapter IV. 
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3. Early Testing and Validation of Effects on Dynamic Components 
Should Be Used to Pace CH-53E Modernization Program 
In order to ensure that CH-53E modernization achieves its objectives, acquisition 
managers should utilize aggressive testing and validation schemes to confirm the effects 
of modernization on aging dynamic components are known prior to program initiation 
and progression.  This issue represents the Achilles heel of the program and managers 
must not allow external pressures to minimize its significance.  Because of the far 
reaching implications in cost, reliability, maintainability and safety, the condition of key 
dynamic components must be continually monitored and evaluated to ensure that 
modernization is indeed the most effective means of meeting user requirements.    
4. Use Decision Support Software and Update With Test and Cost 
Information for More Informed Decisions 
This research clearly demonstrates the value of continually using of LDW, or a 
similar DSS type tool to monitor and evaluate requirements generation, performance 
output and cost changes to ensure that they are in keeping with program goals and 
funding levels.  Such a tool is also useful for gaming out stakeholder evaluation of 
program performance.  It allows program personnel to substitute the preferences of 
various leaders or evaluators and objectively measure program performance.  LDW or 
similar DSS is also a powerful tool for PMs in making ongoing economic value 
assessments of program progress, i.e. modernize or buy, multiyear procurement, and 
advance procurement.  It also helps quickly identify disconnects between costs and 
effectiveness.  However, it must be continually monitored and updated so that timely 
action can be taken to resolve these issues.  Additionally, once the basic model has been 
constructed, it can rather easily continue to evolve to capture the growing program 
complexity.  For this reason, it is recommended that acquisition managers consider 
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adopting such a tool early in program development in order to continually use as a 
decision aid. 
5. Fund Common Program Offices and Teams Directly So Aircraft 
Program Offices Have an Incentive to Utilize Them 
If NAVAIR truly wants to leverage the effectiveness of these common 
organizations, they must be funded directly by the Program Executive Offices (PEOs).  
Otherwise, they will continue to be perceived as well intentioned and capable funding 
parasites.  By de-politicizing the funding issue, common program offices and teams are 
free to focus their attention and energy on addressing critical problems facing many naval 
aircraft rather than competing for funding with individual aircraft program office 
initiatives.  Additionally, because their services are offered free to the aircraft program 
offices, managers are much more likely to heed their suggestions and utilize them to the 
benefit all parties involved. 
C. ADDITIONAL AREAS OF RESEARCH 
It is the author’s sincere intention that this work will add to the body of 
knowledge of acquisition research and that others will follow behind and continue to 
document the progress of the CH-53E and other aging aircraft.  Therefore, it would be 
helpful if this work would serve as an opening chapter in a case study documenting the 
CH-53E’s journey through the acquisition process and evaluate whether the 
recommendations and observations suggested in this work were accurate, relevant and or 
helpful to acquisition managers.   
Clearly, there is a great deal more research that must be done to prepare for this 
particular acquisition; in particular more research needs to be done to try to develop some 
common methodologies or tools that can help acquisition managers deal with 
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modernizing aging systems.  While it is clear that there are no cookbook answers to these 
complex problems and no two situations are exactly alike, there is an opportunity to learn 
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APPENDIX A.  LDW GOAL / MEASURE HIERARCHY 
 
I. Payload 3H Scenario
Pounds
J. Range 3H Scenario
Nautical Miles
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APPENDIX B.  PROCUREMENT COST MODELS 
 
LOW RDT&E
FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 TOTAL
Design & Eng. SLEP 7.4 9.8 4.9 2.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 25            
FTA 0.0 18.9 32.3 2.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 54            
ST/STE 0.0 6.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6              
ST&E 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.2 7.2 33.6 24.0 24.0 96            
SE/PM 0.7 3.5 3.7 1.2 0.7 3.4 2.4 2.4 18            
ECO 0.8 3.8 4.1 1.4 0.8 3.7 2.6 2.6 20            
ILS/Spares/Govt. Supt. 2.0 3.1 49.0 39.8 8.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 102          
S (SLEP ONLY) TOTAL 10.9 45.0 94.0 54.7 16.9 40.7 29.0 29.0 320          
Design & Eng. SLEP 7.4 9.8 4.9 2.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 25            
Design & Eng. Engines 12.3 16.4 8.2 4.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 41            
Design & Eng. Blades 16.2 21.6 10.8 5.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 54            
Design & Eng. EMRH 24.3 32.4 16.2 8.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 81            
Design & Eng. Hook Sys 1.9 2.6 1.3 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6              
Design & Eng. Cockpit 13.5 18.0 9.0 4.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 45            
Design & Eng. Avi. S/W 6.6 6.6 6.6 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 0.0 33            
FTA 0.0 41.7 71.5 6.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 119          
ST/STE 0.0 6.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6              
ST&E 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.2 7.2 33.6 24.0 24.0 96            
SE/PM 8.2 15.5 12.9 4.2 1.1 3.7 2.7 2.4 51            
ECO 9.0 17.1 14.1 4.6 1.2 4.1 3.0 2.6 56            
ILS/Spares/Govt. Supt. 2.0 3.1 49.0 39.8 8.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 102          
ALL SIX ELEMENTS TOTAL 101.5 190.8 204.5 90.2 20.9 44.6 33.0 29.0 715          
Design & Eng. SLEP 7.4 9.8 4.9 2.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 25            
Design & Eng. Engines 12.3 16.4 8.2 4.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 41            
Design & Eng. Hook Sys 1.9 2.6 1.3 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6              
FTA 0.0 28.3 48.4 4.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 81            
ST/STE 0.0 6.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6              
ST&E 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.2 7.2 33.6 24.0 24.0 96            
SE/PM 2.2 6.3 6.3 1.8 0.7 3.4 2.4 2.4 25            
ECO 2.4 6.9 6.9 2.0 0.8 3.7 2.6 2.6 28            
ILS/Spares/Govt. Supt. 2.0 3.1 49.0 39.8 8.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 102          
S,E,H TOTAL 28.2 79.4 125.0 62.1 16.9 40.7 29.0 29.0 410          
Design & Eng. SLEP 7.4 9.8 4.9 2.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 25            
Design & Eng. Engines 12.3 16.4 8.2 4.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 41            
Design & Eng. Blades 16.2 21.6 10.8 5.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 54            
Design & Eng. Hook Sys 1.9 2.6 1.3 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6              
FTA 0.0 33.5 57.3 4.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 96            
ST/STE 0.0 6.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6              
ST&E 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.2 7.2 33.6 24.0 24.0 96            
SE/PM 3.8 9.0 8.3 2.5 0.7 3.4 2.4 2.4 32            
ECO 4.2 9.9 9.1 2.7 0.8 3.7 2.6 2.6 36            
ILS/Spares/Govt. Supt. 2.0 3.1 49.0 39.8 8.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 102          
S,E,B,H TOTAL 47.8 111.8 148.8 69.5 16.9 40.7 29.0 29.0 494          
Design & Eng. SLEP 7.4 9.8 4.9 2.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 25            
Design & Eng. Engines 12.3 16.4 8.2 4.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 41            
Design & Eng. Blades 16.2 21.6 10.8 5.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 54            
Design & Eng. EMRH 24.3 32.4 16.2 8.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 81            
Design & Eng. Hook Sys 1.9 2.6 1.3 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6              
FTA 0.0 38.2 65.5 5.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 109          
ST/STE 0.0 6.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6              
ST&E 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.2 7.2 33.6 24.0 24.0 96            
SE/PM 6.2 12.7 10.7 3.3 0.7 3.4 2.4 2.4 42            
ECO 6.8 14.0 11.8 3.7 0.8 3.7 2.6 2.6 46            
ILS/Spares/Govt. Supt. 2.0 3.1 49.0 39.8 8.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 102          
S,E,B,R,H TOTAL 77.2 156.8 178.4 80.1 16.9 40.7 29.0 29.0 608          
Design & Eng. SLEP 7.4 9.8 4.9 2.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 25            
Design & Eng. Blades 16.2 21.6 10.8 5.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 54            
FTA 0.0 24.1 41.2 3.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 69            
ST/STE 0.0 6.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6              
ST&E 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.2 7.2 33.6 24.0 24.0 96            
SE/PM 2.4 6.1 5.7 1.8 0.7 3.4 2.4 2.4 25            
ECO 2.6 6.8 6.3 2.0 0.8 3.7 2.6 2.6 27            
ILS/Spares/Govt. Supt. 2.0 3.1 49.0 39.8 8.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 102          




Design & Eng. SLEP 7.4 9.8 4.9 2.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 25            
Design & Eng. Blades 16.2 21.6 10.8 5.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 54            
Design & Eng. EMRH 24.3 32.4 16.2 8.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 81            
FTA 0.0 28.8 49.4 4.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 82            
ST/STE 0.0 6.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6              
ST&E 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.2 7.2 33.6 24.0 24.0 96            
SE/PM 4.8 9.9 8.1 2.7 0.7 3.4 2.4 2.4 34            
ECO 5.3 10.9 8.9 3.0 0.8 3.7 2.6 2.6 38            
ILS/Spares/Govt. Supt. 2.0 3.1 49.0 39.8 8.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 102          
S,B,R TOTAL 59.9 122.4 147.4 72.8 16.9 40.7 29.0 29.0 518          
Design & Eng. SLEP 7.4 9.8 4.9 2.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 25            
Design & Eng. Blades 16.2 21.6 10.8 5.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 54            
Design & Eng. EMRH 24.3 32.4 16.2 8.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 81            
Design & Eng. Cockpit 13.5 18.0 9.0 4.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 45            
Design & Eng. Avi. S/W 6.6 6.6 6.6 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 0.0 33            
FTA 0.0 32.3 55.4 4.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 92            
ST/STE 0.0 6.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6              
ST&E 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.2 7.2 33.6 24.0 24.0 96            
SE/PM 6.8 12.7 10.3 3.6 1.1 3.7 2.7 2.4 43            
ECO 7.5 13.9 11.3 3.9 1.2 4.1 3.0 2.6 48            
ILS/Spares/Govt. Supt. 2.0 3.1 49.0 39.8 8.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 102          
S,B,R,C TOTAL 84.3 156.4 173.5 82.8 20.9 44.6 33.0 29.0 625          
Design & Eng. SLEP 7.4 9.8 4.9 2.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 25            
Design & Eng. EMRH 24.3 32.4 16.2 8.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 81            
FTA 0.0 23.6 40.5 3.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 68            
ST/STE 0.0 6.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6              
ST&E 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.2 7.2 33.6 24.0 24.0 96            
SE/PM 3.2 7.2 6.2 2.1 0.7 3.4 2.4 2.4 28            
ECO 3.5 7.9 6.8 2.3 0.8 3.7 2.6 2.6 30            
ILS/Spares/Govt. Supt. 2.0 3.1 49.0 39.8 8.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 102          
S,R TOTAL 40.3 90.0 123.5 65.3 16.9 40.7 29.0 29.0 435          
Design & Eng. SLEP 7.4 9.8 4.9 2.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 25            
Design & Eng. EMRH 24.3 32.4 16.2 8.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 81            
Design & Eng. Cockpit 13.5 18.0 9.0 4.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 45            
Design & Eng. Avi. S/W 6.6 6.6 6.6 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 0.0 33            
FTA 0.0 27.1 46.5 3.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 78            
ST/STE 0.0 6.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6              
ST&E 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.2 7.2 33.6 24.0 24.0 96            
SE/PM 5.2 10.0 8.3 2.9 1.1 3.7 2.7 2.4 36            
ECO 5.7 11.0 9.2 3.2 1.2 4.1 3.0 2.6 40            
ILS/Spares/Govt. Supt. 2.0 3.1 49.0 39.8 8.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 102          












FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 TOTAL
Design & Eng. SLEP 10.2 13.6 6.8 3.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 34            
FTA 0.0 21.1 36.1 3.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 60            
ST/STE 0.0 7.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7              
ST&E 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.1 8.1 37.8 27.0 27.0 108          
SE/PM 1.0 4.2 4.3 1.5 0.8 3.8 2.7 2.7 21            
ECO 1.1 4.6 4.7 1.6 0.9 4.2 3.0 3.0 23            
ILS/Spares/Govt. Supt. 2.3 3.5 55.2 44.9 9.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 115          
S (SLEP ONLY) TOTAL 14.6 53.9 107.2 62.4 19.0 45.7 32.7 32.7 368          
Design & Eng. SLEP 10.2 13.6 6.8 3.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 34            
Design & Eng. Engines 12.9 17.2 8.6 4.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 43            
Design & Eng. Blades 18.0 24.0 12.0 6.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 60            
Design & Eng. EMRH 27.0 36.0 18.0 9.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 90            
Design & Eng. Hook Sys 2.7 3.6 1.8 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9              
Design & Eng. Cockpit 15.0 20.0 10.0 5.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 50            
Design & Eng. Avi. S/W 8.8 8.8 8.8 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 0.0 44            
FTA 0.0 48.2 82.6 6.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 138          
ST/STE 0.0 7.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7              
ST&E 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.1 8.1 37.8 27.0 27.0 108          
SE/PM 9.5 17.8 14.9 4.8 1.3 4.2 3.1 2.7 58            
ECO 10.4 19.6 16.3 5.3 1.4 4.6 3.5 3.0 64            
ILS/Spares/Govt. Supt. 2.3 3.5 55.2 44.9 9.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 115          
ALL SIX ELEMENTS TOTAL 116.8 219.3 235.0 102.9 24.3 51.1 38.0 32.7 820          
Design & Eng. SLEP 10.2 13.6 6.8 3.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 34            
Design & Eng. Engines 12.9 17.2 8.6 4.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 43            
Design & Eng. Hook Sys 2.7 3.6 1.8 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9              
FTA 0.0 30.8 52.7 4.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 88            
ST/STE 0.0 7.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7              
ST&E 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.1 8.1 37.8 27.0 27.0 108          
SE/PM 2.6 7.2 7.0 2.1 0.8 3.8 2.7 2.7 29            
ECO 2.8 7.9 7.7 2.3 0.9 4.2 3.0 3.0 32            
ILS/Spares/Govt. Supt. 2.3 3.5 55.2 44.9 9.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 115          
S,E,H TOTAL 33.5 90.8 139.8 70.4 19.0 45.7 32.7 32.7 465          
Design & Eng. SLEP 10.2 13.6 6.8 3.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 34            
Design & Eng. Engines 12.9 17.2 8.6 4.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 43            
Design & Eng. Blades 18.0 24.0 12.0 6.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 60            
Design & Eng. Hook Sys 2.7 3.6 1.8 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9              
FTA 0.0 39.3 67.4 5.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 112          
ST/STE 0.0 7.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7              
ST&E 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.1 8.1 37.8 27.0 27.0 108          
SE/PM 4.4 10.5 9.7 2.8 0.8 3.8 2.7 2.7 37            
ECO 4.8 11.5 10.6 3.1 0.9 4.2 3.0 3.0 41            
ILS/Spares/Govt. Supt. 2.3 3.5 55.2 44.9 9.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 115          
S,E,B,H TOTAL 55.3 130.2 172.1 79.1 19.0 45.7 32.7 32.7 567          
Design & Eng. SLEP 10.2 13.6 6.8 3.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 34            
Design & Eng. Engines 12.9 17.2 8.6 4.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 43            
Design & Eng. Blades 18.0 24.0 12.0 6.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 60            
Design & Eng. EMRH 27.0 36.0 18.0 9.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 90            
Design & Eng. Hook Sys 2.7 3.6 1.8 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9              
FTA 0.0 44.7 76.6 6.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 128          
ST/STE 0.0 7.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7              
ST&E 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.1 8.1 37.8 27.0 27.0 108          
SE/PM 7.1 14.6 12.4 3.8 0.8 3.8 2.7 2.7 48            
ECO 7.8 16.1 13.6 4.2 0.9 4.2 3.0 3.0 53            
ILS/Spares/Govt. Supt. 2.3 3.5 55.2 44.9 9.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 115          
S,E,B,R,H TOTAL 88.0 180.2 204.9 90.9 19.0 45.7 32.7 32.7 694          
Design & Eng. SLEP 10.2 13.6 6.8 3.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 34            
Design & Eng. Blades 18.0 24.0 12.0 6.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 60            
FTA 0.0 29.6 50.8 4.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 85            
ST/STE 0.0 7.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7              
ST&E 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.1 8.1 37.8 27.0 27.0 108          
SE/PM 2.8 7.4 7.0 2.2 0.8 3.8 2.7 2.7 29            
ECO 3.1 8.2 7.7 2.4 0.9 4.2 3.0 3.0 32            
ILS/Spares/Govt. Supt. 2.3 3.5 55.2 44.9 9.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 115          





Design & Eng. SLEP 10.2 13.6 6.8 3.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 34            
Design & Eng. Blades 18.0 24.0 12.0 6.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 60            
Design & Eng. EMRH 27.0 36.0 18.0 9.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 90            
FTA 0.0 35.0 60.0 5.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100          
ST/STE 0.0 7.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7              
ST&E 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.1 8.1 37.8 27.0 27.0 108          
SE/PM 5.5 11.6 9.7 3.1 0.8 3.8 2.7 2.7 40            
ECO 6.1 12.7 10.6 3.5 0.9 4.2 3.0 3.0 44            
ILS/Spares/Govt. Supt. 2.3 3.5 55.2 44.9 9.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 115          
S,B,R TOTAL 69.1 143.3 172.3 83.0 19.0 45.7 32.7 32.7 598          
Design & Eng. SLEP 10.2 13.6 6.8 3.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 34            
Design & Eng. Blades 18.0 24.0 12.0 6.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 60            
Design & Eng. EMRH 27.0 36.0 18.0 9.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 90            
Design & Eng. Cockpit 15.0 20.0 10.0 5.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 50            
Design & Eng. Avi. S/W 8.8 8.8 8.8 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 0.0 44            
FTA 0.0 38.5 66.0 5.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 110          
ST/STE 0.0 7.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7              
ST&E 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.1 8.1 37.8 27.0 27.0 108          
SE/PM 7.9 14.8 12.2 4.1 1.3 4.2 3.1 2.7 50            
ECO 8.7 16.3 13.4 4.6 1.4 4.6 3.5 3.0 55            
ILS/Spares/Govt. Supt. 2.3 3.5 55.2 44.9 9.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 115          
S,B,R,C TOTAL 97.9 182.4 202.3 94.9 24.3 51.1 38.0 32.7 724          
Design & Eng. SLEP 10.2 13.6 6.8 3.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 34            
Design & Eng. EMRH 27.0 36.0 18.0 9.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 90            
FTA 0.0 26.4 45.3 3.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 75            
ST/STE 0.0 7.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7              
ST&E 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.1 8.1 37.8 27.0 27.0 108          
SE/PM 3.7 8.3 7.0 2.4 0.8 3.8 2.7 2.7 31            
ECO 4.1 9.1 7.7 2.7 0.9 4.2 3.0 3.0 35            
ILS/Spares/Govt. Supt. 2.3 3.5 55.2 44.9 9.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 115          
S,R TOTAL 47.3 103.9 140.0 74.2 19.0 45.7 32.7 32.7 496          
Design & Eng. SLEP 10.2 13.6 6.8 3.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 34            
Design & Eng. EMRH 27.0 36.0 18.0 9.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 90            
Design & Eng. Cockpit 15.0 20.0 10.0 5.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 50            
Design & Eng. Avi. S/W 8.8 8.8 8.8 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 0.0 44            
FTA 0.0 29.9 51.3 4.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 85            
ST/STE 0.0 7.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7              
ST&E 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.1 8.1 37.8 27.0 27.0 108          
SE/PM 6.1 11.5 9.5 3.4 1.3 4.2 3.1 2.7 42            
ECO 6.7 12.7 10.4 3.8 1.4 4.6 3.5 3.0 46            
ILS/Spares/Govt. Supt. 2.3 3.5 55.2 44.9 9.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 115          












FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13 FY14 FY15 FY16 FY17 FY18 TOTAL
SLEP & Hook Sys. Fab Kit 33.8 46.9 89.8 109.6 108.8 109.0 109.7 110.8 104.7 0.0 823          
IDIA&T 0.0 27.1 37.5 71.8 87.3 86.5 86.6 87.1 88.0 83.1 655          
ST/STE 24.0 6.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 30            
SE/PM 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 37            
ECO 0.8 1.6 2.6 3.7 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 3.9 1.7 30            
ILS/Spares/Govt. Supt. 77.3 72.1 56.7 51.5 51.5 51.5 51.5 51.5 51.5 0.0 515          
S (SLEP ONLY) TOTAL 139.5 157.3 190.2 240.2 255.3 254.7 255.5 257.1 251.8 88.5 2,090       
SLEP & Hook Sys. Fab Kit 33.8 46.9 89.8 109.6 108.8 109.0 109.7 110.8 104.7 0.0 823          
Engines Fab Kit 19.8 29.6 59.1 73.8 73.8 73.8 73.7 73.7 68.8 0.0 546          
Blades Fab Kit 14.8 17.2 28.8 32.2 30.2 28.9 27.9 27.2 24.9 0.0 232          
EMRH Fab Kit 13.7 18.2 32.5 38.2 37.1 36.3 35.7 35.2 32.7 0.0 280          
Cockpit Fab Kit 10.0 15.0 30.0 37.5 37.5 37.5 37.5 37.5 35.0 0.0 278          
IDIA&T 0.0 27.1 37.5 71.8 87.3 86.5 86.6 87.1 88.0 83.1 655          
ST/STE 24.0 6.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 30            
SE/PM 7.7 9.3 14.2 16.4 16.2 16.0 15.9 15.8 15.0 3.7 130          
ECO 2.0 3.3 5.8 7.6 7.8 7.8 7.7 7.7 7.4 1.7 59            
ILS/Spares/Govt. Supt. 77.3 72.1 56.7 51.5 51.5 51.5 51.5 51.5 51.5 0.0 515          
ALL SIX ELEMENTS TOTAL 203.1 244.6 354.4 438.6 450.3 447.3 446.4 446.6 427.9 88.5 3,548       
SLEP & Hook Sys. Fab Kit 33.8 46.9 89.8 109.6 108.8 109.0 109.7 110.8 104.7 0.0 823          
Engines Fab Kit 19.8 29.6 59.1 73.8 73.8 73.8 73.7 73.7 68.8 0.0 546          
IDIA&T 0.0 27.1 37.5 71.8 87.3 86.5 86.6 87.1 88.0 83.1 655          
ST/STE 24.0 6.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 30            
SE/PM 5.1 5.7 7.8 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.5 3.7 75            
ECO 1.2 2.2 3.9 5.3 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.4 1.7 42            
ILS/Spares/Govt. Supt. 77.3 72.1 56.7 51.5 51.5 51.5 51.5 51.5 51.5 0.0 515          
S,E,H TOTAL 161.1 189.6 254.7 320.8 335.8 335.2 336.0 337.6 326.9 88.5 2,686       
SLEP & Hook Sys. Fab Kit 33.8 46.9 89.8 109.6 108.8 109.0 109.7 110.8 104.7 0.0 823          
Engines Fab Kit 19.8 29.6 59.1 73.8 73.8 73.8 73.7 73.7 68.8 0.0 546          
Blades Fab Kit 14.8 17.2 28.8 32.2 30.2 28.9 27.9 27.2 24.9 0.0 232          
IDIA&T 0.0 27.1 37.5 71.8 87.3 86.5 86.6 87.1 88.0 83.1 655          
ST/STE 24.0 6.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 30            
SE/PM 6.1 6.9 9.8 11.1 11.0 10.9 10.8 10.7 10.2 3.7 91            
ECO 1.5 2.6 4.5 6.0 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 5.9 1.7 47            
ILS/Spares/Govt. Supt. 77.3 72.1 56.7 51.5 51.5 51.5 51.5 51.5 51.5 0.0 515          
S,E,B,H TOTAL 177.3 208.4 286.2 355.9 368.8 366.7 366.5 367.2 354.1 88.5 2,940       
SLEP & Hook Sys. Fab Kit 33.8 46.9 89.8 109.6 108.8 109.0 109.7 110.8 104.7 0.0 823          
Engines Fab Kit 19.8 29.6 59.1 73.8 73.8 73.8 73.7 73.7 68.8 0.0 546          
Blades Fab Kit 14.8 17.2 28.8 32.2 30.2 28.9 27.9 27.2 24.9 0.0 232          
EMRH Fab Kit 13.7 18.2 32.5 38.2 37.1 36.3 35.7 35.2 32.7 0.0 280          
IDIA&T 0.0 27.1 37.5 71.8 87.3 86.5 86.6 87.1 88.0 83.1 655          
ST/STE 24.0 6.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 30            
SE/PM 7.0 8.2 12.1 13.8 13.5 13.4 13.3 13.2 12.5 3.7 111          
ECO 1.8 2.9 5.2 6.8 7.0 7.0 6.9 6.9 6.6 1.7 53            
ILS/Spares/Govt. Supt. 77.3 72.1 56.7 51.5 51.5 51.5 51.5 51.5 51.5 0.0 515          
S,E,B,R,H TOTAL 192.2 228.2 321.7 397.7 409.3 406.4 405.4 405.7 389.7 88.5 3,245       
SLEP & Hook Sys. Fab Kit 33.8 46.9 89.8 109.6 108.8 109.0 109.7 110.8 104.7 0.0 823          
Blades Fab Kit 14.8 17.2 28.8 32.2 30.2 28.9 27.9 27.2 24.9 0.0 232          
IDIA&T 0.0 27.1 37.5 71.8 87.3 86.5 86.6 87.1 88.0 83.1 655          
ST/STE 24.0 6.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 30            
SE/PM 4.7 4.9 5.7 5.9 5.8 5.7 5.6 5.6 5.4 3.7 53            
ECO 1.1 1.9 3.2 4.4 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.5 1.7 35            
ILS/Spares/Govt. Supt. 77.3 72.1 56.7 51.5 51.5 51.5 51.5 51.5 51.5 0.0 515          
S,B TOTAL 155.7 176.1 221.6 275.4 288.3 286.2 286.0 286.8 279.0 88.5 2,344       
SLEP & Hook Sys. Fab Kit 33.8 46.9 89.8 109.6 108.8 109.0 109.7 110.8 104.7 0.0 823          
Blades Fab Kit 14.8 17.2 28.8 32.2 30.2 28.9 27.9 27.2 24.9 0.0 232          
EMRH Fab Kit 13.7 18.2 32.5 38.2 37.1 36.3 35.7 35.2 32.7 0.0 280          
IDIA&T 0.0 27.1 37.5 71.8 87.3 86.5 86.6 87.1 88.0 83.1 655          
ST/STE 24.0 6.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 30            
SE/PM 5.7 6.1 8.0 8.6 8.4 8.2 8.1 8.0 7.7 3.7 73            
ECO 1.4 2.3 3.9 5.2 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.2 1.7 41            
ILS/Spares/Govt. Supt. 77.3 72.1 56.7 51.5 51.5 51.5 51.5 51.5 51.5 0.0 515          








SLEP & Hook Sys. Fab Kit 33.8 46.9 89.8 109.6 108.8 109.0 109.7 110.8 104.7 0.0 823          
Blades Fab Kit 14.8 17.2 28.8 32.2 30.2 28.9 27.9 27.2 24.9 0.0 232          
EMRH Fab Kit 13.7 18.2 32.5 38.2 37.1 36.3 35.7 35.2 32.7 0.0 280          
Cockpit Fab Kit 10.0 15.0 30.0 37.5 37.5 37.5 37.5 37.5 35.0 0.0 278          
IDIA&T 0.0 27.1 37.5 71.8 87.3 86.5 86.6 87.1 88.0 83.1 655          
ST/STE 24.0 6.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 30            
SE/PM 6.4 7.2 10.1 11.2 11.0 10.9 10.8 10.7 10.2 3.7 92            
ECO 1.6 2.6 4.6 6.0 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 5.9 1.7 47            
ILS/Spares/Govt. Supt. 77.3 72.1 56.7 51.5 51.5 51.5 51.5 51.5 51.5 0.0 515          
S,B,R,C TOTAL 181.5 212.3 289.9 358.0 369.7 366.8 365.9 366.2 352.9 88.5 2,952       
SLEP & Hook Sys. Fab Kit 33.8 46.9 89.8 109.6 108.8 109.0 109.7 110.8 104.7 0.0 823          
EMRH Fab Kit 13.7 18.2 32.5 38.2 37.1 36.3 35.7 35.2 32.7 0.0 280          
IDIA&T 0.0 27.1 37.5 71.8 87.3 86.5 86.6 87.1 88.0 83.1 655          
ST/STE 24.0 6.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 30            
SE/PM 4.6 4.9 5.9 6.3 6.3 6.2 6.2 6.1 6.0 3.7 56            
ECO 1.0 1.9 3.3 4.5 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.6 1.7 36            
ILS/Spares/Govt. Supt. 77.3 72.1 56.7 51.5 51.5 51.5 51.5 51.5 51.5 0.0 515          
S,R TOTAL 154.4 177.2 225.7 281.9 295.8 294.3 294.5 295.6 287.5 88.5 2,395       
SLEP & Hook Sys. Fab Kit 33.8 46.9 89.8 109.6 108.8 109.0 109.7 110.8 104.7 0.0 823          
EMRH Fab Kit 13.7 18.2 32.5 38.2 37.1 36.3 35.7 35.2 32.7 0.0 280          
Cockpit Fab Kit 10.0 15.0 30.0 37.5 37.5 37.5 37.5 37.5 35.0 0.0 278          
IDIA&T 0.0 27.1 37.5 71.8 87.3 86.5 86.6 87.1 88.0 83.1 655          
ST/STE 24.0 6.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 30            
SE/PM 5.3 6.0 8.0 9.0 8.9 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.4 3.7 76            
ECO 1.3 2.3 4.0 5.3 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.4 1.7 42            
ILS/Spares/Govt. Supt. 77.3 72.1 56.7 51.5 51.5 51.5 51.5 51.5 51.5 0.0 515          
S,R,C TOTAL 165.3 193.5 258.5 322.9 336.7 335.2 335.4 336.5 325.7 88.5 2,698        
HIGH APN
FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13 FY14 FY15 FY16 FY17 FY18 TOTAL
SLEP & Hook Sys. Fab Kit 37.8 52.4 100.4 122.5 121.6 121.8 122.7 123.9 117.1 0.0 920          
IDIA&T 0.0 30.3 41.9 80.2 97.6 96.7 96.8 97.4 98.3 92.9 732          
ST/STE 24.0 6.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 30            
SE/PM 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 37            
ECO 0.8 1.7 2.9 4.1 4.5 4.4 4.5 4.5 4.4 1.9 34            
ILS/Spares/Govt. Supt. 77.3 72.1 56.7 51.5 51.5 51.5 51.5 51.5 51.5 0.0 515          
S (SLEP ONLY) TOTAL 143.6 166.2 205.5 262.0 278.9 278.2 279.1 280.9 274.9 98.5 2,268       
SLEP & Hook Sys. Fab Kit 37.8 52.4 100.4 122.5 121.6 121.8 122.7 123.9 117.1 0.0 920          
Engines Fab Kit 19.8 29.6 59.1 73.8 73.8 73.8 73.7 73.7 68.8 0.0 546          
Blades Fab Kit 24.4 29.4 49.3 55.2 51.7 49.5 47.8 46.4 42.6 0.0 396          
EMRH Fab Kit 15.3 20.3 36.4 42.7 41.5 40.6 39.9 39.4 36.5 0.0 313          
Cockpit Fab Kit 10.0 15.0 30.0 37.5 37.5 37.5 37.5 37.5 35.0 0.0 278          
IDIA&T 0.0 30.3 41.9 80.2 97.6 96.7 96.8 97.4 98.3 92.9 732          
ST/STE 24.0 6.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 30            
SE/PM 8.5 10.3 15.9 18.3 18.0 17.8 17.6 17.5 16.5 3.7 144          
ECO 2.3 3.7 6.7 8.6 8.8 8.8 8.7 8.7 8.3 1.9 67            
ILS/Spares/Govt. Supt. 77.3 72.1 56.7 51.5 51.5 51.5 51.5 51.5 51.5 0.0 515          
ALL SIX ELEMENTS TOTAL 219.4 269.1 396.3 490.4 502.1 497.9 496.2 496.0 474.5 98.5 3,940       
SLEP & Hook Sys. Fab Kit 37.8 52.4 100.4 122.5 121.6 121.8 122.7 123.9 117.1 0.0 920          
Engines Fab Kit 19.8 29.6 59.1 73.8 73.8 73.8 73.7 73.7 68.8 0.0 546          
IDIA&T 0.0 30.3 41.9 80.2 97.6 96.7 96.8 97.4 98.3 92.9 732          
ST/STE 24.0 6.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 30            
SE/PM 5.1 5.7 7.8 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.5 3.7 75            
ECO 1.3 2.4 4.2 5.7 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.1 5.9 1.9 45            
ILS/Spares/Govt. Supt. 77.3 72.1 56.7 51.5 51.5 51.5 51.5 51.5 51.5 0.0 515          
S,E,H TOTAL 165.1 198.5 270.0 342.6 359.4 358.7 359.6 361.4 350.0 98.5 2,864       
SLEP & Hook Sys. Fab Kit 37.8 52.4 100.4 122.5 121.6 121.8 122.7 123.9 117.1 0.0 920          
Engines Fab Kit 19.8 29.6 59.1 73.8 73.8 73.8 73.7 73.7 68.8 0.0 546          
Blades Fab Kit 24.4 29.4 49.3 55.2 51.7 49.5 47.8 46.4 42.6 0.0 396          
IDIA&T 0.0 30.3 41.9 80.2 97.6 96.7 96.8 97.4 98.3 92.9 732          
ST/STE 24.0 6.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 30            
SE/PM 6.8 7.8 11.3 12.7 12.5 12.3 12.2 12.1 11.5 3.7 103          
ECO 1.8 3.0 5.2 6.9 7.1 7.1 7.1 7.1 6.8 1.9 54            
ILS/Spares/Govt. Supt. 77.3 72.1 56.7 51.5 51.5 51.5 51.5 51.5 51.5 0.0 515          
S,E,B,H TOTAL 191.8 230.6 323.9 402.8 415.9 412.7 411.7 412.0 396.5 98.5 3,296       
SLEP & Hook Sys. Fab Kit 37.8 52.4 100.4 122.5 121.6 121.8 122.7 123.9 117.1 0.0 920          
Engines Fab Kit 19.8 29.6 59.1 73.8 73.8 73.8 73.7 73.7 68.8 0.0 546          
Blades Fab Kit 24.4 29.4 49.3 55.2 51.7 49.5 47.8 46.4 42.6 0.0 396          
EMRH Fab Kit 15.3 20.3 36.4 42.7 41.5 40.6 39.9 39.4 36.5 0.0 313          
IDIA&T 0.0 30.3 41.9 80.2 97.6 96.7 96.8 97.4 98.3 92.9 732          
ST/STE 24.0 6.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 30            
SE/PM 7.8 9.2 13.8 15.7 15.4 15.1 15.0 14.8 14.0 3.7 125          
ECO 2.1 3.4 6.0 7.8 8.0 7.9 7.9 7.9 7.5 1.9 61            
ILS/Spares/Govt. Supt. 77.3 72.1 56.7 51.5 51.5 51.5 51.5 51.5 51.5 0.0 515          
S,E,B,R,H TOTAL 208.4 252.8 363.6 449.4 461.1 456.9 455.3 455.0 436.3 98.5 3,637       
SLEP & Hook Sys. Fab Kit 37.8 52.4 100.4 122.5 121.6 121.8 122.7 123.9 117.1 0.0 920          
Blades Fab Kit 24.4 29.4 49.3 55.2 51.7 49.5 47.8 46.4 42.6 0.0 396          
IDIA&T 0.0 30.3 41.9 80.2 97.6 96.7 96.8 97.4 98.3 92.9 732          
ST/STE 24.0 6.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 30            
SE/PM 5.4 5.7 7.1 7.5 7.3 7.1 7.0 6.9 6.7 3.7 64            
ECO 1.4 2.4 4.0 5.3 5.6 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.3 1.9 42            
ILS/Spares/Govt. Supt. 77.3 72.1 56.7 51.5 51.5 51.5 51.5 51.5 51.5 0.0 515          
S,B TOTAL 170.2 198.3 259.3 322.2 335.3 332.2 331.2 331.6 321.4 98.5 2,700        
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SLEP & Hook Sys. Fab Kit 37.8 52.4 100.4 122.5 121.6 121.8 122.7 123.9 117.1 0.0 920          
Blades Fab Kit 24.4 29.4 49.3 55.2 51.7 49.5 47.8 46.4 42.6 0.0 396          
EMRH Fab Kit 15.3 20.3 36.4 42.7 41.5 40.6 39.9 39.4 36.5 0.0 313          
IDIA&T 0.0 30.3 41.9 80.2 97.6 96.7 96.8 97.4 98.3 92.9 732          
ST/STE 24.0 6.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 30            
SE/PM 6.4 7.1 9.7 10.5 10.2 10.0 9.8 9.7 9.2 3.7 86            
ECO 1.7 2.8 4.8 6.2 6.5 6.4 6.3 6.3 6.1 1.9 49            
ILS/Spares/Govt. Supt. 77.3 72.1 56.7 51.5 51.5 51.5 51.5 51.5 51.5 0.0 515          
S,B,R TOTAL 186.9 220.5 299.0 368.8 380.6 376.4 374.8 374.6 361.3 98.5 3,041       
SLEP & Hook Sys. Fab Kit 37.8 52.4 100.4 122.5 121.6 121.8 122.7 123.9 117.1 0.0 920          
Blades Fab Kit 24.4 29.4 49.3 55.2 51.7 49.5 47.8 46.4 42.6 0.0 396          
EMRH Fab Kit 15.3 20.3 36.4 42.7 41.5 40.6 39.9 39.4 36.5 0.0 313          
Cockpit Fab Kit 10.0 15.0 30.0 37.5 37.5 37.5 37.5 37.5 35.0 0.0 278          
IDIA&T 0.0 30.3 41.9 80.2 97.6 96.7 96.8 97.4 98.3 92.9 732          
ST/STE 24.0 6.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 30            
SE/PM 7.1 8.2 11.8 13.1 12.8 12.6 12.4 12.3 11.7 3.7 106          
ECO 1.9 3.1 5.4 7.0 7.3 7.2 7.1 7.1 6.8 1.9 55            
ILS/Spares/Govt. Supt. 77.3 72.1 56.7 51.5 51.5 51.5 51.5 51.5 51.5 0.0 515          
S,B,R,C TOTAL 197.8 236.8 331.8 409.8 421.5 417.4 415.7 415.5 399.5 98.5 3,344       
SLEP & Hook Sys. Fab Kit 37.8 52.4 100.4 122.5 121.6 121.8 122.7 123.9 117.1 0.0 920          
EMRH Fab Kit 15.3 20.3 36.4 42.7 41.5 40.6 39.9 39.4 36.5 0.0 313          
IDIA&T 0.0 30.3 41.9 80.2 97.6 96.7 96.8 97.4 98.3 92.9 732          
ST/STE 24.0 6.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 30            
SE/PM 4.7 5.1 6.2 6.7 6.6 6.5 6.5 6.4 6.2 3.7 59            
ECO 1.2 2.2 3.7 5.0 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.2 1.9 40            
ILS/Spares/Govt. Supt. 77.3 72.1 56.7 51.5 51.5 51.5 51.5 51.5 51.5 0.0 515          
S,R TOTAL 160.2 188.4 245.2 308.6 324.1 322.5 322.6 323.9 314.8 98.5 2,609       
SLEP & Hook Sys. Fab Kit 37.8 52.4 100.4 122.5 121.6 121.8 122.7 123.9 117.1 0.0 920          
EMRH Fab Kit 15.3 20.3 36.4 42.7 41.5 40.6 39.9 39.4 36.5 0.0 313          
Cockpit Fab Kit 10.0 15.0 30.0 37.5 37.5 37.5 37.5 37.5 35.0 0.0 278          
IDIA&T 0.0 30.3 41.9 80.2 97.6 96.7 96.8 97.4 98.3 92.9 732          
ST/STE 24.0 6.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 30            
SE/PM 5.4 6.1 8.3 9.3 9.2 9.1 9.1 9.1 8.7 3.7 78            
ECO 1.4 2.5 4.3 5.8 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.1 5.9 1.9 46            
ILS/Spares/Govt. Supt. 77.3 72.1 56.7 51.5 51.5 51.5 51.5 51.5 51.5 0.0 515          
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APPENDIX C.  PROCUREMENT COST FORECAST AND 
ASSUMPTION DISTRIBUTIONS 
 
Forecast:  SLEP ONLY RDT&E TOTAL Crystal Ball Report
Simulation started on 10/1/01 at 15:09:41
Summary: Simulation stopped on 10/1/01 at 15:17:59
Display Range is from 325 to 360 FY00$M
Entire Range is from 325 to 362 FY00$M
After 5,000 Trials, the Std. Error of the Mean is 0
Statistics: Value Percentiles:
Trials 5000
Mean 344 Percentile FY00$M
Median 344 0% 325
Mode --- 10% 337
Standard Deviation 6 20% 339
Variance 33 30% 341
Skewness 0.02 40% 343
Kurtosis 2.58 50% 344
Coeff. of Variability 0.02 60% 346
Range Minimum 325 70% 348
Range Maximum 362 80% 349
Range Width 36 90% 352
Mean Std. Error 0.08 100% 362
Forecast:  ALL SIX RDT&E TOTAL
Summary:
Display Range is from 730 to 810 FY00$M
Entire Range is from 728 to 808 FY00$M
After 5,000 Trials, the Std. Error of the Mean is 0
Statistics: Value Percentiles:
Trials 5000
Mean 767 Percentile FY00$M
Median 767 0% 728
Mode --- 10% 750
Standard Deviation 13 20% 756
Variance 179 30% 760
Skewness 0.01 40% 764
Kurtosis 2.65 50% 767
Coeff. of Variability 0.02 60% 770
Range Minimum 728 70% 775
Range Maximum 808 80% 779
Range Width 80 90% 785
Mean Std. Error 0.19 100% 808
Forecast:  S,E,H RDT&E TOTAL
Summary:
Display Range is from 420 to 455 FY00$M
Entire Range is from 417 to 458 FY00$M
After 5,000 Trials, the Std. Error of the Mean is 0
Statistics: Value Percentiles:
Trials 5000
Mean 437 Percentile FY00$M
Median 437 0% 417
Mode --- 10% 429
Standard Deviation 6 20% 432
Variance 42 30% 434
Skewness 0.04 40% 436
Kurtosis 2.67 50% 437
Coeff. of Variability 0.01 60% 439
Range Minimum 417 70% 441
Range Maximum 458 80% 443
Range Width 42 90% 446
Mean Std. Error 0.09 100% 458
Forecast:  S,E,B,H RDT&E TOTAL
Summary:
Display Range is from 505 to 555 FY00$M
Entire Range is from 502 to 559 FY00$M
After 5,000 Trials, the Std. Error of the Mean is 0
Statistics: Value Percentiles:
Trials 5000
Mean 530 Percentile FY00$M
Median 530 0% 502
Mode --- 10% 517
Standard Deviation 10 20% 521
Variance 91 30% 525
Skewness 0.01 40% 527
Kurtosis 2.58 50% 530
Coeff. of Variability 0.02 60% 533
Range Minimum 502 70% 535
Range Maximum 559 80% 538
Range Width 56 90% 543














325 334 343 351 360
5,000 Trials    4 Outliers














730 750 770 790 810
5,000 Trials    3 Outliers














420 429 438 446 455
5,000 Trials    18 Outliers














505 518 530 543 555
5,000 Trials    18 Outliers





Forecast:  S,E,B,R,H RDT&E TOTAL
Summary:
Display Range is from 620 to 690 FY00$M
Entire Range is from 618 to 683 FY00$M
After 5,000 Trials, the Std. Error of the Mean is 0
Statistics: Value Percentiles:
Trials 5000
Mean 651 Percentile FY00$M
Median 651 0% 618
Mode --- 10% 636
Standard Deviation 11 20% 641
Variance 128 30% 645
Skewness 0.00 40% 648
Kurtosis 2.58 50% 651
Coeff. of Variability 0.02 60% 654
Range Minimum 618 70% 657
Range Maximum 683 80% 661
Range Width 65 90% 666
Mean Std. Error 0.16 100% 683
Forecast:  S,B RDT&E TOTAL
Summary:
Display Range is from 410 to 460 FY00$M
Entire Range is from 412 to 462 FY00$M
After 5,000 Trials, the Std. Error of the Mean is 0
Statistics: Value Percentiles:
Trials 5000
Mean 437 Percentile FY00$M
Median 437 0% 412
Mode --- 10% 426
Standard Deviation 9 20% 429
Variance 74 30% 432
Skewness -0.03 40% 435
Kurtosis 2.57 50% 437
Coeff. of Variability 0.02 60% 439
Range Minimum 412 70% 442
Range Maximum 462 80% 445
Range Width 50 90% 448
Mean Std. Error 0.12 100% 462
Forecast:  S,B,R RDT&E TOTAL
Summary:
Display Range is from 530 to 590 FY00$M
Entire Range is from 527 to 592 FY00$M
After 5,000 Trials, the Std. Error of the Mean is 0
Statistics: Value Percentiles:
Trials 5000
Mean 558 Percentile FY00$M
Median 558 0% 527
Mode --- 10% 544
Standard Deviation 11 20% 548
Variance 112 30% 552
Skewness -0.03 40% 555
Kurtosis 2.55 50% 558
Coeff. of Variability 0.02 60% 561
Range Minimum 527 70% 564
Range Maximum 592 80% 567
Range Width 64 90% 572
Mean Std. Error 0.15 100% 592
Forecast:  S,B,R,C RDT&E TOTAL
Summary:
Display Range is from 640 to 710 FY00$M
Entire Range is from 637 to 713 FY00$M
After 5,000 Trials, the Std. Error of the Mean is 0
Statistics: Value Percentiles:
Trials 5000
Mean 674 Percentile FY00$M
Median 674 0% 637
Mode --- 10% 657
Standard Deviation 13 20% 663
Variance 160 30% 667
Skewness -0.02 40% 671
Kurtosis 2.60 50% 674
Coeff. of Variability 0.02 60% 678
Range Minimum 637 70% 681
Range Maximum 713 80% 685
Range Width 76 90% 691














620 638 655 673 690
5,000 Trials    4 Outliers














410 423 435 448 460
5,000 Trials    5 Outliers














530 545 560 575 590
5,000 Trials    8 Outliers














640 658 675 693 710
5,000 Trials    13 Outliers







Forecast:  S,R RDT&E TOTAL
Summary:
Display Range is from 445 to 485 FY00$M
Entire Range is from 444 to 489 FY00$M
After 5,000 Trials, the Std. Error of the Mean is 0
Statistics: Value Percentiles:
Trials 5000
Mean 465 Percentile FY00$M
Median 465 0% 444
Mode --- 10% 456
Standard Deviation 7 20% 459
Variance 53 30% 461
Skewness 0.00 40% 463
Kurtosis 2.62 50% 465
Coeff. of Variability 0.02 60% 467
Range Minimum 444 70% 469
Range Maximum 489 80% 472
Range Width 45 90% 475
Mean Std. Error 0.10 100% 489
Forecast:  S,R,C RDT&E TOTAL
Summary:
Display Range is from 555 to 610 FY00$M
Entire Range is from 551 to 610 FY00$M
After 5,000 Trials, the Std. Error of the Mean is 0
Statistics: Value Percentiles:
Trials 5000
Mean 581 Percentile FY00$M
Median 581 0% 551
Mode --- 10% 569
Standard Deviation 10 20% 573
Variance 92 30% 576
Skewness 0.00 40% 579
Kurtosis 2.68 50% 581
Coeff. of Variability 0.02 60% 584
Range Minimum 551 70% 587
Range Maximum 610 80% 590
Range Width 59 90% 594
Mean Std. Error 0.14 100% 610
Forecast:  SLEP ONLY APN TOTAL
Summary:
Display Range is from 2,130 to 2,230 FY00$M
Entire Range is from 2,123 to 2,238 FY00$M
After 5,000 Trials, the Std. Error of the Mean is 0
Statistics: Value Percentiles:
Trials 5000
Mean 2,179 Percentile FY00$M
Median 2,179 0% 2,123
Mode --- 10% 2,156
Standard Deviation 18 20% 2,164
Variance 307 30% 2,170
Skewness -0.03 40% 2,175
Kurtosis 2.86 50% 2,179
Coeff. of Variability 0.01 60% 2,184
Range Minimum 2,123 70% 2,188
Range Maximum 2,238 80% 2,194
Range Width 115 90% 2,202
Mean Std. Error 0.25 100% 2,238
Forecast:  ALL SIX APN TOTAL
Summary:
Display Range is from 3,625 to 3,850 FY00$M
Entire Range is from 3,607 to 3,871 FY00$M
After 5,000 Trials, the Std. Error of the Mean is 1
Statistics: Value Percentiles:
Trials 5000
Mean 3,744 Percentile FY00$M
Median 3,744 0% 3,607
Mode --- 10% 3,695
Standard Deviation 38 20% 3,712
Variance 1,460 30% 3,724
Skewness -0.03 40% 3,734
Kurtosis 2.93 50% 3,744
Coeff. of Variability 0.01 60% 3,754
Range Minimum 3,607 70% 3,764
Range Maximum 3,871 80% 3,777
Range Width 264 90% 3,792














445 455 465 475 485
5,000 Trials    10 Outliers














555 569 583 596 610
5,000 Trials    5 Outliers














2,130 2,155 2,180 2,205 2,230
5,000 Trials    16 Outliers














3,625 3,681 3,738 3,794 3,850
5,000 Trials    15 Outliers







Forecast:  S,E,H APN TOTAL
Summary:
Display Range is from 2,720 to 2,830 FY00$M
Entire Range is from 2,710 to 2,833 FY00$M
After 5,000 Trials, the Std. Error of the Mean is 0
Statistics: Value Percentiles:
Trials 5000
Mean 2,775 Percentile FY00$M
Median 2,775 0% 2,710
Mode --- 10% 2,751
Standard Deviation 18 20% 2,760
Variance 311 30% 2,766
Skewness -0.04 40% 2,771
Kurtosis 2.83 50% 2,775
Coeff. of Variability 0.01 60% 2,780
Range Minimum 2,710 70% 2,784
Range Maximum 2,833 80% 2,790
Range Width 124 90% 2,798
Mean Std. Error 0.25 100% 2,833
Forecast:  S,E,B,H APN TOTAL
Summary:
Display Range is from 3,025 to 3,225 FY00$M
Entire Range is from 3,009 to 3,220 FY00$M
After 5,000 Trials, the Std. Error of the Mean is 0
Statistics: Value Percentiles:
Trials 5000
Mean 3,118 Percentile FY00$M
Median 3,118 0% 3,009
Mode --- 10% 3,073
Standard Deviation 35 20% 3,087
Variance 1,233 30% 3,099
Skewness -0.03 40% 3,109
Kurtosis 2.75 50% 3,118
Coeff. of Variability 0.01 60% 3,128
Range Minimum 3,009 70% 3,137
Range Maximum 3,220 80% 3,148
Range Width 210 90% 3,163
Mean Std. Error 0.50 100% 3,220
Forecast:  S,E,B,R,H APN TOTAL
Summary:
Display Range is from 3,325 to 3,550 FY00$M
Entire Range is from 3,318 to 3,565 FY00$M
After 5,000 Trials, the Std. Error of the Mean is 1
Statistics: Value Percentiles:
Trials 5000
Mean 3,441 Percentile FY00$M
Median 3,440 0% 3,318
Mode --- 10% 3,392
Standard Deviation 38 20% 3,408
Variance 1,481 30% 3,420
Skewness 0.04 40% 3,431
Kurtosis 2.86 50% 3,440
Coeff. of Variability 0.01 60% 3,452
Range Minimum 3,318 70% 3,462
Range Maximum 3,565 80% 3,474
Range Width 247 90% 3,491
Mean Std. Error 0.54 100% 3,565
Forecast:  S,B APN TOTAL
Summary:
Display Range is from 2,425 to 2,625 FY00$M
Entire Range is from 2,400 to 2,649 FY00$M
After 5,000 Trials, the Std. Error of the Mean is 0
Statistics: Value Percentiles:
Trials 5000
Mean 2,522 Percentile FY00$M
Median 2,522 0% 2,400
Mode --- 10% 2,476
Standard Deviation 35 20% 2,492
Variance 1,215 30% 2,503
Skewness 0.01 40% 2,513
Kurtosis 2.78 50% 2,522
Coeff. of Variability 0.01 60% 2,530
Range Minimum 2,400 70% 2,541
Range Maximum 2,649 80% 2,552
Range Width 249 90% 2,567














2,720 2,748 2,775 2,803 2,830
5,000 Trials    4 Outliers














3,025 3,075 3,125 3,175 3,225
5,000 Trials    20 Outliers














3,325 3,381 3,438 3,494 3,550
5,000 Trials    17 Outliers














2,425 2,475 2,525 2,575 2,625
5,000 Trials    14 Outliers







Forecast:  S,B,R APN TOTAL
Summary:
Display Range is from 2,725 to 2,950 FY00$M
Entire Range is from 2,710 to 2,982 FY00$M
After 5,000 Trials, the Std. Error of the Mean is 1
Statistics: Value Percentiles:
Trials 5000
Mean 2,845 Percentile FY00$M
Median 2,845 0% 2,710
Mode --- 10% 2,796
Standard Deviation 38 20% 2,812
Variance 1,472 30% 2,825
Skewness 0.00 40% 2,835
Kurtosis 2.93 50% 2,845
Coeff. of Variability 0.01 60% 2,855
Range Minimum 2,710 70% 2,865
Range Maximum 2,982 80% 2,878
Range Width 273 90% 2,894
Mean Std. Error 0.54 100% 2,982
Forecast:  S,B,R,C APN TOTAL
Summary:
Display Range is from 3,025 to 3,250 FY00$M
Entire Range is from 3,020 to 3,269 FY00$M
After 5,000 Trials, the Std. Error of the Mean is 1
Statistics: Value Percentiles:
Trials 5000
Mean 3,147 Percentile FY00$M
Median 3,147 0% 3,020
Mode --- 10% 3,099
Standard Deviation 39 20% 3,114
Variance 1,485 30% 3,126
Skewness 0.05 40% 3,137
Kurtosis 2.91 50% 3,147
Coeff. of Variability 0.01 60% 3,156
Range Minimum 3,020 70% 3,168
Range Maximum 3,269 80% 3,180
Range Width 248 90% 3,197
Mean Std. Error 0.54 100% 3,269
Forecast:  S,R APN TOTAL
Summary:
Display Range is from 2,440 to 2,560 FY00$M
Entire Range is from 2,432 to 2,576 FY00$M
After 5,000 Trials, the Std. Error of the Mean is 0
Statistics: Value Percentiles:
Trials 5000
Mean 2,502 Percentile FY00$M
Median 2,502 0% 2,432
Mode --- 10% 2,474
Standard Deviation 21 20% 2,484
Variance 451 30% 2,491
Skewness 0.03 40% 2,497
Kurtosis 2.71 50% 2,502
Coeff. of Variability 0.01 60% 2,507
Range Minimum 2,432 70% 2,514
Range Maximum 2,576 80% 2,521
Range Width 144 90% 2,530
Mean Std. Error 0.30 100% 2,576
Forecast:  S,R,C APN TOTAL
Summary:
Display Range is from 2,750 to 2,860 FY00$M
Entire Range is from 2,728 to 2,878 FY00$M
After 5,000 Trials, the Std. Error of the Mean is 0
Statistics: Value Percentiles:
Trials 5000
Mean 2,805 Percentile FY00$M
Median 2,805 0% 2,728
Mode --- 10% 2,778
Standard Deviation 21 20% 2,787
Variance 443 30% 2,793
Skewness 0.01 40% 2,799
Kurtosis 2.88 50% 2,805
Coeff. of Variability 0.01 60% 2,810
Range Minimum 2,728 70% 2,816
Range Maximum 2,878 80% 2,823
Range Width 149 90% 2,832














2,725 2,781 2,838 2,894 2,950
5,000 Trials    17 Outliers














3,025 3,081 3,138 3,194 3,250
5,000 Trials    24 Outliers














2,440 2,470 2,500 2,530 2,560
5,000 Trials    13 Outliers














2,750 2,778 2,805 2,833 2,860
5,000 Trials    35 Outliers








Simulation started on 10/1/01 at 15:09:41
Simulation stopped on 10/1/01 at 15:17:59
Assumptions
Assumption:  SLEP ONLY FY04 Rollup RDT&E COST - Cell:  C4 Assumption:  FY05 Rollup RDT&E COST - Cell:  D4
Uniform distribution with parameters:
 Uniform distribution with parameters: Minimum 45.0 (=D25)
Minimum 10.9 (=C25) Maximum 53.9 (=P25)
Maximum 14.6 (=O25) Mean value in simulation was 49.5
Mean value in simulation was 12.8
Assumption:  C5 Rollup RDT&E COST - Cell:  C5 Assumption:  FY06 Rollup RDT&E COST - Cell:  E4
 Uniform distribution with parameters: Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 101.5 (=C40) Minimum 94.0 (=E25)
Maximum 116.8 (=O40) Maximum 107.2 (=Q25)
Mean value in simulation was 109.0 Mean value in simulation was 100.7
Assumption:  C6 Rollup RDT&E COST - Cell:  C6 Assumption:  FY07 Rollup RDT&E COST - Cell:  F4
 Uniform distribution with parameters: Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 28.2 (=C51) Minimum 54.7 (=F25)
Maximum 33.5 (=O51) Maximum 62.4 (=R25)
Mean value in simulation was 30.9 Mean value in simulation was 58.5
Assumption:  C7 Rollup RDT&E COST - Cell:  C7 Assumption:  FY08 Rollup RDT&E COST - Cell:  G4
 Uniform distribution with parameters: Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 47.8 (=C63) Minimum 16.9 (=G25)
Maximum 55.3 (=O63) Maximum 19.0 (=S25)
Mean value in simulation was 51.6 Mean value in simulation was 17.9
Assumption:  C8 Rollup RDT&E COST - Cell:  C8 Assumption:  FY09 Rollup RDT&E COST - Cell:  H4
 Uniform distribution with parameters: Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 77.2 (=C76) Minimum 40.7 (=H25)
Maximum 88.0 (=O76) Maximum 45.7 (=T25)
Mean value in simulation was 82.5 Mean value in simulation was 43.2
Assumption:  C9 Rollup RDT&E COST - Cell:  C9 Assumption:  FY10 Rollup RDT&E COST - Cell:  I4
 Uniform distribution with parameters: Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 30.5 (=C86) Minimum 29.0 (=I25)
Maximum 36.4 (=O86) Maximum 32.7 (=U25)
Mean value in simulation was 33.5 Mean value in simulation was 30.9
Assumption:  C10 Rollup RDT&E COST - Cell:  C10 Assumption:  FY11 Rollup RDT&E COST - Cell:  J4
 Uniform distribution with parameters: Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 59.9 (=C97) Minimum 29.0 (=J25)
Maximum 69.1 (=O97) Maximum 32.7 (=V25)
Mean value in simulation was 64.5 Mean value in simulation was 30.9
Assumption:  C11 Rollup RDT&E COST - Cell:  C11 Assumption:  D5 Rollup RDT&E COST - Cell:  D5
 Uniform distribution with parameters: Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 84.3 (=C110) Minimum 190.8 (=D40)
Maximum 97.9 (=O110) Maximum 219.3 (=P40)
Mean value in simulation was 91.1
Mean value in simulation was 205.1
Assumption:  C12 Rollup RDT&E COST - Cell:  C12 Assumption:  E5 Rollup RDT&E COST - Cell:  E5
 Uniform distribution with parameters: Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 40.3 (=C120) Minimum 204.5 (=E40)
Maximum 47.3 (=O120) Maximum 235.0 (=Q40)
Mean value in simulation was 43.8
Mean value in simulation was 219.7
Assumption:  C13 Rollup RDT&E COST - Cell:  C13 Assumption:  F5 Rollup RDT&E COST - Cell:  F5
 Uniform distribution with parameters: Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 64.7 (=C132) Minimum 90.2 (=F40)
Maximum 76.1 (=O132) Maximum 102.9 (=R40)
Mean value in simulation was 70.4
Mean value in simulation was 96.6
10.9 11.9 12.8 13.7 14.6
SLEP ONLY FY04
101.5 105.3 109.1 112.9 116.8
C5
28.2 29.5 30.8 32.2 33.5
C6
47.8 49.7 51.5 53.4 55.3
C7
77.2 79.9 82.6 85.3 88.0
C8
30.5 32.0 33.5 35.0 36.4
C9
59.9 62.2 64.5 66.8 69.1
C10
84.3 87.7 91.1 94.5 97.9
C11
40.3 42.1 43.8 45.6 47.3
C12
64.7 67.5 70.4 73.2 76.1
C13
45.0 47.2 49.4 51.7 53.9
FY05
94.0 97.3 100.6 103.9 107.2
FY06
54.7 56.6 58.6 60.5 62.4
FY07
16.9 17.4 17.9 18.5 19.0
FY08
40.7 41.9 43.2 44.5 45.7
FY09
29.0 29.9 30.9 31.8 32.7
FY10
29.0 29.9 30.9 31.8 32.7
FY11
190.8 197.9 205.0 212.1 219.3
D5
204.5 212.1 219.7 227.3 235.0
E5







Assumption:  G5 Rollup RDT&E COST - Cell:  G5 Assumption:  J6 Rollup RDT&E COST - Cell:  J6
 Uniform distribution with parameters: Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 20.9 (=G40) Minimum 29.0 (=J51)
Maximum 24.3 (=S40) Maximum 32.7 (=V51)
Mean value in simulation was 22.6 Mean value in simulation was 30.8
Assumption:  H5 ]Rollup RDT&E COST - Cell:  H5 Assumption:  D7 Rollup RDT&E COST - Cell:  D7
 Uniform distribution with parameters: Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 44.6 (=H40) Minimum 111.8 (=D63)
Maximum 51.1 (=T40) Maximum 130.2 (=P63)
Mean value in simulation was 47.8 Mean value in simulation was 120.9
Assumption:  I5 Rollup RDT&E COST - Cell:  I5 Assumption:  E7 Rollup RDT&E COST - Cell:  E7
 Uniform distribution with parameters: Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 33.0 (=I40) Minimum 148.8 (=E63)
Maximum 38.0 (=U40) Maximum 172.1 (=Q63)
Mean value in simulation was 35.5 Mean value in simulation was 160.4
Assumption:  J5 Rollup RDT&E COST - Cell:  J5 Assumption:  F7 Rollup RDT&E COST - Cell:  F7
 Uniform distribution with parameters: Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 29.0 (=J40) Minimum 69.5 (=F63)
Maximum 32.7 (=V40) Maximum 79.1 (=R63)
Mean value in simulation was 30.9 Mean value in simulation was 74.3
Assumption:  D6 Rollup RDT&E COST - Cell:  D6 Assumption:  G7 Rollup RDT&E COST - Cell:  G7
 Uniform distribution with parameters: Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 79.4 (=D51) Minimum 16.9 (=G63)
Maximum 90.8 (=P51) Maximum 19.0 (=S63)
Mean value in simulation was 85.1 Mean value in simulation was 17.9
Assumption:  E6 Rollup RDT&E COST - Cell:  E6 Assumption:  H7 Rollup RDT&E COST - Cell:  H7
 Uniform distribution with parameters: Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 125.0 (=E51) Minimum 40.7 (=H63)
Maximum 139.8 (=Q51) Maximum 45.7 (=T63)
Mean value in simulation was 132.4 Mean value in simulation was 43.2
Assumption:  F6 Rollup RDT&E COST - Cell:  F6 Assumption:  I7 Rollup RDT&E COST - Cell:  I7
 Uniform distribution with parameters: Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 62.1 (=F51) Minimum 29.0 (=I63)
Maximum 70.4 (=R51) Maximum 32.7 (=U63)
Mean value in simulation was 66.2 Mean value in simulation was 30.9
Assumption:  G6 Rollup RDT&E COST - Cell:  G6 Assumption:  J7 Rollup RDT&E COST - Cell:  J7
 Uniform distribution with parameters: Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 16.9 (=G51) Minimum 29.0 (=J63)
Maximum 19.0 (=S51) Maximum 32.7 (=V63)
Mean value in simulation was 17.9 Mean value in simulation was 30.9
Assumption:  H6 Rollup RDT&E COST - Cell:  H6 Assumption:  D8 Rollup RDT&E COST - Cell:  D8
 Uniform distribution with parameters: Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 40.7 (=H51) Minimum 156.8 (=D76)
Maximum 45.7 (=T51) Maximum 180.2 (=P76)
Mean value in simulation was 43.2 Mean value in simulation was 168.4
Assumption:  I6 Rollup RDT&E COST - Cell:  I6 Assumption:  E8 Rollup RDT&E COST - Cell:  E8
 Uniform distribution with parameters: Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 29.0 (=I51) Minimum 178.4 (=E76)
Maximum 32.7 (=U51) Maximum 204.9 (=Q76)
Mean value in simulation was 30.8 Mean value in simulation was 191.7
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Assumption:  F8 Rollup RDT&E COST - Cell:  F8 Assumption:  I9 Rollup RDT&E COST - Cell:  I9
 Uniform distribution with parameters: Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 80.1 (=F76) Minimum 29.0 (=I86)
Maximum 90.9 (=R76) Maximum 32.7 (=U86)
Mean value in simulation was 85.5 Mean value in simulation was 30.9
Assumption:  G8 Rollup RDT&E COST - Cell:  G8 Assumption:  J9 Rollup RDT&E COST - Cell:  J9
 Uniform distribution with parameters: Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 16.9 (=G76) Minimum 29.0 (=J86)
Maximum 19.0 (=S76) Maximum 32.7 (=V86)
Mean value in simulation was 17.9 Mean value in simulation was 30.9
Assumption:  H8 Rollup RDT&E COST - Cell:  H8 Assumption:  D10 Rollup RDT&E COST - Cell:  D10
 Uniform distribution with parameters: Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 40.7 (=H76) Minimum 122.4 (=D97)
Maximum 45.7 (=T76) Maximum 143.3 (=P97)
Mean value in simulation was 43.2 Mean value in simulation was 132.8
Assumption:  I8 Rollup RDT&E COST - Cell:  I8 Assumption:  E10 Rollup RDT&E COST - Cell:  E10
 Uniform distribution with parameters: Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 29.0 (=I76) Minimum 147.4 (=E97)
Maximum 32.7 (=U76) Maximum 172.3 (=Q97)
Mean value in simulation was 30.8 Mean value in simulation was 159.9
Assumption:  J8 Rollup RDT&E COST - Cell:  J8 Assumption:  F10 Rollup RDT&E COST - Cell:  F10
 Uniform distribution with parameters: Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 29.0 (=J76) Minimum 72.8 (=F97)
Maximum 32.7 (=V76) Maximum 83.0 (=R97)
Mean value in simulation was 30.9 Mean value in simulation was 77.8
Assumption:  D9 Rollup RDT&E COST - Cell:  D9 Assumption:  G10 Rollup RDT&E COST - Cell:  G10
 Uniform distribution with parameters: Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 77.4 (=D86) Minimum 16.9 (=G97)
Maximum 93.3 (=P86) Maximum 19.0 (=S97)
Mean value in simulation was 85.4 Mean value in simulation was 17.9
Assumption:  E9 Rollup RDT&E COST - Cell:  E9 Assumption:  H10 Rollup RDT&E COST - Cell:  H10
 Uniform distribution with parameters: Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 117.9 (=E86) Minimum 40.7 (=H97)
Maximum 139.4 (=Q86) Maximum 45.7 (=T97)
Mean value in simulation was 128.8 Mean value in simulation was 43.2
Assumption:  F9 Rollup RDT&E COST - Cell:  F9 Assumption:  I10 Rollup RDT&E COST - Cell:  I10
 Uniform distribution with parameters: Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 62.2 (=F86) Minimum 29.0 (=I97)
Maximum 71.1 (=R86) Maximum 32.7 (=U97)
Mean value in simulation was 66.6 Mean value in simulation was 30.9
Assumption:  G9 Rollup RDT&E COST - Cell:  G9 Assumption:  J10 Rollup RDT&E COST - Cell:  J10
 Uniform distribution with parameters: Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 16.9 (=G86) Minimum 29.0 (=J97)
Maximum 19.0 (=S86) Maximum 32.7 (=V97)
Mean value in simulation was 17.9 Mean value in simulation was 30.9
Assumption:  H9 Rollup RDT&E COST - Cell:  H9 Assumption:  D11 Rollup RDT&E COST - Cell:  D11
 Uniform distribution with parameters: Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 40.7 (=H86) Minimum 156.4 (=D110)
Maximum 45.7 (=T86) Maximum 182.4 (=P110)
Mean value in simulation was 43.2 Mean value in simulation was 169.2
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Assumption:  E11 Rollup RDT&E COST - Cell:  E11 Assumption:  H12 Rollup RDT&E COST - Cell:  H12
 Uniform distribution with parameters: Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 173.5 (=E110) Minimum 40.7 (=H120)
Maximum 202.3 (=Q110) Maximum 45.7 (=T120)
Mean value in simulation was 188.0 Mean value in simulation was 43.2
Assumption:  F11 Rollup RDT&E COST - Cell:  F11 Assumption:  I12 Rollup RDT&E COST - Cell:  I12
 Uniform distribution with parameters: Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 82.8 (=F110) Minimum 29.0 (=I120)
Maximum 94.9 (=R110) Maximum 32.7 (=U120)
Mean value in simulation was 88.9 Mean value in simulation was 30.9
Assumption:  G11 Rollup RDT&E COST - Cell:  G11 Assumption:  J12 Rollup RDT&E COST - Cell:  J12
 Uniform distribution with parameters: Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 20.9 (=G110) Minimum 29.0 (=J120)
Maximum 24.3 (=S110) Maximum 32.7 (=V120)
Mean value in simulation was 22.6 Mean value in simulation was 30.9
Assumption:  H11 Rollup RDT&E COST - Cell:  H11 Assumption:  D13 Rollup RDT&E COST - Cell:  D13
 Uniform distribution with parameters: Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 44.6 (=H110) Minimum 124.0 (=D132)
Maximum 51.1 (=T110) Maximum 143.0 (=P132)
Mean value in simulation was 47.8 Mean value in simulation was 133.5
Assumption:  I11 Rollup RDT&E COST - Cell:  I11 Assumption:  E13 Rollup RDT&E COST - Cell:  E13
 Uniform distribution with parameters: Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 33.0 (=I110) Minimum 149.7 (=E132)
Maximum 38.0 (=U110) Maximum 170.0 (=Q132)
Mean value in simulation was 35.5 Mean value in simulation was 159.9
Assumption:  J11 Rollup RDT&E COST - Cell:  J11 Assumption:  F13 Rollup RDT&E COST - Cell:  F13
 Uniform distribution with parameters: Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 29.0 (=J110) Minimum 75.4 (=F132)
Maximum 32.7 (=V110) Maximum 86.2 (=R132)
Mean value in simulation was 30.9 Mean value in simulation was 80.7
Assumption:  D12 Rollup RDT&E COST - Cell:  D12 Assumption:  G13 Rollup RDT&E COST - Cell:  G13
 Uniform distribution with parameters: Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 90.0 (=D120) Minimum 20.9 (=G132)
Maximum 103.9 (=P120) Maximum 24.3 (=S132)
Mean value in simulation was 97.0 Mean value in simulation was 22.6
Assumption:  E12 Rollup RDT&E COST - Cell:  E12 Assumption:  H13 Rollup RDT&E COST - Cell:  H13
 Uniform distribution with parameters: Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 123.5 (=E120) Minimum 44.6 (=H132)
Maximum 140.0 (=Q120) Maximum 51.1 (=T132)
Mean value in simulation was 131.8 Mean value in simulation was 47.9
Assumption:  F12 Rollup RDT&E COST - Cell:  F12 Assumption:  I13 Rollup RDT&E COST - Cell:  I13
 Uniform distribution with parameters: Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 65.3 (=F120) Minimum 33.0 (=I132)
Maximum 74.2 (=R120) Maximum 38.0 (=U132)
Mean value in simulation was 69.8 Mean value in simulation was 35.5
Assumption:  G12 Rollup RDT&E COST - Cell:  G12 Assumption:  J13 Rollup RDT&E COST - Cell:  J13
 Uniform distribution with parameters: Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 16.9 (=G120) Minimum 29.0 (=J132)
Maximum 19.0 (=S120) Maximum 32.7 (=V132)
Mean value in simulation was 17.9 Mean value in simulation was 30.9
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Assumption:  FY09 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  C4 Assumption:  FY10 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  D4
 Uniform distribution with parameters: Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 139.5 (=C24) Minimum 157.3 (=D24)
Maximum 143.6 (=Q24) Maximum 166.2 (=R24)
Mean value in simulation was 141.5 Mean value in simulation was 161.8
Assumption:  C5 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  C5 Assumption:  FY11 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  E4
 Uniform distribution with parameters: Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 203.1 (=C36) Minimum 190.2 (=E24)
Maximum 219.4 (=Q36) Maximum 205.5 (=S24)
Mean value in simulation was 211.2 Mean value in simulation was 197.8
Assumption:  C6 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  C6 Assumption:  FY12 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  F4
 Uniform distribution with parameters: Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 161.1 (=C45) Minimum 240.2 (=F24)
Maximum 165.1 (=Q45) Maximum 262.0 (=T24)
Mean value in simulation was 163.1 Mean value in simulation was 251.3
Assumption:  C7 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  C7 Assumption:  FY13 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  G4
 Uniform distribution with parameters: Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 177.3 (=C55) Minimum 255.3 (=G24)
Maximum 191.8 (=Q55) Maximum 278.9 (=U24)
Mean value in simulation was 184.5 Mean value in simulation was 267.2
Assumption:  C8 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  C8 Assumption:  FY14 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  H4
 Uniform distribution with parameters: Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 192.2 (=C66) Minimum 254.7 (=H24)
Maximum 208.4 (=Q66) Maximum 278.2 (=V24)
Mean value in simulation was 200.3 Mean value in simulation was 266.5
Assumption:  C9 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  C9 Assumption:  FY15 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  I4
 Uniform distribution with parameters: Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 155.7 (=C75) Minimum 255.5 (=I24)
Maximum 170.2 (=Q75) Maximum 279.1 (=W24)
Mean value in simulation was 162.9 Mean value in simulation was 267.3
Assumption:  C10 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  C10 Assumption:  FY16 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  J4
 Uniform distribution with parameters: Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 170.6 (=C85) Minimum 257.1 (=J24)
Maximum 186.9 (=Q85) Maximum 280.9 (=X24)
Mean value in simulation was 178.8 Mean value in simulation was 269.0
Assumption:  C11 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  C11 Assumption:  FY17 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  K4
 Uniform distribution with parameters: Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 181.5 (=C96) Minimum 251.8 (=K24)
Maximum 197.8 (=Q96) Maximum 274.9 (=Y24)
Mean value in simulation was 189.8 Mean value in simulation was 263.2
Assumption:  C12 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  C12 Assumption:  FY18 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  L4
 Uniform distribution with parameters: Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 154.4 (=C105) Minimum 88.5 (=L24)
Maximum 160.2 (=Q105) Maximum 98.5 (=Z24)
Mean value in simulation was 157.3 Mean value in simulation was 93.5
Assumption:  C13 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  C13 Assumption:  D5 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  D5
 Uniform distribution with parameters: Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 165.3 (=C115) Minimum 244.6 (=D36)
Maximum 171.1 (=Q115) Maximum 269.1 (=R36)
Mean value in simulation was 168.3 Mean value in simulation was 256.9
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Assumption:  E5 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  E5 Assumption:  F6 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  F6
 Uniform distribution with parameters: Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 354.4 (=E36) Minimum 320.8 (=F45)
Maximum 396.3 (=S36) Maximum 342.6 (=T45)
Mean value in simulation was 375.3 Mean value in simulation was 331.8
Assumption:  F5 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  F5 Assumption:  G6 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  G6
 Uniform distribution with parameters: Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 438.6 (=F36) Minimum 335.8 (=G45)
Maximum 490.4 (=T36) Maximum 359.4 (=U45)
Mean value in simulation was 464.7 Mean value in simulation was 347.6
Assumption:  G5 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  G5 Assumption:  H6 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  H6
 Uniform distribution with parameters: Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 450.3 (=G36) Minimum 335.2 (=H45)
Maximum 502.1 (=U36) Maximum 358.7 (=V45)
Mean value in simulation was 476.3 Mean value in simulation was 347.0
Assumption:  H5 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  H5 Assumption:  I6 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  I6
 Uniform distribution with parameters: Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 447.3 (=H36) Minimum 336.0 (=I45)
Maximum 497.9 (=V36) Maximum 359.6 (=W45)
Mean value in simulation was 472.8 Mean value in simulation was 347.7
Assumption:  I5 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  I5 Assumption:  J6 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  J6
 Uniform distribution with parameters: Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 446.4 (=I36) Minimum 337.6 (=J45)
Maximum 496.2 (=W36) Maximum 361.4 (=X45)
Mean value in simulation was 471.2 Mean value in simulation was 349.3
Assumption:  J5 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  J5 Assumption:  K6 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  K6
 Uniform distribution with parameters: Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 446.6 (=J36) Minimum 326.9 (=K45)
Maximum 496.0 (=X36) Maximum 350.0 (=Y45)
Mean value in simulation was 471.0 Mean value in simulation was 338.5
Assumption:  K5 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  K5 Assumption:  L6 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  L6
 Uniform distribution with parameters: Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 427.9 (=K36) Minimum 88.5 (=L45)
Maximum 474.5 (=Y36) Maximum 98.5 (=Z45)
Mean value in simulation was 451.2 Mean value in simulation was 93.6
Assumption:  L5 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  L5 Assumption:  D7 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  D7
 Uniform distribution with parameters: Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 88.5 (=L36) Minimum 208.4 (=D55)
Maximum 98.5 (=Z36) Maximum 230.6 (=R55)
Mean value in simulation was 93.5 Mean value in simulation was 219.5
Assumption:  D6 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  D6 Assumption:  E7 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  E7
 Uniform distribution with parameters: Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 189.6 (=D45) Minimum 286.2 (=E55)
Maximum 198.5 (=R45) Maximum 323.9 (=S55)
Mean value in simulation was 194.1 Mean value in simulation was 304.9
Assumption:  E6 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  E6 Assumption:  F7 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  F7
 Uniform distribution with parameters: Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 254.7 (=E45) Minimum 355.9 (=F55)
Maximum 270.0 (=S45) Maximum 402.8 (=T55)
Mean value in simulation was 262.3 Mean value in simulation was 379.6
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Assumption:  G7 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  G7 Assumption:  H8 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  H8
 Uniform distribution with parameters: Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 368.8 (=G55) Minimum 406.4 (=H66)
Maximum 415.9 (=U55) Maximum 456.9 (=V66)
Mean value in simulation was 392.0 Mean value in simulation was 431.9
Assumption:  H7 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  H7 Assumption:  I8 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  I8
 Uniform distribution with parameters: Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 366.7 (=H55) Minimum 405.4 (=I66)
Maximum 412.7 (=V55) Maximum 455.3 (=W66)
Mean value in simulation was 389.9 Mean value in simulation was 429.8
Assumption:  I7 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  I7 Assumption:  J8 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  J8
 Uniform distribution with parameters: Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 366.5 (=I55) Minimum 405.7 (=J66)
Maximum 411.7 (=W55) Maximum 455.0 (=X66)
Mean value in simulation was 389.0 Mean value in simulation was 430.3
Assumption:  J7 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  J7 Assumption:  K8 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  K8
 Uniform distribution with parameters: Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 367.2 (=J55) Minimum 389.7 (=K66)
Maximum 412.0 (=X55) Maximum 436.3 (=Y66)
Mean value in simulation was 389.5 Mean value in simulation was 413.3
Assumption:  K7 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  K7 Assumption:  L8 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  L8
 Uniform distribution with parameters: Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 354.1 (=K55) Minimum 88.5 (=L66)
Maximum 396.5 (=Y55) Maximum 98.5 (=Z66)
Mean value in simulation was 375.4 Mean value in simulation was 93.6
Assumption:  L7 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  L7 Assumption:  D9 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  D9
 Uniform distribution with parameters: Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 88.5 (=L55) Minimum 176.1 (=D75)
Maximum 98.5 (=Z55) Maximum 198.3 (=R75)
Mean value in simulation was 93.6 Mean value in simulation was 187.2
Assumption:  D8 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  D8 Assumption:  E9 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  E9
 Uniform distribution with parameters: Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 228.2 (=D66) Minimum 221.6 (=E75)
Maximum 252.8 (=R66) Maximum 259.3 (=S75)
Mean value in simulation was 240.5 Mean value in simulation was 240.6
Assumption:  E8 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  E8 Assumption:  F9 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  F9
 Uniform distribution with parameters: Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 321.7 (=E66) Minimum 275.4 (=F75)
Maximum 363.6 (=S66) Maximum 322.2 (=T75)
Mean value in simulation was 342.6 Mean value in simulation was 298.9
Assumption:  F8 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  F8 Assumption:  G9 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  G9
 Uniform distribution with parameters: Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 397.7 (=F66) Minimum 288.3 (=G75)
Maximum 449.4 (=T66) Maximum 335.3 (=U75)
Mean value in simulation was 423.9 Mean value in simulation was 312.1
Assumption:  G8 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  G8 Assumption:  H9 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  H9
 Uniform distribution with parameters: Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 409.3 (=G66) Minimum 286.2 (=H75)
Maximum 461.1 (=U66) Maximum 332.2 (=V75)
Mean value in simulation was 435.2 Mean value in simulation was 309.3
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Assumption:  I9 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  I9 Assumption:  J10 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  J10
 Uniform distribution with parameters: Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 286.0 (=I75) Minimum 325.2 (=J85)
Maximum 331.2 (=W75) Maximum 374.6 (=X85)
Mean value in simulation was 308.5 Mean value in simulation was 349.7
Assumption:  J9 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  J9 Assumption:  K10 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  K10
 Uniform distribution with parameters: Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 286.8 (=J75) Minimum 314.7 (=K85)
Maximum 331.6 (=X75) Maximum 361.3 (=Y85)
Mean value in simulation was 309.1 Mean value in simulation was 338.2
Assumption:  K9 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  K9 Assumption:  L10 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  L10
 Uniform distribution with parameters: Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 279.0 (=K75) Minimum 88.5 (=L85)
Maximum 321.4 (=Y75) Maximum 98.5 (=Z85)
Mean value in simulation was 299.5 Mean value in simulation was 93.6
Assumption:  L9 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  L9 Assumption:  D11 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  D11
 Uniform distribution with parameters: Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 88.5 (=L75) Minimum 212.3 (=D96)
Maximum 98.5 (=Z75) Maximum 236.8 (=R96)
Mean value in simulation was 93.6 Mean value in simulation was 224.6
Assumption:  D10 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  D10 Assumption:  E11 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  E11
 Uniform distribution with parameters: Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 195.9 (=D85) Minimum 289.9 (=E96)
Maximum 220.5 (=R85) Maximum 331.8 (=S96)
Mean value in simulation was 208.2 Mean value in simulation was 311.0
Assumption:  E10 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  E10 Assumption:  F11 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  F11
 Uniform distribution with parameters: Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 257.2 (=E85) Minimum 358.0 (=F96)
Maximum 299.0 (=S85) Maximum 409.8 (=T96)
Mean value in simulation was 277.9 Mean value in simulation was 383.8
Assumption:  F10 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  F10 Assumption:  G11 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  G11
 Uniform distribution with parameters: Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 317.1 (=F85) Minimum 369.7 (=G96)
Maximum 368.8 (=T85) Maximum 421.5 (=U96)
Mean value in simulation was 342.7 Mean value in simulation was 395.6
Assumption:  G10 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  G10 Assumption:  H11 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  H11
 Uniform distribution with parameters: Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 328.8 (=G85) Minimum 366.8 (=H96)
Maximum 380.6 (=U85) Maximum 417.4 (=V96)
Mean value in simulation was 354.5 Mean value in simulation was 391.4
Assumption:  H10 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  H10 Assumption:  I11 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  I11
 Uniform distribution with parameters: Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 325.9 (=H85) Minimum 365.9 (=I96)
Maximum 376.4 (=V85) Maximum 415.7 (=W96)
Mean value in simulation was 351.2 Mean value in simulation was 390.6
Assumption:  I10 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  I10 Assumption:  J11 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  J11
 Uniform distribution with parameters: Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 325.0 (=I85) Minimum 366.2 (=J96)
Maximum 374.8 (=W85) Maximum 415.5 (=X96)
Mean value in simulation was 350.2 Mean value in simulation was 390.8
286.0 297.3 308.6 319.9 331.2
I9
286.8 298.0 309.2 320.4 331.6
J9
279.0 289.6 300.2 310.8 321.4
K9
88.5 91.0 93.5 96.0 98.5
L9
195.9 202.1 208.2 214.3 220.5
D10
257.2 267.6 278.1 288.6 299.0
E10
317.1 330.0 343.0 355.9 368.8
F10
328.8 341.7 354.7 367.6 380.6
G10
325.9 338.5 351.2 363.8 376.4
H10
325.0 337.4 349.9 362.3 374.8
I10
325.2 337.6 349.9 362.2 374.6
J10
314.7 326.3 338.0 349.6 361.3
K10
88.5 91.0 93.5 96.0 98.5
L10
212.3 218.4 224.6 230.7 236.8
D11
289.9 300.4 310.8 321.3 331.8
E11
358.0 371.0 383.9 396.8 409.8
F11
369.7 382.7 395.6 408.6 421.5
G11
366.8 379.4 392.1 404.7 417.4
H11
365.9 378.4 390.8 403.3 415.7
I11







Assumption:  K11 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  K11 Assumption:  L12 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  L12
 Uniform distribution with parameters: Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 352.9 (=K96) Minimum 88.5 (=L105)
Maximum 399.5 (=Y96) Maximum 98.5 (=Z105)
Mean value in simulation was 376.0 Mean value in simulation was 93.6
Assumption:  L11 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  L11 Assumption:  D13 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  D13
 Uniform distribution with parameters: Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 88.5 (=L96) Minimum 193.5 (=D115)
Maximum 98.5 (=Z96) Maximum 204.8 (=R115)
Mean value in simulation was 93.6 Mean value in simulation was 199.1
Assumption:  D12 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  D12 Assumption:  E13 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  E13
 Uniform distribution with parameters: Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 177.2 (=D105) Minimum 258.5 (=E115)
Maximum 188.4 (=R105) Maximum 277.9 (=S115)
Mean value in simulation was 182.9 Mean value in simulation was 268.2
Assumption:  E12 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  E12 Assumption:  F13 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  F13
 Uniform distribution with parameters: Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 225.7 (=E105) Minimum 322.9 (=F115)
Maximum 245.2 (=S105) Maximum 349.6 (=T115)
Mean value in simulation was 235.6 Mean value in simulation was 336.1
Assumption:  F12 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  F12 Assumption:  G13 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  G13
 Uniform distribution with parameters: Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 281.9 (=F105) Minimum 336.7 (=G115)
Maximum 308.6 (=T105) Maximum 365.0 (=U115)
Mean value in simulation was 295.3 Mean value in simulation was 350.7
Assumption:  G12 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  G12 Assumption:  H13 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  H13
 Uniform distribution with parameters: Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 295.8 (=G105) Minimum 335.2 (=H115)
Maximum 324.1 (=U105) Maximum 363.4 (=V115)
Mean value in simulation was 309.9 Mean value in simulation was 349.3
Assumption:  H12 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  H12 Assumption:  I13 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  I13
 Uniform distribution with parameters: Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 294.3 (=H105) Minimum 335.4 (=I115)
Maximum 322.5 (=V105) Maximum 363.6 (=W115)
Mean value in simulation was 308.3 Mean value in simulation was 349.4
Assumption:  I12 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  I12 Assumption:  J13 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  J13
 Uniform distribution with parameters: Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 294.5 (=I105) Minimum 336.5 (=J115)
Maximum 322.6 (=W105) Maximum 364.8 (=X115)
Mean value in simulation was 308.5 Mean value in simulation was 350.8
Assumption:  J12 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  J12 Assumption:  K13 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  K13
 Uniform distribution with parameters: Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 295.6 (=J105) Minimum 325.7 (=K115)
Maximum 323.9 (=X105) Maximum 353.0 (=Y115)
Mean value in simulation was 309.7 Mean value in simulation was 339.6
Assumption:  K12 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  K12 Assumption:  L13 Rollup APN COST - Cell:  L13
 Uniform distribution with parameters: Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 287.5 (=K105) Minimum 88.5 (=L115)
Maximum 314.8 (=Y105) Maximum 98.5 (=Z115)
Mean value in simulation was 301.1 Mean value in simulation was 93.5
352.9 364.5 376.2 387.8 399.5
K11
88.5 91.0 93.5 96.0 98.5
L11
177.2 180.0 182.8 185.6 188.4
D12
225.7 230.6 235.5 240.3 245.2
E12
281.9 288.6 295.3 302.0 308.6
F12
295.8 302.9 310.0 317.0 324.1
G12
294.3 301.4 308.4 315.4 322.5
H12
294.5 301.5 308.6 315.6 322.6
I12
295.6 302.7 309.7 316.8 323.9
J12
287.5 294.3 301.1 308.0 314.8
K12
88.5 91.0 93.5 96.0 98.5
L12
193.5 196.4 199.2 202.0 204.8
D13
258.5 263.3 268.2 273.1 277.9
E13
322.9 329.5 336.2 342.9 349.6
F13
336.7 343.8 350.9 358.0 365.0
G13
335.2 342.3 349.3 356.4 363.4
H13
335.4 342.4 349.5 356.5 363.6
I13
336.5 343.6 350.7 357.7 364.8
J13
325.7 332.5 339.3 346.2 353.0
K13
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AHXD/CH-53E
October 1999 to September 2000
Flight Hours: 20766          Aircraft Reporting: 81%          Sorted by: Support$
Service: Marine          Command: Atlantic Pacific Reserves Training Marine          WUC Range: All
Row Format: Actual Values
WUC Nomenclature Support$ AFM$ AVDLR$ DMMH$
15 ROTARY WINGS 30864315 1705060 23224463 5934792
26 VTOL/STOL TRANSMISSIONS/DRIVES 17926591 1448875 13485819 2991897
3 MAINTENANCE INSPECTIONS 15855044 44450 0 15810594
22 TURBOSHAFT ENGINES 10787812 1559626 6801993 2426193
11 AIRFRAME 10045964 2809088 312148 6924728
29 POWER PLANT INSTALLATION 9503904 1660201 2093104 5750599
42 ELEC PWR SUPPLY/DISTR/LIGHTING SYS 9056204 6034952 357651 2663601
14 DIRECTIONAL FLT CONTROL/LIFT SYSTEMS 5251822 936984 2350690 1964148
13 ALIGHTING/LAUNCHING SYSTEM 4471833 772393 1315447 2383993
46 FUEL SYSTEM 4306023 525096 1809960 1970967
12 FURNISHINGS/COMPARTMENTS 3531831 1918263 947293 666275
45 HYDRAULIC SYSTEMS 3207817 790117 907326 1510374
4 CORROSION PREVENTION 2896956 1828 0 2895128
49 MISC EMERGENCY/UTILITY SYSTEMS 2728859 1207879 861556 659424
24 AUXILIARY POWER PLANT (AIRBORNE) 2573267 529526 1557638 486103
57 INTEGRATED GUIDANCE/FLT CONT SYSTEMS 1599891 253196 442371 904324
56 FLIGHT REFERENCE SYSTEMS 1419039 17071 1080601 321367
71 RADIO NAVIGATION SYSTEMS 1023271 159501 385259 478511
91 EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT 927181 826698 0 100483
64 INTERPHONE SYSTEMS 907855 305554 982 601319
51 INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEMS 670503 81586 242948 345969
76 COUNTERMEASURES SYSTEMS 606231 100396 80095 425740
72 RADAR NAVIGATION SYSTEMS 562018 165730 71756 324532
41 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL/PNEU SYSTEMS 522507 189012 73840 259655
62 VHF COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS 430196 16510 114849 298837
97 EXPLOSIVE DEVICES 329021 4878 0 324143
44 LIGHTING SYSTEMS 327204 312991 191 14022
48 ICE/RAIN REMOVAL/PROTECTION SYSTEMS 297598 178478 11980 107140
65 IFF SYSTEMS 296836 29320 34507 233009
61 HF COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS 156844 28328 13775 114741
75 WEAPON DELIVERY 99028 71322 0 27706
73 BOMBING NAVIGATION SYSTEMS 51833 1602 36784 13447
63 UHF COMMUNICATIONS 42997 15645 0 27352
67 COM/NAV/IFF INTEGRATED PACKAGE SYSTE 30890 227 4570 26093
16 [WUC NOMENCLATURE NOT FOUND] 30709 28063 632 2014
5 GENERAL AERONAUTICAL FUNCTIONS 14218 2 0 14216
96 PERSONNEL EQUIPMENT 7646 735 0 6911
66 EMERGENCY RADIO SYSTEMS 7479 3321 0 4158
69 MISCELLANEOUS COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS 7463 237 0 7226
78 [WUC NOMENCLATURE NOT FOUND] 5831 5831 0 0
10 [WUC NOMENCLATURE NOT FOUND] 3676 80 0 3596
74 WEAPONS CONTROL SYSTEMS 3430 0 3430 0
93 DECELERATION/DRAG CHUTE SYSTEMS 2543 375 0 2168
32 HYDRAULIC PROPELLERS 2132 0 0 2132
77 PHOTOGRAPHIC/RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS 2118 0 0 2118
9 NONAERONAUTICAL WORK 2029 558 0 1471
19 [WUC NOMENCLATURE NOT FOUND] 711 0 0 711
23 TURBOJET ENGINES 594 594 0 0
27 TURBOFAN ENGINES 447 447 0 0
52 AUTOPILOT SYSTEMS 426 0 0 426
36 [WUC NOMENCLATURE NOT FOUND] 299 299 0 0
89 [WUC NOMENCLATURE NOT FOUND] 287 3 0 284
59 TARGET SCORING AND AUGMENTATION SYSTE 284 0 0 284
39 [WUC NOMENCLATURE NOT FOUND] 256 0 0 256
58 IN-FLIGHT TEST EQUIPMENT SYSTEMS 253 182 0 71
31 [WUC NOMENCLATURE NOT FOUND] 213 0 0 213
87 [WUC NOMENCLATURE NOT FOUND] 213 0 0 213
54 TELEMETRY SYSTEMS 100 0 0 100
25 [WUC NOMENCLATURE NOT FOUND] 93 1 0 92
53 DRONE GUIDANCE SYSTEMS 71 0 0 71
28 [WUC NOMENCLATURE NOT FOUND] 50 0 0 50
47 OXYGEN SYSTEMS 50 0 0 50
17 ESCAPE SYSTEMS 43 43 0 0
81 AIRBORNE GUIDED WEAPONS 36 0 0 36
8 INSPECTION OF SAFETY/SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT 0 0 0 0
20 [WUC NOMENCLATURE NOT FOUND] 0 0 0 0
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APPENDIX E. OPERATION EFFECTIVENESS SURVEY 
 
CH-53E MODERNIZATION SURVEY 
 
 This survey will be used as a tool to evaluate the performance of proposed 
modernization configurations for the CH-53E helicopter.  The questions posed are not 
meant to be all encompassing and are only part of the cost effectiveness analysis being 
conducted.   
 For the purposes of this study only six modernization elements are being 
considered.  Those elements combine to create ten feasible, while not necessarily 
desirable, configurations.  Each of the ten configurations is then evaluated or scored 
against how well the evaluator believes that configuration would be able to perform a 
given Mission Essential Task List (METL) for the CH-53E.  Evaluators should consider 
in their evaluation how well a particular modernization configuration would perform a 
METL in the 2010-2025 timeframe, as this is when a modernized CH-53E would be in 
service.  Lastly, evaluators will be asked to provide an ordered percentage weighting of 
the METLs such that they total to equal 100%. 
 It is important that evaluators have a clear understanding of the 
information the survey seeks.  Specifically, my cost effectiveness analysis assumes a 
couple of key facts: 1) That the CH-53E must remain in service until approximately 2025 
in order to satisfy the Marine Corps’ heavy lift requirement.  2) Because of (1), a SLEP is 
mandatory and therefore the only remaining question is what other 
upgrades/modernization is required in order to ensure that the CH-53E remains a viable 
and capable platform until a replacement system can be fielded.  This is one of the 
questions my thesis seeks to answer.  While the adjectival descriptors used in the 
evaluation are somewhat vague, this is done intentionally in order to allow evaluators the 
latitude to interpret how the modernization configurations might improve performance.  
Additionally, I felt that because the details of some of the modernization elements are yet 
to be fully defined (i.e. the improved hook system and the cockpit), it would be difficult 
to strictly quantify performance improvements.     
The evaluation being performed should focus on how each of the modernization 
configurations improves the aircraft’s performance in a given METL profile.  Improved 
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performance here is defined broadly as: Anything that makes the aircraft more 
effective and/or efficient in performing its given mission on the battlefield.  
Evaluators should take this to include such items as safety and human systems integration 
improvements that reduce pilot/crew workload and enhance mission situational 
awareness.  Additionally, while the cost benefits of maintenance improvements will be 
captured in the “cost” side of the analysis, evaluators should take into account the 
increased effectiveness of the CH-53E arising from higher mission capable rates due to 
modernization enhancements.  A separate payload and range measure will also be 
incorporated independent of these evaluations as another measure of performance.  Other 
elements of analysis such as reduced O&S costs will be captured in other portions of the 
study.  It is understood that these evaluations are subjective and qualitative vice 
quantitative, this is done intentionally in order to capture an “expert opinion” on how the 
given modernization configurations will affect mission performance. 
 Below, are a listing and description of the modernization elements, 
possible configurations, the METLs each to be ranked and the possible adjectival 
“scores” with “definitions” in ranked order. 
 
Modernization Elements: 
1. Service Life Extension (S): Consists of structural reinforcement and replacement 
of fatigued areas.  Required in order to provide capability until 2025. 
2. New Engines (E): Consists of replacing existing engines with more powerful 
engines currently being used on the KC-130J and MV-22 thus providing 
operating improvements and maintenance (O&M) cost savings. 
3. Improved Main Rotor Blade (B): All composite material design that provides 
additional lift and performance capability due to delayed onset of blade stall. 
4. Elastomeric Rotor Head (R): Replaces current “wet head” design with elastomeric 
bearings resulting in simpler and less frequent maintenance. 
5. Improved External Cargo Hook System (H):  Replaces current system and takes 
advantage of the increased capabilities created by new blades and engines. 
6. Common Cockpit (C):  Unsure as to exact nature but will include improved 
communication and navigation suite that is interoperable with current C4I systems 







Modernization Configuration Options 
(Combinations use abbreviations 
indicated above) 
1 S (SLEP ONLY) 










Mission Essential Task List: 
Abbr. METL Description 
Assault Provide assault transport of combat troops, equipment, and supplies. 
Raids Provide assault support for conduct of amphibious raids. 
TRAP Conduct tactical retrieval and recovery operations for downed aircraft, equipment and personnel. 
MEDEVAC Provide support for MEDEVAC operations. 
SPECOps Conduct assault support for maritime special operations. 
NEO Conduct assault support for evacuation operations. 
ShipOps Maintain capability to operate from amphibious shipping, floating bases, and forward operating bases. 
Night/IMC Operate at night, in adverse weather, and under instrument flight conditions at extended ranges. 
 
Adjectival Evaluation Scores: 
A. Significantly enhances current capability 
     Performance improvement is likely to meet projected requirements until 2025. 
B. Enhances current capability 
Performance will be improved but will likely require further 
improvements/technology refreshment before system retirement. 
C. Doesn’t alter current capability 
     Self-explanatory. 
D. Provides for Limited capability 
System will still meet some requirements but will be unable to meet the full 
range of projected requirements until 2025.   
133
E. Lack of capability is a performance liability 
Performance shortfall will likely result in the inability of the Marine Corps to 
successfully prosecute the sort of missions anticipated until 2025. 
 
 
Performance Assessment         
 Assault Raid TRAP MEDEVAC SPEC Ops NEO Ship Ops Night/IMC  
S (SLEP ONLY)          
S,E,B,R,H & C (ALL SIX)          
S,E,H          
S,E,B,H          
S,E,B,R,H          
S,B          
S,B,R          
S,B,R,C          
S,R          
S,R,C          
          
Weights          
  
Please use the letters below to enter your score. 
 A. Significantly enhances current capability 
 B. Enhances current capability 
 C. Doesn’t alter current capability 
 D. Provides for Limited capability 
 E. Lack of capability is a performance liability 
 
Total of weights across METLs must sum to equal 100.  Tenths of a point can be used if 
the evaluator believes it to be necessary. 
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